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 Following the end of World War II, members of international society acknowledged 
its obligation to address international crimes of mass barbarity. Determined to prevent the 
recurrence of such atrocities, members took action to create a system of international 
individual criminal legal accountability.  Beginning with the Nuremberg and Tokyo War 
Crimes trials in 19451 and continuing with the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 19932 and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) in 19943, the international community commenced its ad hoc prosecution 
of individuals for the commission of international crimes. 
In 1998 the international community went further and took the groundbreaking step 
of establishing a standing international arbiter of justice: the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). Through the Court’s establishing treaty, the Rome Statute, the international 
community created the first permanent international criminal judicial organ charged with the 
prosecution of individuals accused of the most serious international crimes, specifically 
crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.4 The ICC’s 
temporal jurisdiction, however, is limited to those crimes committed from July 1, 2002 
forward.5 This Statute and the signing thereof signified a pioneering event. For the first time 
in history, states, as signatories to the Rome Statute, voluntarily agreed to submit to the 
jurisdiction of an international court for the prosecution of individuals charged with the 
                                                                        
1“The International Criminal Court: Origins, Jurisdiction and the ‘African Bias,’” South African History Online, 
(October 24, 2016), http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/international-criminal-court-origins-jurisdiction-and-
african-bias. 
2 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 827, “International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY),” May 25, 1993, http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_827_1993_en.pdf. 
3 United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 955, “Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) and adoption of the Statute of the Tribunal,” November 8, 1994, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/140/97/PDF/N9514097.pdf?OpenElement. 
4 International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (The Hague: International 
Criminal Court, 2011), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html. [This corresponds to the version of the 
Statute updated through November 2010.] 
5  Ibid. 
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perpetration of international crimes.6 In 2002, the Court commenced its investigations into 
such crimes. 
The road for the ICC thus far, however, has been fraught with criticism. Ironically, 
the most vociferous Court naysayers come from its largest regional membership bloc and 
some of its most ardent initial supporters: Africa. With all but one of its ten investigations 
involving Africa and African nationals,7 the Court has faced significant backlash from 
African states asserting that the Court has an African bias. In just the past few months, 
Burundi, South Africa, and The Gambia have attempted withdrawal from the Court, issuing 
harsh criticisms against a Court that they see as selectively targeting Africa, pursuing a neo-
colonial agenda, hindering peace processes, and disrespecting heads of state. While both 
South Africa and The Gambia have recently rescinded their motions to withdraw from the 
Court, Burundi remains in the process of severing its ties with the ICC. In the meantime, the 
AU at-large has signed a non-binding agreement in recent months to withdraw en masse from 
the Court, though such a process remains unclear and likely to take a long time. In light of 
these recent withdrawal attempts from the Court, the ICC’s strained and scarred relationship 
with Africa has emerged as a topic of great and pivotal global interest. An inquiry into this 
African backlash is thus both topical and informed by rich discussion within the international 
community.  
In examining the ICC and African responses to the Court, I aim to tackle five related 
and central questions. First, what are the central concerns underlying contemporary African 
critiques of the Court? Second, how may those critiques be linked to historical state and 
African concerns previously expressed in regards to international tribunals, such as the ICTY 
and ICTR, as well as during the Rome Statute negotiations? Third, how do the concerns of 
African leaders compare to the perceptions of local Africans, victims, and civil society actors 
regarding the Court? Fourth, how do local, victim, and civil society concerns relate to 
historical concerns and critiques of international tribunals? Fifth, what changes to the Court 
                                                                        
6 “The International Criminal Court: Origins, Jurisdiction and the ‘African Bias,’” South African History 
Online. 
7 “Situations under investigation,” International Criminal Court, accessed September 20, 2016, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx. 
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might make it a more effective international adjudicative institution for Africans and, 
consequently, for those that may be subject to it in the future?  
Examining and answering these five main questions involves an investigation into the 
history that predated the ICC and current African concerns. It is reasonable to begin this 
historical analysis with an examination of the concerns that surrounded the ICTY and ICTR, 
especially given that ICC negotiations and investigations significantly overlapped with these 
tribunals. Additionally, this historical inquiry includes an analysis of the nine years of 
negotiations that led to the Rome Statute. The timeline then extends through the Court’s 
actions in practice and into present day discussion about the Court and African perceptions of 
it. 
In Chapter 1, I will delve into the history pre-dating the Court, examining the various 
state and African concerns expressed regarding the ICTY and ICTR, as well as during the 
Rome negotiations. Such an analysis will rely upon sources such as news media, UN 
documents, International Law Commission documents, African government documents, 
fieldwork, and various other academic scholarship. The analyses in this chapter will work to 
form a basis for initial state and African concerns about international adjudicative institutions 
and international justice. These concerns will serve as crucial warning signs for the Court as 
the story of the current ICC-Africa relationship unfolds in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 will then focus on current African concerns with the ICC and will examine 
both the general critiques made by the African Union and various African leaders and 
specific reactions in individual cases. The case of Darfur, for example, reflects the broad 
critique of the African Union and its leaders, as it involves concern over the Court’s selective 
bias, imperialist tendencies, effect on peace, and interference with a sitting head of state.8 
The Darfur case, as well, presents an example of a United Nations Security Council referral, 
which will demonstrate state concerns with this political body. Kenya similarly entails the 
prosecution of a sitting head of state and neo-colonial criticisms of the Court, though it was 
                                                                        
8 Roland J.V. Cole, “Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court: More Political than Legal,” 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 14, no. 2 (2014): 4, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=5BNN-HY50-01GK-
Y19H&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true. 
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initiated by the Chief Prosecutor. Uganda, a state self-referral, exemplifies concerns over the 
Court’s effect on peace and the politics involved in the selective prosecution of perpetrators. 
In examining these cases and the concerns of African leaders and the AU, I will rely on the 
substantial body of scholarship that has analyzed the African bias question and these 
particular cases. 
Chapter 3 will examine local African perspectives to see if and how African citizens’ 
perceptions of the Court differ from those of their leaders. I aim to investigate how local 
Africans, both victims and non-victims, as well as African civil society actors, perceive the 
Court. Using these contemporary concerns, I will investigate how these critiques relate to 
those raised against the ICTY and ICTR.  
In Chapter 4, I will discuss changes that could be made to the Court to improve its 
efficacy and legitimacy in the eyes of Africans and generally improve its international 
stature. These recommendations will build upon those that have been made by scholars and 
NGOs to improve the Court in its ability to deliver justice to people. While systemic-level 
changes may be more difficult to accomplish in regards to the ICC, many more state and 
individual-level solutions will emerge as promising strategies for achieving a Court that truly 
serves the people most affected by the heinous international crimes within its jurisdiction. 
The ICC presents scholars with the fascinating interconnection between politics and 
international law. And though scholars have examined the ICC and its efficacy as an 
international adjudicative institution from the lenses of realism, liberal institutionalism, and 
constructivism, Waltz’ well-known levels of analysis9 in international relations offers a more 
fitting framework for understanding the challenges and solutions involved in the ICC-Africa 
relationship. Though Waltz’ analysis specifically locates the central causes of war, his 
theoretical framework provides a basis for studying other phenomena within international 
relations. This framework considers situations, including their causes and effects, at three 
levels: (1) the individual level, which focuses on the key roles played by specific people; (2) 
the state level, which focuses on the nature and characteristics of individual states; and (3) 
the societal level, which emphasizes the impact of the larger state system on international 
                                                                        
9 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, Revised edition (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001), 12. 
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behavior.10 And while these levels certainly interconnect, it is analytically useful to locate 
phenomena on each level when considering their roots, consequences, and potential 
remedies.  
In this story of the ICC and Africa, we will see challenges rooted in all three levels — 
individual, state, and society — yet feasible solutions largely grounded on the state and 
individual levels. While societal-level initiatives cannot be ignored, international constraints 
prevent them from offering realistic avenues for Court reform. Fortunately, state-level and 
especially individual-level prescriptions provide viable pathways for the Court to better 
deliver justice.  
In this project, I aim to examine the African backlash in a way that both contributes, 
yet challenges and adds nuance to, scholars’ theoretical conceptions of the Court, reactions to 
it, and its potential for efficacy as an international adjudicative institution. Such an endeavor 
will enhance our understanding of institutions like the ICC. In light of Africa’s mounting 
opposition to the Court and the recent African withdrawal attempts from its membership, 
such an understanding could not come at a better time.
                                                                        
10 Ibid. 




Chapter 1: A History of Warning Signs 
 
In the wake of the horrors of World War 2, members of international society 
acknowledged the pressing need to address crimes of mass barbarity on an international 
level.11 In 1945, the world’s major Allied powers, consisting of the United States, France, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, signed the London Agreement. This agreement 
established an international military tribunal for the purpose of trying the major war 
criminals of the Axis powers.12  
The London Agreement brought about the establishment of the International Military 
Tribunal, which would hold what became known as “The Nüremberg Trials.” Additionally, 
the Agreement included within it the Nüremberg Charter, which constructed three 
international crime categories: (1) crimes against the peace, which constituted war initiation; 
(2) war crimes, which included deportation, ill treatment, and murder; and (3) crimes against 
humanity, which encompassed the persecution of civilians for their race, ethnicity, religious, 
or political beliefs.13 Following the Nüremberg Charter, the Allied powers enacted the Tokyo 
Charter, which established the International Military Tribunal for the Far East to try accused 
Japanese war criminals.14  
Though an important first step in establishing international criminal legal 
accountability for crimes of mass barbarity, the Nüremberg Trials were not without their 
critics. In 1946, following the conclusion of Nüremberg, U.S. Senator Robert Taft expressed 
doubt regarding the trials’ legitimacy and objectivity, remarking, “About this whole 
judgement there is the spirit of vengeance and vengeance is seldom justice.”15 Dating back to 
                                                                        
11 “The International Criminal Court: Origins, Jurisdiction and the ‘African Bias,’” South African History 
Online. 
12 "London Agreement of August 8th 1945,” in Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol. 1, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtchart.asp. 
13 "Charter of the International Military Tribunal,” in Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol. 1, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp. 
14 “The International Criminal Court: Origins, Jurisdiction and the ‘African Bias,’” South African History 
Online. 
15 John F. Kennedy, Caroline Kennedy, and Robert F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage (New York: 
HarperPerennial Modern Classics, 2006), 199. 
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seventy years ago, concerns about the partiality and selectivity of international criminal 
justice, and particularly the concept of “victor’s justice,”16 were already on states’ radars.  
 In 1949, the United Nations revised and enacted four Geneva Conventions that 
founded legal protocols for wartime treatment of civilians, combatants and prisoners of 
war.17 During this time, the International Law Commission, followed by the General 
Assembly’s Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, began examining the question 
of establishing an international criminal court. However, with the onset of the Cold War 
states were unable to agree on the question of an international adjudicative body, causing the 
discussions and drafts regarding such a court to forestall.18 From the late 1940s through the 
end of the Cold War, atrocities in Cambodia, East Timor,19 and Uganda were largely 
overlooked by the international community, which failed to take legal action against these 
crimes.20 
 Following the end of the Cold War and nearly fifty years after Nüremberg and the 
Tokyo Tribunal, the international community revisited the question of international justice in 
the face of further horrific crimes. In response to the perpetration of atrocities in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, the UN Security Council took action to establish legal 
criminal accountability. However, just as there were concerns with the Nüremberg Trials, so 
                                                                        
16 “Victor’s justice” is a popular international relations term which refers to the selective prosecution of the 
“losers” of a particular conflict. Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations defines it as, “When 
victors in war convict and punish leaders or soldiers of the defeated side, which may or may not mean that real 
justice is done.” See Cathal J. Nolan, “Victor’s Justice,” in Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, 
(Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2002), 
https://login.ezproxy.bowdoin.edu/login?url=http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/abcintrel/victor_s_j
ustice/0. 
17 “The International Criminal Court: Origins, Jurisdiction and the ‘African Bias,’” South African History 
Online. 
18 William Schabas, ed., International Criminal Law, Cambridge Companions to Law (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 140. 
19 Paul R. Bartrop, Genocide: The Basics, 1 Edition (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 70; 
74. 
20 “Idi Amin,” in New World Encyclopedia, (New World Encyclopedia, 2013), 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Idi_Amin; Ramesh Thakur and Peter Malcontent, eds., From 
Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 2004), 34. 
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too would there be critiques of the justice rendered by these tribunals. Such concerns shed 
light on later criticisms of the ICC.  
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)  
What Happened? 
 Alongside Eastern Europe’s communist collapse and revival of nationalism in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, Yugoslavia went through fierce economic and political upheaval. 
Political leaders of different ethnicities employed pro-nationalist language to incite terror and 
distrust among them and to undermine any sense of a united Yugoslav identity. Yugoslavia 
began to collapse as Yugoslav republics declared independence, resulting in fighting and an 
eventual horrific three-sided battle for territory between Serbs, Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), 
and Croats.21 
 During this period of conflict, perpetrators committed a vast array of egregious 
human rights violations, including summary executions, rape, torture, capricious large-scale 
internment, hostage-taking, deportation, displacement, abuse of prisoners, and the arbitrary 
destruction of cities and private property.22 All sides of the conflict, including Serbs, Croats, 
and Bosniaks, committed heinous crimes against one another. In total, an estimated 100,000 
plus people died and two million citizens were displaced.23 
 In light of reports of these atrocities, the UN Security Council began to monitor 
humanitarian violations in the region. In 1993, the UNSC passed Resolution 808, which 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, providing the 
Tribunal with the jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes and other egregious offences claimed 
to have been committed in the former Yugoslavia during the conflict.24 In Resolution 827’s 
preamble, the drafters of the Tribunal established its explicit goal as the restoration of 
                                                                        
21 United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “The Conflicts,” accessed October 
17, 2016, http://www.icty.org/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia/conflicts. 
22 Theodor Meron, “Answering for War Crimes: Lessons from the Balkans,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (1997): 
2, doi:10.2307/20047904. 
23 United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “The Conflicts.” 
24 Christopher Greenwood, “The International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia,” International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 69, no. 4 (1993): 642, doi:10.2307/2620590. 
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international security and peace in the region.25 Among its other objectives were to combat 
impunity with impartial prosecutions, provide victims with justice, and assist domestic 
judicial and legal systems with capacity building.26  
Since its establishment the Tribunal has indicted 161 individuals, convicted 32 of 
them, and established rape as a crime against humanity.27 In these respects, the ICTY has 
achieved success and has made an important contribution to international justice. Despite 
these achievements, however, the Tribunal has also faced several severe challenges that have 
hindered its ability to deliver upon many of its lofty, and perhaps unrealistic, objectives. 
Challenges 
 One of the large challenges that faced the ICTY was the initial difficulty of promoting 
cooperation among states whose individuals were subject to its jurisdiction, as well as 
between states and the Tribunal itself. As Theodor Meron argues, this challenge “plagued” 
the Tribunal from the very beginning, as the institution struggled to achieve cooperation from 
Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian leaders.28 Without a police power, the ICTY had to rely upon 
pressure from the UNSC and the international community to persuade recalcitrant states to 
deliver defendants to the Tribunal and cooperate with its investigations.29  
 The Tribunal not only struggled to garner cooperation, however, but it also failed in 
its outreach to the victims that it was actually meant to serve. Located in the Netherlands and 
operating while conflict was still raging in the Balkans, the Tribunal’s activities have been 
overwhelmingly distant from the local communities within the region. Tribunal offices and 
activities have been heavily concentrated in The Hague, while the Court has held a miniscule 
presence within the Balkans. Though continuing violence during the Tribunal’s first few 
years likely supported the decision to locate the ICTY away from the region, the Tribunal’s 
                                                                        
25 Ibid., 643. 
26 Richard H Steinberg, Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2011), 25, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004215641. 
27 “Landmark Cases,” United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, accessed 
December 3, 2016, http://www.icty.org/en/in-focus/crimes-sexual-violence/landmark-cases. 
28 Meron, “Answering for War Crimes: Lessons from the Balkans,” 3. 
29 Ibid. 
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failure to involve citizens and domestic actors in the process has been a great oversight. 
According to Adam Smith, Balkans citizens were “an afterthought,” considering its dismal 
outreach and public relations programs, as well as the fact that, as of 2009, no Balkans 
citizen was employed by the ICTY.30 
 The ICTY’s difficulty connecting to local communities has been further exhibited by 
local Bosnian and Serbian perceptions of the Tribunal. In a 2009 survey of 1,400 Serbs of 
sixteen years-old or older, 50% of respondents either knew “Nothing” or “A little” about the 
ICTY.31 Additionally, of those respondents with no or scant knowledge of the Tribunal, 72% 
held a “Mostly negative” or “Extremely negative” view of the Tribunal, citing feelings of the 
Tribunal’s partiality and bias against Serbs as their major complaints.32 Criticisms of the 
Tribunal’s political biases have been bolstered and fueled by the fact that, for a while at the 
beginning, only Serbs were indicted and prosecuted.33 
 Bosnians, though more favorable of the Tribunal, have similarly criticized the ICTY 
for its inability to deliver justice promptly and clearly. In a 2010 study of local Bosnian 
perceptions of the ICTY, Diane Orentlicher revealed these frustrations with the Tribunal’s 
work. According to this study, Bosnians believed that the Tribunal was delivering imperfect 
justice, citing frustrations with the lightness of sentences, the lengthy and complicated 
process, the politicization of the courtroom, and the ability of high-level perpetrators to delay 
justice as their central grievances with the ICTY.34  
 In addition to the ICTY’s disconnectedness from local communities, the Tribunal 
struggled to incorporate state institutions into the justice process. The fact that little attention 
                                                                        
30 Adam M. Smith, After Genocide: Bringing the Devil to Justice (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2009), 
82. 
31 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to Serbia, “Public Perception in Serbia of the 
ICTY and the National Courts Dealing with War Crimes” (Serbia: OSCE Mission to Serbia, 2009), 12, 
http://wcjp.unicri.it/proceedings/docs/OSCESrb_ICTY_Perception_in_Serbia.pdf. 
32 Ibid., 14; 16. 
33 Meron, “Answering for War Crimes: Lessons from the Balkans,” 6. 
34 Diane Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia (New York: Open 
Society Justice Initiative: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2010), 14–16, 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publications/that-
someone-guilty-20100707/that-someone-guilty-20100708.pdf. 
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was paid to the role of locals in the quest for justice highlights the “pervasive emasculation of 
almost all government and civil society functions” that occurred within the region during the 
ICTY’s operation.35 This absence of local involvement signaled the region’s lack of 
ownership over the justice process within the region. According to Smith, the ICTY was 
viewed “as yet another slight to the country’s attempts to attain some domestic stake in the 
operation of the state. It is little wonder that the Court’s reception has been so cool.”36 
 One last and major criticism of the Tribunal is perhaps the most glaring, given the 
ICTY’s stated purpose of restoring security and peace in the former Yugoslavia. Rather than 
fulfilling this goal, the Tribunal has been marked by an inability to contribute to peace.37 The 
Tribunal itself “had no major impact, positive or negative, on national reconciliation” as of 
1997, four years into its operation.38 Far from contributing to peace and security, the region 
has experienced “a mainstreaming of radicalism” and “an entrenching of the very ethnic 
animosities that led to the brutal wars of the 1990s.”39 The massacre at Srebrenica, the height 
of the war’s despicable crimes, occurred in 1995, after the ICTY had been operational for 
two years and had indicted two major leaders in the conflict.40 This, along with other 
examples, reveal the Tribunal’s clear inability to instill security and peace. Yet, considering 
the complexities of the situation in the former Yugoslavia and the fighting that continued 
during the Tribunal’s proceedings, it would have been very difficult for the ICTY to achieve 
its explicit goal of fostering peace and reconciliation in the region.  
 
 
                                                                        
35 Smith, After Genocide, 82. 
36 Ibid., 92. 
37 James Gow, Milena Michalski, and Rachel Kerr, “Space Capsule Justice: The ICTY and Bosnia — Image, 
Distance and Disconnection,” The Slavonic and East European Review 91, no. 4 (2013): 823–24, 
doi:10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.91.4.0818. 
38 Meron, “Answering for War Crimes: Lessons from the Balkans,” 6. 
39 Smith, After Genocide, 63. 
40 United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “The Conflicts.” 
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The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
What Happened? 
 While officials at the ICTY were beginning to investigate and prosecute crimes in the 
former Yugoslavia, perpetrators in Rwanda were committing similarly horrific crimes that 
would lead to the formation of the ICTR. Dating back to the late 1950s under Belgian 
colonial rule, ethnic conflict between the Hutus, Rwanda’s majority ethnic group, and the 
Tutsis, its main minority ethnic group, embroiled Rwanda. Fighting intensified between the 
two groups in 1990, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), largely composed of Tutsi 
refugees who had been violently expelled from Rwanda by Hutus, began attacking Rwanda. 
Though a peace agreement between the government and the RPF was reached in the 1993 
Arusha Accords, it would not last.41  
Following the April 6, 1994 shooting down of the plane of the Burundian president 
and Rwandan president, a Hutu, Hutu extremists engaged in a massive genocidal campaign. 
In the span of one hundred days, Hutu extremists massacred an estimated one million Tutsis 
and moderate Hutus. The RPF in turn committed atrocities against Hutus as it captured 
military control of Rwanda.42 
In response to these atrocities, the UNSC called upon the Secretary General to create 
a Commission of Experts for investigating and reporting on the Hutu crimes. Finding clear 
and substantial evidence of genocide, in October of 1994 the Commission advocated for the 
establishment of a tribunal. The Rwandan government, now controlled by the RPF Tutsis, 
supported such a tribunal and proclaimed its complete cooperation with the process. Under 
Resolution 955 the UNSC authorized the creation of the ICTR under the UN Charter’s 
Chapter VII authority. The new tribunal would have jurisdiction over crimes against 
                                                                        
41 “Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country,” Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United 
Nations, accessed October 18, 2016, 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml. 
42 Ibid. 
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humanity, genocide, and crimes committed in violation of Article III to the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II between January 1 and December 31 of 1994.43 
As with the ICTY, the Security Council boldly and perhaps unrealistically aimed to 
stop such horrific crimes, deliver justice to the perpetrators, and foster national 
reconciliation, restoration, and lasting peace.44 Since 1995, the ICTR has indicted 93 
individuals, convicted 62 of them, and become the first international tribunal to rule on 
genocide, define genocide, and establish rape as a genocidal act.45 Yet again, despite these 
marked accomplishments, the Tribunal has been plagued by challenges and critiques which 
have hampered its ability to achieve its ambitious goals.   
Challenges 
 Though the Rwandan government was initially receptive to the establishment of the 
ICTR, Rwandan officials began opposing the tribunal once they realized the scope of 
international involvement in the process and how disconnected its form of justice would be 
from that of Rwandans.46 The Rwandan government also objected to the Tribunal’s temporal 
limitation, preferring that the jurisdictional time period extend further back to crimes prior to 
the Arusha Accords and less far forward, so that retribution crimes by Tutsis against Hutus 
would not fall within the ICTR’s scope.47 Additionally, the government wanted punishments 
to include the death penalty and for genocide to be the only crime covered within the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction, so as to again protect retribution crimes committed by Tutsis.48 The 
government also opposed the ICTR’s location in Arusha, Tanzania, arguing that the 
                                                                        
43 Lilian A. Barria and Steven D. Roper, “How Effective Are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of 
the ICTY and the ICTR,” The International Journal of Human Rights 9, no. 3 (September 2005): 354-355, 
doi:10.1080/13642980500170782. 
44 Rosemary Byrne, “Promises of Peace and Reconciliation: Previewing the Legacy of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” European Review 14, no. 4 (October 2006): 489, 
doi:10.1017/S1062798706000500. 
45 “The ICTR in Brief,” United Nations Legacy Website of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
accessed December 3, 2016, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal. 
46 Smith, After Genocide, 69. 
47 Barria and Roper, “How Effective Are International Criminal Tribunals?,” 355. 
48 Ibid. 
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Tribunal’s deterrent ability “will be lost if the trials were to be held hundreds of miles away 
from the scene of the crime.”49 
 Such concerns forecast the Rwandan government’s lack of cooperation with the 
Tribunal. In fact, the government under President Paul Kagame actively opposed the 
Tribunal, running a “high-saturation ad campaign” to persuade locals to condemn the ICTR 
and organizing protests against it.50 Locals carried out such protests on multiple occasions, 
including in 200251 and 2004,52 when protestors openly opposed the UN and its imposition of 
justice. 
 As with the ICTY, many of the complaints by the government and citizens alike have 
revolved around a feeling of disconnect between the Tribunal and the region it was meant to 
serve. President Kagame outwardly rebuked the ICTR’s attempt to deliver justice outside of 
Rwanda,53 arguing that Rwanda “need[ed] the people of Rwanda to see this justice for 
themselves.”54 Given the Tribunal’s great physical distance from local Rwandans, it is 
unsurprising that many have been unable to directly experience the Tribunal’s work. To 
reach the ICTR in Arusha, Rwandans would have to travel by bus across Rwanda, Uganda, 
and Kenya before reaching Tanzania.55 This cost $60, or a typical Rwandan’s month’s 
earnings.56 
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 This disconnect is similarly bolstered by local perceptions of the ICTR. According to 
Steven Ratner, “many Rwandans tend to hold an overwhelmingly negative opinion of 
international justice.”57 Dina Temple-Raston’s study reveals this feeling of negativity and 
alienation, with Hutu inmates in Rwandan jails expressing their disdain with the international 
justice system for high-level perpetrators, who they saw as living posh lives “better than our 
lives in freedom.”58 Such sentiment reveals a disconnect between local and international 
justice and perhaps a preference for local accountability and punishment. Similarly, victims 
expressed their outrage with the light sentencing of perpetrators. Two women who had been 
rape victims in particular stated their indignation that what they had suffered and would 
forever suffer from the rape was worse than the punishment their perpetrators received from 
the ICTR.59 
 Such disconnect from Rwandan society has been inherently intertwined with concerns 
that, due to Rwanda’s lack of ownership over the process, the goal of national reconciliation 
was unfeasible. During the establishment of the ICTR, Rwandan academics like James 
Bucyana worried that this Western style of justice would impede the ability of Rwandans to 
achieve reconciliation and would further entrench ethnic hostilities between Tutsis and 
Hutus.60 Rather than imposing Western justice, the international community should have 
served as an aid in the process of reconciliation, recognizing that the goal of national 
reconciliation was something to be attained by Rwandans.61 Concerns over the Tribunal’s 
ineptitude in regards to reconciliation were well-founded, as hostilities and murders have 
persisted among Tutsis and Hutus.62 By 2004, Tutsis dominated the valuable jobs in Rwanda, 
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leaving Hutus feeling disenfranchised.63 In the words of one Hutu man, “This isn’t over. 
There will be another genocide. Maybe not as bad as the killing in 1994, but there will be 
another. The majority people won’t let this stand.”64 
 The Court has also been criticized for its partiality due to its temporal jurisdiction and 
one-sided prosecution of perpetrators. Early on in the development of the ICTR, Bucyana 
expressed concern that limiting the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal would leave out 
histories and crimes that had been committed prior to January 1, 1994. In Bucyana’s words: 
Hearing only one category of crimes committed in a specified and restricted 
time period leaves other condemnable crimes unchallenged. Such justice 
favours [sic] wrongdoers of one camp at the expense of victims of the other 
camp. This sorrow will be all the more harrowing and the injustice all the 
more flagrant, because one group of victims will have to pay twice: First, 
through their loss, and secondly, through having to pay but without being 
compensated themselves.65 
 
 One-sided justice would indeed develop, as the ICTR has only tried Hutus for crimes, 
despite the RPF’s clear perpetration of atrocities before and after the genocide. Many 
Rwandans thus view the Tribunal as biased. Such biased accountability has painted the ICTR 
“as a victor’s tribunal instead of being an international impartial tribunal.”66 In calling for the 
prosecution of Tutsi perpetrators, many critics are simultaneously lambasting the Tribunal for 
its partiality while calling for another form of partiality, this time one that favors Hutus.  
 Attempts to prosecute both sides of the conflict, however, were met with great 
resistance from the Rwandan government, local organizations, and local Rwandans. In 2002, 
Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte broached the possibility of prosecuting RPF members who 
had allegedly committed war crimes, which sparked an indignant reaction from President 
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Kagame.67 Witness organizations, including Ibuka, which represented genocide survivors, 
threatened to stop working with the Tribunal.68 When Del Ponte went to Kigali to discuss the 
possibility of two-sided prosecution, she was met with three thousand protestors shouting at 
her to “Go home.”69 The Rwandan government eventually refused to work with the ICTR by 
denying potential witness visas, thus forcing the Tribunal to choose between trials of Hutus 
or no trials whatsoever.70 The government also successfully demanded Del Ponte’s 
resignation; she was replaced by Hassan Bubacar Jallow, a prosecutor with no intention of 
pursuing RPF crimes.71 
Common Challenges from the ICTY and ICTR Experiences 
 Looking at the experiences of the ICTY and ICTR, one can discern some common 
and severe challenges that both Tribunals have faced. These difficulties and critiques can be 
broken down into five themes: (1) lack of government cooperation with the Tribunal; (2) 
disconnect between the Tribunal and locals/victims; (3) lack of domestic institution 
building/ownership of the justice process; (4) inability to contribute to reconciliation/peace; 
and (5) perceived and often real one-sided justice. Unfortunately, the ICC would not learn 
from these pitfalls. 
Falling into the Trap: The ICC’s Replication of IJ’s Past Mistakes 
 Problematically, the ICC would come from and be modeled after these two tribunals, 
both of which have been undoubtedly plagued by serious issues. As Smith notes, in each of 
the international criminal justice institutions established, the victims, perpetrators, states, and 
local communities affected by the crimes have been “left behind.”72 Rather than serving the 
victims and locals affected by the heinous crimes, the ICC has offered “justice from on 
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high,”73 repeating several of the mistakes of the ICTY and ICTR and overpowering “long-
held, respected indigenous tools for forgiveness and reconciliation.”74 Smith, commenting on 
the work of Vojin Dimitrijevic, finds that the people on the ground simply do not see or feel 
international justice the way that those in The Hague do.75 Turning now toward the ICC’s 
creation, one will be able to see some similar and glaring forewarnings to the Court. 
The Creation of the ICC 
Lead Up 
 Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the subsequent re-opening of international 
cooperation,76 and the coincident human rights focus of the Western and Eastern blocs,77 the 
UN General Assembly called upon the UN International Law Commission, an expert body, 
to write a treaty that would create a permanent international criminal court.78 General 
Assembly Resolution 44/39, adopted in the 44th Session in 1989, called for the establishment 
of an international criminal court to prosecute individuals and entities guilty of transnational 
illicit drug trafficking and other transnational crimes.79 In the UN Committee on Crime 
Prevention and Control’s 11th meeting held in 1990, the committee also called for the 
consideration of an international criminal court that would try the most serious international 
crimes through the universal jurisdiction principle.80 Such international crimes typically 
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include crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, drugs and arms trafficking, and other 
violations of international law.81 For nine years, the ILC debated the establishment of a court 
to prosecute such atrocities. These debates reveal members’ underlying concerns regarding a 
permanent international arbiter of justice and illuminate current critiques of the Court.  
Throughout the early 1990s, actors from governments, legal backgrounds, academia, 
NGOs, and various other fields continued a concerted push for criminal accountability at the 
international level.82 In 1990, the ILC recognized the concerns of many of these actors and 
stated, “It has now emerged that international crime has achieved such wide dimensions that 
it can endanger the very existence of States and seriously disturb international peaceful 
relations.”83 States widely supported the creation of a permanent international criminal court, 
though they varied in their opinions about its appropriate structure and jurisdictional scope.84 
African states, both separately and as regional blocks, also overwhelmingly supported the 
Court and were some of the Court’s largest proponents during negotiations.85 
 There was also an early recognition and conception of the benefits of an international 
criminal court for the global legal community. The ILC discussed in its first report the 
advantage of an international criminal court that would promote uniform legal application 
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and the best assurance of objectivity in trying crimes.86 Such uniformity and objectivity 
would be characterized in its report a year later as necessary for viable and sustained 
international order.87 
 In this 1992 report by the Working Group on the Question of an International 
Criminal Jurisdiction, members also asserted that an international criminal court would 
provide justice in cases where they perceived national courts had largely failed to do so. The 
Commission remarked that many instances of crimes against humanity had occurred without 
punishment at the state level, either due to state bias or incapacity. Absent punishment or 
accountability for these actions, members believed that international law would lose its 
legitimacy. Moreover, they acknowledged that situations can become further complicated 
and challenging to adjudicate at the state level when the State itself has been implicated in 
the alleged crimes.88 When states are unable to properly address crimes themselves, members 
argued that an international criminal court would be able to handle the case. In the Working 
Group’s words,  
the problem is not that national courts are working improperly or are 
misconstruing the provisions of international treaties or the meaning of 
general international law. The problem is that such courts, and the system of 
national jurisdiction generally, seem ineffective to deal with an important 
class of international crime, especially State-sponsored crime or crime which 
represents a fundamental challenge to the integrity of State structures. 
Reinforcing national criminal justice systems is not likely to address this 
need.89 
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To skeptics, the 1992 Working Group stated that, “…the task of constructing an 
international order, an order in which the values which underlie the relevant rules of 
international law are respected and made effective, must begin somewhere.”90 Establishing 
international accountability for egregious international crimes was a logical step toward 
creating such a world. In the words of the Working Group, “Unless responsibility can be laid 
at the door of those who decide to commit heinous crimes of an international character, the 
suppression of those crimes will be that much more difficult.”91 This statement involves two 
key components: (1) that an international criminal court would serve to enhance respect for 
and the efficacy of international law, and (2) that international legal responsibility from an 
international criminal court would contribute to quashing those crimes.92 
Red Flags 
 Though international actors generally agreed that international accountability for 
international crimes was necessary, throughout the negotiations ILC members reflected 
concerns regarding how a permanent international criminal court would function in practice. 
Some of the sharpest debates were over the Court’s jurisdiction and which bodies would have 
to consent to an individual case. Such discussions highlight state concerns with the Court’s 
relationship to national judiciaries, state sovereignty, and how states might work alongside 
the Court.  
Members also disagreed about the role to be played by the UN Security Council and 
its relationship to the Court, as they expressed unease with the UNSC’s potential political 
influence over the institution. In addition, States debated over which actors should have the 
ability to initiate proceedings or inform the Court of a situation, some desiring a wider net of 
potential initiators and others seeking a more narrow scope of actors. Others envisioned a 
very different approach which revolved around supporting national judiciaries. These 
members emphasized concerns with disrupting state judicial systems, fortifying domestic 
judiciaries, and keeping judicial proximity to the victim communities. 
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 One major source of contention regarding an international criminal court was what 
kind of jurisdiction the court would have. Under one model, the ICC would have exclusive 
jurisdiction, meaning that all crimes under the Court’s competences would fall solely within 
the Court’s jurisdiction.93 In the Commission’s 1991 and 1992 reports, some states argued 
that exclusive jurisdiction would be the cleanest and simplest model and advocated for a 
stronger court with compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction for certain crimes, meaning that 
general consent to the Court constituted consent to individual cases and that only the Court 
had jurisdiction over certain crimes.94 Others opposed this approach, however, and some 
questioned whether the Court’s jurisdiction would apply only to crimes committed by 
nationals of State parties or to those committed by nationals of both State and non-state 
parties,95 potentially signaling unease with a non-state party being subjected to the Court’s 
exclusive jurisdiction.  
 In a second model, the ICC and national courts would have concurrent jurisdiction. 
This would involve state parties determining on an individual case basis whether to subject 
the case to its own jurisdiction or to refer it to the Court.96 In their 1992 Report, members 
spoke about concurrent jurisdiction in light of the belief that, “…the basic purpose of a court 
is to assist states in finding solutions to problems involving serious offences of an 
international character.”97 The report acknowledged “the danger of disrupting satisfactory 
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implementation of the existing systems,”98 while they also recognized that a significant issue 
posed by an international criminal court was its potential hindrance upon state sovereignty.99 
Concurrent jurisdiction would thus better protect against these state concerns, while it would 
also foster more domestic judicial ownership. 
 While those opposed to this approach recognized that more States would agree to it, 
because it is less of a hindrance on sovereignty, they nonetheless expressed “strong 
reservations” as to concurrent jurisdiction.100 This side believed that such a system would 
require intricate analysis of how to jurisdictionally meld national courts and the Court, which 
would potentially create jurisdictional conflicts and thus “paralysis and injustice.”101 In this 
view, concurrent jurisdiction would spur incredibly difficult conflicts with little chance of 
resolving them. Sovereignty “was no longer as absolute as it had been in the past” and States 
could not use this to block justice.102   
Consent Requirement 
 Another issue of concern was whose consent would be required for the Court to hear 
an individual case. One side argued that only the consent of the territorial state, or the state 
where the alleged crime occurred, should be required, since this would “facilitate 
investigation and collection of evidence.”103 Others believed that such a requirement would 
allow territorial states to interfere with the trials by using their territorial dominance to 
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control the trials, which would therefore hinder the Court and foster impunity.104 They thus 
argued that the custodial state, or the state whose national the suspect was, should also have 
to consent to the Court’s jurisdiction, so as to guarantee “the presence of the accused.”105 
Linked to the previous concern regarding state interference, other members worried that such 
a mechanism would allow states to disrupt individual cases on behalf of their nationals.106 
 Another view held that States should be given the option to select national criminal 
jurisdiction, even if they generally consented to the Court’s jurisdiction. These proponents 
preferred that the consent of the territorial state be given priority, as this solution would 
better preserve sovereignty and most States already adhered to the principle of territoriality. 
They also recognized the drawback of the perpetrating or victim state conducting the trial, 
yet argued that the advantages of the system would outweigh the disadvantages.107 
 While most held that agreement of the territorial state was essential, many were 
hesitant to require additional states to provide consent. In their view, such a requirement 
would allow numerous states to deny the Court jurisdiction, and thus to severely limit the 
Court’s ability to adjudicate.108 Another side took these paralysis concerns to the extreme and 
advocated for no special territorial state privilege and no other state consent requirement.109 
According to this view, international crimes were the concern of the whole international 
community and consent to the Court should entail consent to the Court’s jurisdiction over a 
State’s nationals as well.110 
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The Role of the Security Council 
 Another major source of contention between states was the role the Security Council 
would play in the Court. As the preeminent international body charged with addressing 
security issues facing the international community, the UNSC was created by the UN Charter 
to be a powerful institution. Far from being neutral, however, the UNSC is an inherently 
political institution, with only five permanent members and ten rotating non-permanent 
members with positions on the Council.111 The permanent five, consisting of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia, would hold particularly strong sway 
in the referral of security situations, if the Council was to be given such a responsibility.112 If 
any one of the five permanent members vetoed a referral decision, the case would not get 
referred, which would thus give these five states immense power.113 
 Given the political character of the UNSC, and the permanent five in particular, ILC 
members were particularly wary of the ICC-UNSC relationship. This concern was amplified 
by the period in which the negotiations were occurring, given that the UNSC in the early 
1990s had begun to assert itself more by imposing sanctions and deploying peacekeeping 
missions in the Middle East and Africa.114 Members were specifically worried that an ICC 
heavily influenced by the UNSC would not be impartial or independent, but would rather be 
influenced by the politics of its most prominent members. In turn, referrals would fall in line 
with the UNSC’s political preferences and no case would be able to be brought against any 
permanent member of the Council.115 Unease with the UNSC’s ICC role was also 
                                                                        
111 “Members of the United Nations Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, accessed November 8, 
2016, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/. 
112 The Security Council did hold such sway over referrals in both the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, 
thus lending historical potency to states’ concerns with the Council’s powerful referral role in international 
judicial institutions like the ICC. 
113 “Voting System and Records for the United Nations Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, 
accessed November 8, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/voting.shtml. 
114 Newsteam Staff, “The UN Security Council (UNSC),” Council on Foreign Relations, September 2, 2015, 
http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and-alliances/un-security-council-unsc/p31649. 
115 Fanny Bendetti, “A Report on the Negotiations for the Creation of an International Criminal Court,” 
accessed November 8, 2016, https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v5i1/html/icc2.html. 
A History of Warning Signs    Marisa O’Toole 
26 
 
complicated by the U.S. turn against the Court as the summer of 1998 neared its end,116 
which positioned the United States as a non-party to the Statute yet an influential referral 
player on the Council.  
  In light of this, several ILC members discussed what role the UNSC should have in 
consenting to cases. Some suggested that the UNSC’s consent should be required only for 
cases involving a threat or breach of peace or an act of aggression. Others resisted requiring 
consent by the UNSC for the initiation of proceedings for crimes of aggression, holding that 
doing so could potentially establish inequality among those accused of such crimes. These 
members asserted that the Court must be held to a UNSC positive finding of a threat or act of 
aggression but not necessarily vice versa, as this would create unfairness among large and 
small states. Such a double standard would be legally unacceptable.117 
 Concern about keeping the Court and the UNSC distinct also arose, as such advocates 
argued that the Court must operate as a judicial organ free from the politics of the UNSC. 
Due to the absence of a system of checks and balances or oversight of the UNSC, the two 
institutions needed to be distinguished. A truly independent court, from their view, would 
improve the UN Charter system and allow for both justice and political wisdom to prevail. 
Relying upon the UNSC for a determination of aggression or threat thereof would stall the 
justice process, as oftentimes the Council had been unable to make such a determination 
when it should have, or they had vetoed a determination for political, rather than legal 
reasons.118 
 The potential UNSC veto and referral powers were also areas of serious contention. 
One side of the debate argued that a UNSC veto might hinder “respect for the principles of 
non-discrimination and equal justice.”119 Relatedly, there was concern with the UNSC’s 
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ability to refer specific individuals to the Court. Ultimately, members agreed in the ILC’s 
1993 Working Group Report that the UNSC would only have the power to refer general 
situations, with a prosecutor having the discretion to investigate and prosecute specific 
individuals.120 The role of the UNSC and its influence over the ICC process remain major 
points of disagreement today.  
Initiation Proceedings 
 Another central concern during the ILC negotiations was who would have the power 
to initiate proceedings. In the ILC’s 1991 Report, numerous members argued that States 
should only have the power to inform the Court of potential crimes and alleged perpetrators, 
while the power to initiate a case and bring charges should belong to a prosecutor’s office 
within the Court.121 According to these members, allowing States to have this power would 
invite political motivations and threaten the objectivity and fairness of the process.122 
 Others argued that all State parties to the Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, regardless of whether the case involves their territory or nationals, 
should have the ability to inform the Court of cases. Another view pushed for NGOs, 
intergovernmental organizations, and individuals to have the power to inform the Court about 
cases, due to these groups’ greater flexibility with their involvement in international 
relations.123 These members wanted to expand the set of actors who could inform the Court 
about violations.  
 Beyond the ability to inform the Court of cases, many also wanted to broaden the 
number of players who could officially refer cases. In the ILC’s 1991 Report, one member 
asserted that crimes against the peace and security of mankind necessarily involve 
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individuals with the support or agreement of a State.124 Thus, States, or at least those states, 
should not be the only referring power; rather, the General Assembly, the UNSC without the 
ability to veto, and UN recognized national liberation movements should have the power to 
refer cases.125 A related view expressed concern with the UNSC’s veto power and thus 
suggested that the General Assembly should have referral power, given that it was the most 
internationally representative body, had Charter competencies to address peace and security 
issues, and could act in the event of a UNSC veto.126 
Alternate Visions for the Court 
Supporting National Judiciaries 
Many members discussed the possibility of focusing on national judiciary building, 
either instead of or in addition to establishing an international criminal court. In the first case, 
some members argued that, rather than establishing a permanent international criminal court, 
the international community should instead focus on fortifying existing national courts so 
that they may better adjudicate international crimes themselves. This member thus argued 
that the international community should endeavor instead to bolster national criminal 
judiciaries, rather than create a new institution, so that they may fulfill responsibilities 
already set out by international criminal treaties.127 
 The 1992 Working Group agreed that, for some circumstances, such as smaller 
countries suffering from finite judicial and legal capacities, bolstering national judiciaries 
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would be the preferred solution. Such a boost could be facilitated by sending experienced 
judges from nearby judiciaries to these states, creating regional collaborative appeal courts, 
or providing courts with judicial training and aid.128 In this way, the international community 
could engage in domestic institution building and foster domestic ownership over the justice 
process. Thus, both sides of the argument generally agreed as to the importance of building 
national judicial capacity.  
 Yet, the Working Group also recognized that the international criminal court would 
be primarily designed to address cases in which the State is unable or unwilling to prosecute 
cases impartially.129 The Court would be most useful in circumstances in which no other 
venue exists which could give a fair trial and especially where political factors may impede 
the justice process.130 Another approach called for the Court to do both. The Court could act 
in an advisory capacity to national courts for certain cases, serving as “a tool for international 
pressure” and as a framework and shaper of global public opinion.131 Similarly, the Court 
could offer optional preliminary rulings regarding the extent of the State’s involvement in the 
conflict; this would then permit a determination of whether the State could appropriately try 
the suspected individuals in the situation.132 In response to this, however, members cited 
concerns with the impartiality and fairness of national trials under certain circumstances, 
especially where the State itself may be implicated in the crimes.133 Another option would be 
for the Court to assist national courts with potential legal standards or principles, so as to 
facilitate decisions in national courts.134 
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 As these various suggestions reveal, members were cognizant of the importance of 
keeping national judiciaries close to the justice process. The 1992 Working Group explicitly 
recognized the need to foster closeness of justice and argued that, when feasible, the Court’s 
hearing of a case should occur in the state, or at a minimum, in the region, where the alleged 
crime occurred.135 Here one can see the ILC’s early acknowledgement of the importance of 
proximity of victims to the judicial proceedings. Yet, at the same time members also 
admitted that there was a danger in having trials too close to the state where the crimes were 
committed, as doing so could “cast a political shadow over judicial proceedings” and lead to 
impartiality and security concerns.136 Despite this concern, members still held that the 
domestic location of trials was preferable and that outside locations should be used “only 
when it is both practicable and consistent with the interest of justice to do so.”137 However, it 
is unclear how closeness of justice to the State would be logistically feasible with a 
permanent, sitting Court, unless there was an outreach mechanism by which victims could 
easily access the Court or its local offices, or if the Court heavily prioritized domestic trials. 
Africa’s Unique Role and Embrace of the Court 
Africa Leading the Charge 
 One of the most interesting stories of the ICC negotiations was the essential and 
leading role that African nations played in supporting the Court’s establishment.138 Led by 
high-level officials like Attorneys General, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of 
Justice, African nations were heavily engaged in the negotiations.139 Africans were in every 
commission, held eight of the thirty-one Vice Presidencies of the diplomatic conference, and 
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served as the chair of the Drafting Committee.140 African delegates consistently advocated 
for a standing, objective, and powerful ICC that would both handle international crimes and 
assist with fortifying national judiciaries.141 
South African Development Community (SADC) Support for the Court 
 The South African Development Community (SADC) was a particularly fervent 
supporter of the ICC throughout the negotiation process. In its 1997 meeting, Ambassador 
Josiah Jele Khiphusizi, speaking as a permanent representative of South Africa on the 
SADC’s behalf, expressed enthusiasm and support for an international criminal court. In his 
view, establishing a permanent international criminal court would both punish criminals for 
their atrocities and deter such future acts.142 After several meetings, members during the 
September 11 to September 14, 1997 meeting agreed to ten fundamental principles for a 
Court, pictured in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: SADC 10 Principles for an International Criminal Court 
Source: Screenshot from: Khiphusizi (1997)  
 
 In light of these ten principles, one can see some key points of concern for SADC 
members in regards to what an international criminal court would look like. SADC members 
desired an effective and objective court, as supported by an independent prosecutor and the 
ability to be undeterred by a UNSC veto. Additionally, members invoked the principle of 
complementarity and sought cooperation of states with the Court. SADC members also 
supported an opt-in mechanism in which states could individually accept jurisdiction for 
certain crimes. Lastly, members desired a court that was especially concerned with and 
accountable to the victims. For the SADC, inclusion of these principles in the Statute was 
“essential to the effective establishment and functioning of an international criminal 
court.”143  
Regional Declaration of Support at Dakar 
 In February of 1998, months before the Rome Conference, representatives from 
various African nations met for the African Conference in Dakar and declared their support 
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for the ICC’s establishment. In underlining the importance of establishing such a Court for 
Africa and the entire world, they stressed a Court that would be “independent, permanent, 
impartial, just and effective.”144 The attendees, like the SADC members, also discussed the 
importance of keeping the ICC separate from any political interference from the UNSC, as 
well as the need to have an independent prosecutor and a financial source that would not 
impact its independence and objectivity.145  
Aside from the emphasis on independence, members also declared the importance of 
complementarity. In their view, national and regional judiciaries should hold the 
“primordial” role in prosecutions and the Court should only act when such systems were 
either unable or unwilling to address crimes within its jurisdiction.146 This idea of the ICC as 
a “court of last resort”147 is embodied in the principle of complementarity, in which the Court 
only adjudicates international crimes when domestic judicial systems will not or cannot 
adjudicate such crimes themselves. Yet, to be effective, the Court would need states to 
cooperate with it when it is adjudicating cases.148  
African Voices at the Rome Conference 
 Throughout the Rome Conference, African delegates from various countries shared 
their visions of the Court. During the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court in 1998, delegates from various African 
states revealed their preferences for the ICC. These preferences reflected potential concerns 
that African nations had with the Court and how it would operate. 
Like their SADC and Dakar predecessors, all delegates were keen to stress the 
importance of creating a court that would be independent of political influences, either from 
states or from the UNSC, and that would have an independent prosecutor. In addition to these 
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concerns, delegates supported the principle of complementarity, as well as the need to build 
up domestic judiciaries.149 In light of contemporary African critiques of the Court, these 
common concerns will become all the more prescient. 
Certain concerns and visions, however, were more particular to certain states. For 
example, Mr. Omar, the South African delegate representing the SADC, strongly advocated 
against impunity and viewed the Court as a mechanism for international peace.150 He stated, 
The establishment of an international criminal court would not only strengthen 
the arsenal of measures to combat gross human rights violations but would 
ultimately contribute to the attainment of international peace. In view of the 
crimes committed under the apartheid system, the International Criminal 
Court should send a clear message that the international community was 
resolved that the perpetrators of such gross human rights violations would not 
go unpunished.151 
 
Additionally, Mr. Omar was particularly concerned with State integrity and equality in the 
international arena and the Court’s role in promoting these.152 Mr. Raditapole, the Mosotho 
delegate, agreed with the SADC’s position, though he did not himself emphasize these 
points.153 
 Mr. Raditapole did, however, express a different viewpoint than other African 
representatives in pushing for a more powerful Court that would not be hindered by states. 
To achieve this, he argued for the Court to have far reaching powers in order to attain State 
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cooperation and for automatic jurisdiction over all statutorily-defined crimes.154 In his view, 
the Court should be the body to determine the unwilling or unable standard of 
complementarity and “complementarity should not be invoked with the aim of obstructing 
justice.”155 Mr. Asmani, the Tanzanian delegate, expressed a similar desire that sovereignty 
and complementarity not come at the expense of judicial inaction.156 
 The Kenyan delegate, Mr. Wako, took a somewhat different view on this issue, 
expressing concern with the Court holding too much power. Mr. Wako stressed that the 
powers of the prosecutor would have to be specifically delineated so as to minimize abuse of 
power, signaling potential concern with a Court process that was too invasive. He further 
argued that the Court’s financing procedure not impinge upon its independence.157   
The Mountain of Warning Signs  
 Taken together, concerns raised from the experiences of the ICTY and ICTR, as well 
as those expressed during ICC negotiations, warned of trouble to come for the Court. From 
the ICTY and ICTR experiences, key issues were raised regarding: (1) a lack of 
governmental cooperation with the Court; (2) judicial distance from locals/victims; (3) a 
failure to foster domestic ownership/institution-building; (4) a failure to foster 
reconciliation/peace; and (5) a perception of one-sided justice. Similarly, concerns raised by 
various states and African leaders illuminate issues with: (1) complementarity; (2) state 
sovereignty; (3) state cooperation with the Court; (4) State and UNSC politics; (5) 
referral/initiation powers; and (6) domestic institution building. Such historical concerns 
ultimately shed light on the contemporary African backlash against the ICC. This backlash 
and the connection between current and past African critiques will be explored next. 
                                                                        
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
Again, here is the concept of complementarity highlighted by delegates. However, this delegate is recognizing 
the potential abuse of the concept and supporting a Court that would be able to prevent States from misusing it. 
156 Ibid., 74. 
157 Ibid., 77. 
Africa Lashes Back    Marisa O’Toole 
36 
 
 Chapter 2: Africa Lashes Back  
 Just two months before members of the international community agreed to establish 
the International Criminal Court via the Rome Statute, British Nigerian scholar Funmi 
Olonisakin made a few ominous predictions. In May of 1998, Olonisakin predicted that 
Africa, with its recent crimes in various parts of the continent, would be an early region of 
focus for the Court.158 Though such violations were in part a motivating factor for African 
nations to push for the Court159 and to sign numerous international conventions to 
demonstrate their “collective willingness to combat impunity,” Olonisakin asserted that the 
past had shown that actually combatting impunity had been hindered by individual states’ 
inability to implement such agreements.160 According to Olonisakin, African states were only 
likely to work with the ICC when doing so was in their best interest.161 Regional and political 
allegiances might thus prevent African states from arresting ICC suspects and delivering 
them to the Court and the Court could really only be successful in situations where “there is 
no clear authority and sovereignty is blurred.”162 Such was the outlook for Africa and the 
ICC as the Court would commence its operation. 
 As the Court began to take its first cases, it would indeed focus on Africa and 
engender great resistance as a result. With nine out of its ten “situations” located in Africa,163 
the Court has almost exclusively focused on the prosecution of African perpetrators of 
African crimes. This apparent targeting of Africa by the ICC, coupled with the ICC’s 
indictments of two sitting African heads of state, has sparked a massive African backlash by 
several African leaders and the AU against the Court. Virtually unrecognizable from the 
supportive body of countries that had called for the establishment of the ICC back in the 
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1990s, in recent years numerous African nations have increasingly sought to disparage, 
undermine, and even withdraw from the Court.  
The Backlash Begins 
On January 31, 2017, African leaders met at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa and, in a 
non-binding decision, agreed to a plan for Africa’s collective withdrawal from the ICC.164 
Though still in its very early stages, with no established timeline or steps, the plan calls for 
African nations to fortify their own judiciaries and to enlarge the jurisdiction of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights to thus “reduce the deference to the ICC.165 This move 
came after three African nations, Burundi, South Africa, and The Gambia, decided to 
withdraw from the Court late in 2016, though both South Africa and The Gambia have 
recently rescinded their plans for withdrawal. In February of 2017, new Gambian president 
Adama Barrow wrote to the United Nations to revoke his country’s withdrawal from the 
Court, citing his commitment to human rights, the Rome Statute, and the ICC.166 Having 
been blocked from withdrawal by its High Court, which ruled its withdrawal 
unconstitutional, South Africa has also recently rescinded its withdrawal from the ICC.167 
These withdrawals, or at least attempts thereof, nonetheless beg the question: what pushed 
these states to this point? Though uncovering with certainty the reasons beneath this backlash 
is an impossible task, an examination into each nations’ criticisms of the Court will shed 
much needed light upon this extremely topical issue. 
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Burundi Backs Out 
 On October 12, 2016, Burundi’s National Assembly voted to withdraw from the 
ICC.168 In April of that same year, the Court had begun a preliminary examination into 
Burundian political violence alleged to have occurred between 2015 and 2016.169 
Repudiating this examination, the Burundian government lashed out at the Court and argued 
that the ICC’s involvement would fuel “potentially negative forces and their cronies” to 
commit additional violence.170 Yet, the main thrust of Burundi’s criticisms were not centered 
around concerns with peace. Rather, Burundi’s withdrawal was largely framed as a refusal to 
submit to what they saw as an imperialist Court. 
Calling the Court an “instrument” used for the purposes of destabilizing the world’s 
poor nations, the government accused the Court of pursuing “a regime change agenda, 
masterminded by Western powers.”171 In their press release announcing their withdrawal, 
Burundi’s Council of Ministers claimed that the Burundian government had been fighting 
terrorists who were attempting to overthrow its institutions.172 According to the Council, 
these terrorists were funded and aided by certain western nations and have not been 
condemned or reported by those countries since.173  
The Burundian government alleged that western powers were not only supporting 
rebels against it, but that they were also using their financial power over the Court to 
influence its case selection. In that same press release, the Council discussed the Court’s 
financing, in which the EU provides more than 70% of its funding. This structure, according 
to the Council, has created a Court that is “an instrument of political pressure on the 
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Governments of poor countries or a means of destabilizing them.”174 Thus, in the eyes of 
Burundi’s government, ICC investigations of African statesman, like its investigation of the 
Burundian violence, have been “under the impulse of the great powers.”175 
Burundi, according to the Council, had initially joined the Court to fight impunity and 
was committed to this fight, claiming to be in the process of investigating the political 
violence that the Court was trying to take over. According to the Council, the ICC’s intrusion 
violates the Rome Statute’s complementarity principle and amounts to “a serious and flagrant 
violation of sovereignty and national security.”176 The Council also pointed out that, at the 
same time as certain world powers are using the Court to force the hand of international law 
down upon Burundi, these states have themselves refused to submit to the Court’s 
jurisdiction in an effort to protect their own nationals. Calling the major powers out for their 
hypocrisy, Burundi refused to remain a party to a statute that is, in their view, controlled by 
countries who are not parties to it.177  
South Africa Follows Suit 
Just one week later, South Africa followed Burundi and decided to begin its own 
withdrawal process from the Court.178 Similarly to Burundi’s claims, South African leaders 
criticized the Court for targeting African leaders179 and for forcing Africans to “continue to 
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unjustifiably bear the brunt of the decisions of the ICC,” citing the referral of the Sudanese 
case as the most recent example.180 According to one African minister, executing the ICC 
arrest warrant for Sudanese president al-Bashir would result in “regime change.”181 In 
regards to concerns with the Court’s alleged imperialist overtones, South Africa echoed 
Burundi’s critiques.  
Yet, South Africa’s concerns about the Court run deeper and involve the 
government’s image of its own role as a player in the international sphere and African 
politics. Under Article 89(1) of the Rome Statute, State parties are required to comply with 
the ICC’s arrest warrants,182 even if those warrants are for high-level officials, such as sitting 
heads of state, who would otherwise be protected by diplomatic immunity. In June of 2015, 
Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir travelled to South Africa for an AU summit and left 
without arrest. In explaining their failure to arrest Bashir, South African Minister of the 
Presidency Jeff Radebe cited AU treaty obligations, presumably head of state immunities, as 
a legal barrier to handing over heads of state like Bashir.183 South Africa endeavored to 
engage in formal talks with the Court to discuss such concerns, as well as to propose 
amendments to the Statute so as to remedy confusion within the Statute’s consulting and 
cooperation requirements for members, again presumably in relation to head of state 
immunities.184 At the same time, South Africa was seeking to begin bilateral and multilateral 
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negotiations with other African nations in order to quicken the reform process for the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as for various other regional tribunals.185 
South African courts, however, were not pleased with the government’s refusal to 
arrest and deliver Bashir to the ICC. Having issued an emergency court order in 2015 for 
Bashir’s arrest at the Johannesburg Summit, the High Court in 2016 reaffirmed the 
unconstitutionality of the government’s failure to arrest Bashir.186 Labeling the government’s 
actions as “disgraceful conduct”,187 the Court rebuked South Africa’s inaction, 
foreshadowing its later position against the government’s recent attempt at ICC withdrawal. 
Attempts at withdrawal from the Court would come not long after South Africa’s own 
High Court lambasted its failure to apprehend Bashir, as South Africa began the process in 
the fall of 2016. Among South Africa’s chief reasons for withdrawal were its duties as a 
promoter of peace in Africa and its obligations under customary law. South Africa’s 
Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act of 2001 offers diplomatic immunities and 
privileges to heads of state, among other high-level persons.188 In the government’s press 
release, Minister Michael Masutha asserted that the Rome Statute’s requirement to arrest 
indicted sitting heads of state impeded South Africa’s ability to engage in international 
relations with other countries, especially those nations undergoing severe conflicts.189 In this 
view, South Africa’s diplomatic responsibilities necessitated withdrawal from the Court.  
Turning away from the ICC and toward Africa’s own judicial mechanisms, Masutha 
reaffirmed South Africa’s commitment to combating impunity and fostering peaceful 
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solutions and declared they would do so by continuing to work with the AU and the African 
Court on Human and People’s’ Rights, as well as other “international human rights 
instruments.”190 According to South African Minister of International Relations and 
Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, the Rome Statute itself conflicts with the vital aim 
of peaceful resolutions to conflicts.191 In his words, “peace and justice must be viewed as 
complementary and not mutually exclusive.”192 From the perspective of South African 
leaders, withdrawing from the Court will enable the government to fulfill its international 
diplomatic responsibilities, hold perpetrators accountable, and promote peaceful solutions, all 
without the perceived meddling of an allegedly biased international body in African affairs. 
Such efforts, however, have been forestalled by the South African High Court’s 
ruling that the government’s withdrawal is unconstitutional. According to the High Court, 
such a withdrawal is invalid, as the government failed to consult the South African 
Parliament prior to beginning the process.193 This ruling likely fueled the South African 
government’s recent revocation of its withdrawal from the ICC, though it is unclear if the 
government intends to pursue another route to withdraw from the Court. Given the ruling 
party’s massive majority in parliament, withdrawal via legislature would likely prevail.194 
Out Goes The Gambia  
 Less than a week after South Africa initiated its withdrawal from the ICC, The 
Gambia followed suit. On October 25, 2016, The Gambia’s information minister, Sheriff 
Bojang, justified his country’s withdrawal by pointing to the Court’s selective prosecution of 
Africans. Bojang labeled the Court as a tool “for the persecution of Africans and especially 
their leaders” and an institution that has turned a blind eye to Western crimes.195 The minister 
                                                                        
190 Ibid. 
191 “South Africa to Quit International Criminal Court.” 
192 Ibid. 
193 Onishi, “South Africa Reverses Withdrawal From International Criminal Court.” 
194 Ibid. 
195 “Gambia Withdraws from International Criminal Court,” Al Jazeera, October 26, 2016, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/gambia-withdraws-international-criminal-court-
161026041436188.html. 
Africa Lashes Back    Marisa O’Toole 
43 
 
pointed to at least thirty Western countries that had perpetrated “heinous war crimes against 
independent sovereign states and their citizens” but had gone un-examined by the Court.196 
Echoing the anti-imperialist sentiments of the Burundian and South African leaders, Bojang 
called the ICC the “International Caucasian Court” and described it as pursuing the 
humiliation of Africans.197 Leading up to their withdrawal, President Jammeh in a 2015 
meeting with Chief Prosecutor Bensouda had formally and unsuccessfully requested an ICC 
investigation into the migrant crisis as a way to hold the EU accountable for thousands of 
African refugee and migrant deaths.198 Here, again, what was perceived as the Court’s 
selective prosecution and imperialist targeting of African countries prompted yet another 
African country to attempt to sever its ties with the ICC. While such severance has been 
stopped by incoming President Barrow, The Gambia’s initial attempt to withdraw from the 
Court and the reasons behind it are worth analysis. 
 As these recent examples of withdrawal illustrate, the criticisms behind current 
African opposition to the Court are multifaceted and complex. However, these criticisms, as 
well as those that will be evoked in the case studies of Darfur, Kenya, and Uganda, and in the 
examination of the AU-ICC relationship, can be broken down into four main critiques 
described by Roland Cole: (1) the Court’s selective bias; (2) the Court’s 
neocolonial/imperialistic agenda; (3) the Court’s inhibition of peace processes; and (4) the 
Court’s lack of respect for heads of state.199 Though not all encompassing, these four 
concerns comprise the thrust of present African resistance to the Court and will thus be 
useful later in developing strategies to increase the ICC’s legitimacy in the eyes of Africans 
and bring Africa back within the Court’s fold. 
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The Criticisms Explained 
Selective Bias 
 The first criticism, selective bias, revolves around the issue of which cases the Court 
has chosen to pursue. By virtue of this selection, this criticism also involves which cases the 
Court has not selected for investigation. Nine out of the Court’s ten investigations have been 
in Africa, leading many African leaders and civil society actors to charge the Court with an 
Africa bias. 
Tim Murithi argues that the Court’s nearly exclusive selection of African cases “has 
created a distorted perception amongst African governments regarding the underlying 
intention behind the establishment of the Court.”200 Given that countries around the world 
continue to perpetrate war crimes, while Africa remains the nearly sole focus of the Court, 
African leaders view the Court as administering “selective justice.”201 A common critique, 
says Murithi, is that the ICC only chooses cases that will not “alienate its main financial 
supporters.”202 Prominent Ugandan scholar, author, and activist, Mahmood Mamdani 
supports this critique and argues that the Court chooses to investigate cases where the target 
is a U.S. adversary and chooses not to investigate those where the governments are U.S. 
allies.203 In the words of Tedros Adhanom, Ethiopian foreign minister, “The court has 
transformed itself into a political instrument targeting Africa and Africans.”204 
 This charge that the Court is intentionally targeting a specific world region is as 
pernicious as it is, unfortunately, predictable. Back in 2001, Henry Kissinger acknowledged 
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the ambiguity of the Rome Statute’s defined crimes and the tendency for this lack of clarity 
to lead to “politicized application.”205 In fact and as history has shown, this selectivity, even 
among choosing which perpetrators within a conflict to prosecute, has been a staple of past 
international tribunals, including those established in the wake of WW2 and after the 
Yugoslavian and Rwandan conflicts. General Curtis Lemay, the WW2 general responsible 
for the fire raids against the Japanese, explicitly recognized the power politics and “victor’s 
justice” involved in international justice when he remarked, “If we’d lost the war, I’d have 
been hung as a war criminal.”206 The perception of political manipulation in the form of the 
selective application of the Rome Statute and the selective prosecution of certain perpetrators 
poses serious credibility concerns for international adjudicative institutions like the ICC. 
Human Rights Watch perhaps puts it best: 
When officials from or supported by powerful states have been able to avoid 
international prosecutions, the legitimacy of international justice, and, in turn, 
the ICC as its flagship institution, is called into question.207 
 
Neo-colonialism/Imperialistic Agenda 
 The second major, and related criticism of the ICC, revolves around claims of neo-
colonialism and imperialism. In essence, this is the belief that certain stronger countries are 
endeavoring to indirectly control weaker countries through legal, economic, and financial 
means.208 In regards to the ICC, this criticism amounts to perceptions of the Court as a legal 
tool of the West used to destabilize, humiliate, and/or thwart African countries.  
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 Featured heavily in the criticisms by Burundian, South African, and Gambian 
officials during their ICC withdrawal announcements, this critique of the Court has been 
voiced by numerous African leaders in regards to various African cases, including the Darfur 
and Kenya referrals. Kenyan foreign minister Moses Wetangual has called the Court’s 
activities “very suspect” and charged that the general application of “so-called universal 
jurisdiction in criminal matters has been laced with some racial undertones.”209 Rwandan 
President Paul Kagame has echoed this sentiment, asserting that the ICC “has been put in 
place only for African countries, only for poor countries.”210 Further painting the Court as an 
imperialist institution, Kagame has also stated,  
Is it only the African involved in criminal activity? We have to fight this 
tendency for Europeans to always cast themselves in the role of judge and the 
African always as the guilty party. We have to fight it on all fronts.211 
 
 This criticism has deep roots in the very foundations of international law and the 
development of the universality principle contained within the concept of universal 
jurisdiction. As Steve Odero explains in his analysis of this neo-colonialism critique, colonial 
powers used the specter of international law to justify colonialism in Africa, in that such 
powers employed international law to legitimate their subjugation of African peoples under 
the guise of civilizing the undeveloped world.212 Anghie and Chimni further assert that 
colonialism brought about international law’s integral concept of universality by spreading 
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and applying the law to colonies as the law for all countries.213 Scholars thus point to an 
inherent power dynamic intertwined with international law, universality, and sovereignty.214  
Having used international law to rationalize the subjugation of African peoples, these 
same powers are now said to be paradoxically using the law as a symbol of their dedication 
to human rights and as a means of prosecuting Africans.215 Some scholars have argued that 
one can view the use of the law to both protect and prosecute Africans as a continuance of 
colonialism’s “civilizing mission.”216 It thus comes as no surprise, as Anghie and Chimni 
state, that African states, former colonies themselves, might be gravely concerned with the 
operationalization of international criminal law by stronger countries.217  
Scholars assert that this distrust of international legal institutions is only further 
fueled by the “Double Standard” problem, in which countries are not treated equally under 
international law.218 This is most explicitly borne out by the composition of the UNSC, on 
which the United States, China, and Russia all hold permanent seats, yet none are parties to 
the Rome Statute. Such UNSC protection of countries like the United States from ICC 
accountability, as Jalloh argues, confirms for Africans their notions of both selective justice 
and neo-colonialism.219 Their position on the Council, coupled with their non-member status 
to the Court, shield these major powers from facing accountability at the ICC. 
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Inhibition of Peace Processes: The Peace versus Justice Debate 
 A third major criticism leveled against the Court involves the well-known and 
controversial “peace versus justice” debate220 among international justice scholars. At the 
crux of this dichotomy is the idea that international criminal tribunals, by indicting and 
prosecuting perpetrators, discourage perpetrators from coming to peaceful resolutions and 
thus, protract the conflict. By this logic, immunity, rather than prosecution, motivates 
perpetrators to halt their violence and thus fosters peace.221  
Though scholars like Pam Akhavan and others take issue with what they see as a false 
dichotomy between peace and justice,222 the debate as to the working relationship between 
peace and legal accountability rages on. Some argue that there is a “duty to prosecute” and 
that such prosecution deters crimes, promotes reconciliation by individualizing guilt, and 
establishes rule of law in otherwise unstable situations.223 Others, on the contrary, point to 
the importance of political context and hold that judicial intervention can destabilize regions 
and inflame local divisions, thus endangering the possibility of peaceful settlement.224 
According to this view, the prosecution-peace promotion relationship is not self-evident and 
one must consider the ability of trials to invoke hostility among people and to be used as 
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potential political platforms, and, in contrast, the ability of amnesties to foster truthfulness 
and reconciliation.225 
More than just a topic of debate among scholars, the peace versus justice issue is one 
of direct concern to many African critics of the Court. Given that individuals suspected of 
planning, funding, beginning, and carrying out atrocities in civil wars are often the players 
later involved in peace negotiations and their implementation, Murithi quite logically asserts 
the existence of a peace-justice tension.226 Though the establishment of the ICC was expected 
to bring “a new era of respect for human rights, peace, justice and reconciliation,”227 and the 
founders of the Rome Statute themselves hoped that the ICC would deter the most serious 
international crimes,228 many critics perceive the Court as negatively impacting peace and 
stability in the regions it targets. Such concerns with the potential conflict between peace and 
justice have been expressed both historically in the Yugoslavian and Rwandan cases, as well 
as in the three ICC case studies of Darfur, Uganda, and Kenya. Scholars also connect the last 
major critique, regarding the prosecution of sitting heads of state, to concerns with threatened 
peace and stability.229 
Lack of Respect for Head of State Immunity 
 This final concern regarding head of state immunity stands out among the others as a 
concern of a legal nature. Essentially, this critique amounts to the conflict between the 
sovereign and diplomatic immunities afforded under international law and the Rome 
Statute’s Article 27 provision, which establishes that the Statute “shall apply equally to all 
persons without any distinction based on official capacity.”230 Despite the Rome Statute’s 
clear assertion that heads of state would not be exempt from criminal culpability, sovereign 
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and diplomatic immunity are nonetheless important components of international law.231 
Sovereign equality among all countries within the UN fundamentally means that no state is 
allowed to meddle in another’s domestic jurisdiction; to do so, by prosecuting another states’ 
high ranking official, would imply violation of that state’s sovereignty.232 
 Despite this, there is precedent for international courts seeking prosecution against 
current heads of state. Though in DRC v. Belgium the ICJ ruled against the validity of the 
Court of Brussels’ arrest warrant for a DRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Court implied 
that prosecution by an appropriate international body would be acceptable.233 Slobodan 
Milosevic’s indictment by the ICTY, as well as Charles Taylors’ indictment by the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), provide further evidence of the precedent for prosecuting 
sitting heads of state.234 Though the prosecution of such individuals is clearly precedential, 
African leaders have levelled the charge that the ICC does not respect head of state immunity 
and have most forcefully made this argument in the context of the Sudanese and Kenyan 
cases.  
 Having established these four main African critiques of the Court, it is now useful to 
turn to some case studies to illustrate how these critiques are relevant in practice. The cases 
of Darfur, Kenya, and Uganda will not only bring these core critiques to life, but will do so 
from differing angles and with differing emphases. The diversity within these cases reveals 
the complexity of the challenges that the ICC faces in confronting the backlash. 
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Case 1: Darfur 
The Conflict 
 In 2003, rebel groups in Darfur, Sudan, including the Sudanese Liberation 
Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) armed themselves 
against the Sudanese Government, claiming that the government was discriminating against 
Darfur, particularly in its failure to provide the region with adequate social programs and 
infrastructure.235 Beginning in March, armed conflict raged between the Sudanese 
Government and these numerous rebel groups.236 Following an April 2003 rebel attack on the 
El Fasher airport, Bashir and fellow high-ranking Sudanese government officials constructed 
a counter-insurgency plan against the rebels.237  
During this campaign, the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allies, including the 
Janjaweed militia, the Sudanese Police Forces, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), 
and the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), allegedly attacked Darfur citizens, 
particularly the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa groups, whom the government presumed to be 
closely tied to the rebel groups. Government forces allegedly perpetrated crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and war crimes throughout the campaign primarily against these ethnic 
groups. Such crimes included: pillaging towns and villages; murdering and exterminating 
thousands of civilians; raping thousands of civilian women; forcibly transferring hundreds of 
thousands of civilians; torturing civilians; contaminating the water pumps and wells of towns 
and villages; and encouraging tribes allied with the Government to resettle in these groups’ 
villages and lands.238 
 Since 2004 the Sudanese Government and the rebels have attempted and agreed to 
numerous ceasefires, with the most recent example being Bashir’s extension of a ceasefire at 
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the end of 2016.239 Since the conflict began, it has displaced over 2.3 million people and, 
though the number is debated, has killed an estimated 300,000 people.240 Despite a massive 
AU-UN joint peacekeeping mission that has sought to aid the millions of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), the region remains embroiled in fighting and brutality.241 
The UNSC Steps In 
 On July 30, 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1566 to declare Darfur 
an international security and peace threat and call upon the Sudanese Government to disarm 
the Janjaweed, take them into custody, and hold them accountable for their atrocities.242 Later 
in 2004 and having found that Sudan was not cooperating with the previous resolution, the 
UNSC passed Resolution 1564, which called for the establishment of an international 
commission of inquiry to investigate crimes committed by all parties in Darfur and the 
identification of those individual perpetrators.243 The International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur then found that the Sudanese Government and the Janjaweed committed “serious 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law” and that, while the Sudanese 
government itself had not pursued genocide, certain individuals may have done so.244 
 In light of these findings and despite deliberating other avenues for holding the 
perpetrators accountable, the UNSC ultimately decided to refer Darfur to the ICC. This 
decision followed the recommendation of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
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that “the ICC is the only credible way of bringing alleged perpetrators to justice.”245 
Interestingly, the United States had advocated for a joint UN/AU tribunal to try the alleged 
crimes committed in Darfur, which would have been located in Arusha, Tanzania.246 
Nonetheless, on March 31, 2005, the UNSC referred Darfur as its first case to the ICC.247 
The Indictments  
 Since it began investigating the Darfur case, the ICC has issued arrest warrants for 
both government and rebel perpetrators for a mix of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
On the government side, the ICC has issued warrants for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, 
Minister of State for the Interior of the Government of Sudan Ahmad Harun, alleged 
Militia/Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb, and Minister of National Defence and former Minister 
of the Interior and Special Representative for the Sudanese President in Darfur Abdel 
Hussein.248 On the rebel side, the Court has issued warrants for Chairmen and General 
Coordinator of Military Operations of the United Resistance Front Abu Garda and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Justice and Equality Mouvement Collective-Leadership 
Abdallah Banda.249 Bashir, the most high profile of all of the indicted, has been accused by 
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the ICC of playing “an essential role in coordinating the design and implementation of the 
common plan” in which he allegedly enlisted the Janjaweed to carry out heinous crimes 
against the rebels.250 
Country Reactions to the Referral  
 On the same day that the UNSC made Darfur its first ICC referral, a Sudanese 
Representative to the Council lambasted the Council’s action, remarking, 
The resolution just adopted is full of exceptions, in view of the fact that the 
State concerned with these exceptions is not party to the ICC. By the same 
token, we would like to remind the Council that the Sudan also is not party to 
the ICC ... the Council today did not settle the question of accountability in 
Darfur. Rather, it exposed the fact that this Criminal Court was originally 
intended for developing and weak States, and that it is a tool for the exer-cise 
[sic] of the culture of superiority and to impose cultural superiority. It is a tool 
for those who believe that they have a monopoly on virtues in this world, rife 
with injustice and tyranny.251 
 
Clearly expressed within these remarks are the selective justice and anti-imperialist critiques 
against the Court, as well as the rather explicit assertion of the UNSC’s hypocrisy in referring 
a non-member state to the Court when several of its permanent members are also non-
members.   
Given this immediate sentiment after the Darfur referral, it is no great surprise that 
Sudan would refuse and still refuses to cooperate with the Court, particularly in regards to 
handing over Bashir.252 According to Victor Peskin, the Sudanese government has remained 
an “openly” and “staunchly defiant regime” in the face of the ICC’s investigation, refusing to 
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comply with the ICC’s requests for interviews and documents relating to the conflict.253 In 
response to the arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb, Minister Al-Zubayr Bashir Tasha 
pledged to “cut the throat of any international official…who tries to jail a Sudanese official 
in order to present him to the international justice.”254 Tasha further referred to the Chief 
Prosecutor at the time, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, as “an intruder” with “no jurisdiction here.”255 
Rather than hold those indicted accountable, Bashir promoted Harun to Minister of State for 
Humanitarian Affairs256 and retaliated against the investigation by expelling sixteen 
humanitarian agencies from the country.257  
In March of 2009 and supposedly due to perceived stability concerns regarding 
Bashir’s prosecution, Sudan, the AU, the Arab League, Russia, and China requested that the 
UNSC suspend the Darfur case.258 However, divisions within the Council, and particularly 
the opposition of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, rendered the Council 
incapable of invoking Article 16 of the Rome Statute to suspend the case.259 Yet, the UNSC’s 
failure to suspend the case has not stopped African countries from, in effect, deferring 
Bashir’s arrest. The AU and individual African nations have widely condemned the ICC’s 
move to indict Bashir and refused to arrest him, despite his trips to Djibouti, Kenya, Chad, 
South Africa, and Uganda.260 Bashir has still not been arrested, and in 2014, Chief Prosecutor 
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Bensouda temporarily suspended active investigation into Bashir’s crimes, due to the 
UNSC’s inability to apprehend him.261 
Criticisms Embodied in the Darfur case 
 Darfur presents a fascinating case for analysis, as it involves all four core African 
criticisms against the ICC and an additional legal argument against the Court, while it also 
arose out of a UNSC referral. Though African leaders have levelled each criticism against the 
Court in relation to the Darfur case, each major criticism essentially culminates in a forceful 
attack on the Court for supposedly selectively and intentionally violating a weaker state’s 
sovereignty and inhibiting peace processes as a result. But first, the legal argument against 
the Court deserves brief consideration.  
A Legal Argument against ICC involvement in Darfur 
 The central legal argument posed against the ICC’s investigation of Darfur holds that, 
because Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute and because Sudan had not specially agreed 
to cooperate with the Court, the UNSC lacked the legal right to refer to the Court alleged 
crimes perpetrated in Sudan.262 To complicate this jurisdictional argument, the Sudanese 
government has also argued that the ICC’s investigation violates its own principle of 
complementarity. This is based upon their claim that the Sudanese judicial system was well-
capable as an independent and ethical set of institutions to handle the cases.263  
However, reforms to address partisanship in the Sudanese courts have not been 
carried out, thereby reducing the credibility of this claim. Moreover, despite Khartoum’s 
creation of special criminal courts to try Darfur crimes, such courts were limited to low-level 
crimes not under the ICC’s jurisdiction. Since their establishment, these courts have not 
prosecuted a single high level official involved with the chain of command and widespread 
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immunity provisions persist. Many judges, as well, remain political loyalists to the ruling 
NCP.264 In light of Sudan’s weak attempts to impose legitimate legal accountability that 
would match prosecution at the ICC’s level, the legal criticism lacks much force.  
Selective Bias 
 On March 8, 2009, shortly after the ICC issued its first warrant for Bashir, the Arab 
Bar Union released a statement saying that the Court “ignored atrocities committed by Israel 
on the Palestinian people…despite the many calls for investigations into the crimes 
committed by Israel against Palestinians.”265 Further painting the Court as a selective 
administer of justice, during the UNSC vote to pass the Darfur referral resolution Sudanese 
representative Elfatih Mohamed Ahmed Erwa claimed that the Court operated by double 
standards and was “sending a message that exemptions were only for major Powers.”266 In a 
December 2008 Crisis Group interview, numerous NCP figures expressed that they also 
believed the Court was biased.267 
Neo-colonialism/Imperialism Critique 
Intertwined with the selective bias critique is the even more common African 
assertion that the ICC’s investigation into Darfur illustrates the Court’s neo-colonial agenda. 
Sudanese representative Erwa, during the same UNSC vote to pass the Darfur referral 
resolution, declared that the UNSC interpreted justice in terms of “exceptions and 
exploitation of crises in developing countries and bargaining among major Powers” and 
claimed that “the ICC was intended for developing and weak countries and was a tool to 
exercise cultural superiority.”268 In the same 2008 Crisis Group interview, several NCP 
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figures further characterized the referral as a violation of Sudanese sovereignty and labeled 
the Court as a tool used to cripple Sudan.269 Bashir and his NCP party have in fact 
consistently painted the Court and the Chief Prosecutor at the time as a Western tool for 
regime change and opponent of Islamism and, in doing so, have rallied thousands of 
supporters in opposition to this perceived imperialist agenda.270 Former AU chairperson and 
former Libyan Prime Minister Muammer al-Qaddafi added fuel to the fire in 2009 when he 
called the ICC’s indictment of Bashir “a direct violation of the sovereignty of small 
independent countries and interference in their domestic affairs.”271 Taken together, the 
selective bias and neo-colonialism critiques of various African leaders in regards to the 
Darfur referral present some heavy charges against the Court and its credibility. 
Head of State Immunity Concerns 
 Not unconnected from the selectivity and neo-colonial concerns with the Court, 
African critics of the ICC Darfur intervention have also argued that prosecuting Bashir, as a 
sitting head of state, has consequences both for Sudan’s sovereignty and regional security. 
The AU, in its opposition to the indictment of sitting heads of state, explicitly asserted that 
such indictments undercut the “sovereignty, stability, and peace” of parties to the Statute.272 
The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) has further criticized the referral and indictment, 
partly in the interest of Sudan’s democratic governance.273 The AU as a body has explicitly 
challenged the Court’s legal ability to indict sitting heads of state, perceived to derive from 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute,274 arguing that the Rome Statute does not take precedence 
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over state officials’ immunity when those officials’ states are not members of the Court275 
and has firmly stated that such sitting leaders “should not be prosecuted while in office.”276 
So strong is this critique against head of state indictment that many attribute Bashir’s 
indictment to be the major force behind the wave of African backlash against the Court.277 
Yet, given leaders’ interwoven concerns with peace, selective justice, and neo-colonial 
agendas, it is unclear if African governments would arrest Bashir even if he were to leave 
office and no longer possess head of state immunities.  
Peace v. Justice 
 The final African critique of the ICC’s involvement with the Darfur case is the related 
concern with the ICC’s potential destabilizing effect on Sudan. During the UNSC vote to 
pass the resolution to refer the Darfur case to the Court, Sudanese representative Erwa 
claimed that referring the situation would impede peace processes and make the matter more 
complicated.278 Bashir’s government has further argued that the ICC’s intervention would 
drive instability in the region.279 The Sudanese government was also simultaneously dealing 
with potential South Sudanese secession and independence,280 which would eventually be 
achieved in 2011.281 
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The AU has agreed that the Court’s involvement would have negative consequences 
for Sudan’s security. In its March 5, 2009 meeting, the AU (PSC) sent out a communique 
asserting that Bashir’s indictment would seriously interfere with and subvert the ongoing 
peace, reconciliation, and democratic processes. In their view, his indictment would “have 
the potential to seriously undermine the ongoing efforts to address the many pressing peace 
and security challenges facing the Sudan and may lead to further suffering for the people of 
the Sudan and greater destabilization of the country and the region.282 While justice was 
important to members of the PSC, they also held that “the search for justice should be 
pursued in a way that does not impede or jeopardize the promotion of peace.”283 As was 
noted earlier, the primary stated motivation behind calls for the UNSC to defer Bashir’s 
indictment and arrest were concerns over the effects of Bashir’s prosecution on peace and 
stability within Sudan, thus lending weight to this particular critique.  
Darfur Investigation Critiques: In a Nutshell 
 As the first UNSC referral to the ICC, the Darfur case thus offers a lens into the 
criticisms of what is seen as this political, western-centric UN institution of which actors, and 
particularly Africans, had been keenly concerned with throughout the Rome negotiations. In 
the legal argument against the Court’s intervention, the Sudanese government pointed to the 
UNSC’s perceived lack of legal authority to refer the situation, while they also claimed that 
such a referral violated complementarity and thus Sudan’s sovereign ability to handle its own 
cases. The politics of UNSC referrals and power within the ICC process further played out in 
African criticisms of the Court’s apparent selective bias and double standards, in their belief 
that the UNSC was using the Court as a Western imperialist tool, and in their claims that 
indictments against Bashir further violated Sudanese sovereignty. Even the concern with the 
inhibition of peace processes, though not expressly tied to political charges against the UNSC 
and the Court, does connect to the head of state issue, as well as a potential perception of 
cavalier, western-style justice that does not consider local contexts when demanding legal 
accountability.   
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Case 2: Kenya 
The Conflict 
 Leading up to the Kenyan presidential election on December 27, 2007, Rail Odinga 
was poised to win and declared victory two days later, after votes put him strongly ahead.284 
By December 30, however, the votes had swung incumbent President Mwai Kibaki’s way, 
and the chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya declared Kibaki the winner, despite 
days later confessing that he did not know who the winner was.285 Odinga supporters 
challenged the results and pledged to inaugurate Odinga instead.286 Investigators have since 
uncovered evidence of vote rigging, including suspicious tally sheets and invalid ballots and 
suspicions of fraud in more than one-third of the constituencies.287 
 Soon after the results were announced, violence erupted along ethnic lines, as Kibaki 
was of the majority Kikuyus and Odinga was of the Luos.288 In only 59 days, the fighting 
slaughtered between 1,000 and 1,400 people,289 while police officers shot unarmed 
protestors, youth gangs torched homes, and riots erupted.290 Witnesses described the violence 
in terms of “Tribal war” as young men battled soldiers along ethnic lines.291 
 Perpetrators allegedly committed crimes against humanity in Nairobi, North Rift 
Valley, South Rift Valley, Central Rift Valley, Western Province, and Nyanze Province. In 
addition to taking thousands of lives, perpetrators also purportedly committed more than 900 
acts of documented sexual violence and rape, seriously injured more than 3,500 people, and 
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displaced 350,000 more. Such crimes included: burning people alive, destroying IDP 
shelters, beheadings, hacking people to death with machetes and pangas, terrorizing 
communities with checkpoints to pick victims according to ethnicity, gang rape, genital 
mutilation, and forcing families to witness such mutilation.292  
ICC Intervention 
 Prior to ICC intervention, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had pushed Kenya 
multiple times to establish a local tribunal to try the alleged post-election crimes.293 Despite 
support from both Kibaki and Odinga, however, the Kenyan Parliament refused to agree to 
such a tribunal in early 2009.294 In March 2010, new ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda 
used her proprio motu powers, the first time any ICC Prosecutor had done so, to launch an 
investigation into the Kenyan violence between June 1, 2005 and November 26, 2009.295  
The Court issued warrants against William Samoei Ruto, suspended Kenyan Minister 
of High Education, Science and Technology and MP for Eldoret North, as well as for Joseph 
Arap Sang, a Kass FM radio broadcaster.296 While Ruto was charged with coordinating a 
common plan to commit widespread systematic attacks against civilians that amounted to 
crimes against humanity, Sang was charged with contributing to this common plan by using 
his radio show to help advertise the plan, amplify violence, and broadcast lies.297 Also on 
March 8, the Court issued a warrant for Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, current President and 
former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance at the time of the alleged atrocities, 
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charging him with various crimes against humanity, including rape and murder.298 On August 
2, 2013 the Court expanded its warrants to charge Kenyan national Walter Osapiri Barasa 
with offences against administration and corrupting ICC witnesses.299 Later, on March 10, 
2015, the Court issued warrants against Kenyan lawyer Paul Gicheru and Kenyan national 
Philip Kipkoech Bett for similar offences of corruption against ICC witnesses.300 
Due to lack of sufficient evidence against Ruto and Sang, however, the case against 
them was terminated without prejudice on April 5, 2015. Similarly, charges against Kenyatta 
were withdrawn due to insufficient evidence. Barasa’s case remains in the Pre-Trial Stage, 
while Gicheru and Bett remain at-large.301 
Government Response 
 Following their ICC summonses in 2011, Kenyatta and Ruto, former bitter 
adversaries, formed the Jubilee Alliance and won the country’s 2013 election.302 During their 
campaign, they vilified the ICC and engendered a Kenyan protest opposing outside meddling 
into Kenyan matters.303 In 2011, Kenya also requested a UNSC deferral of the case,304 which 
the AU supported in its 16th Summit later that year.305 The Government called upon the AU 
to demand that Kenyatta, who at this point was President, would not have to attend trial.306 
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The Government307 and the AU308 in 2013 then requested once more that the UNSC defer the 
case under its Article 16 power. However, this effort failed to gain the support of even a 
majority of the fifteen UNSC members in a vote.309 
 The UNSC’s failure to defer the case did not stop Kenyatta from berating the Court 
and defending himself from its charges against him. Despite refusing to appear at prior court 
dates due to his presidential responsibilities, Kenyatta agreed to appear at The Hague in 2014 
after the Court declared that he must be physically present at the proceedings.310 Before 
agreeing, however, Kenyatta handed his presidential duties over to Ruto, so as to appear at 
the Court as a private individual, rather than a president, and to thus supposedly protect 
Kenya’s sovereignty.311 When he arrived at the ICC, Kenyatta “mounted a vigorous defense” 
which eventually resulted in his charges being withdrawn.312 In the fall of 2015 the Kenyan 
government advocated for an amendment to Rule 68, which had admitted pre-recorded 
evidence into the ICC case against Ruto where those witnesses had since abandoned their 
testimony.313 The appeals courts were already considering the correct application of this rule 
and on February 12, 2016, ruled that the Trial Chamber had erred in admitting the pre-
recorded evidence in Ruto and Sang’s case.314 In addition to these attempts, Kenya has also 
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engaged its diplomats in garnering support for a mass African withdrawal from the Court.315 
Like Sudan’s reaction to the Darfur referral, Kenya has vehemently resisted the Court’s 
investigation into its country’s conflict.  
Criticisms Embodied in the Kenyan Case 
 Unlike the Darfur referral, Kenya’s case presents an opportunity to examine a Chief 
Prosecutor-initiated case where, despite the lack of an active UNSC role in referring the case, 
Africans have still leveled charges of neo-colonialism and imperialism against the Court 
itself. Though leaders have similarly criticized the Court for its selective bias and targeting of 
a head of state in the Kenyan case, Kenyatta and fellow leaders have mounted a particularly 
aggressive campaign against the Court as an imperialist institution within the context of the 
Kenyan referral. Such criticisms accentuate Kenya’s perceived lack of domestic control over 
its judicial process, as well as the sentiment that the Court is intentionally smiting Kenya. 
Sitting Head of State and Selective Bias 
 Though not the crux of criticisms related to the Kenyan case, leaders have 
nonetheless pointed to concerns with prosecuting Kenyatta as a sitting head of state and 
another African country in general, despite atrocities committed elsewhere in the world.316 
Following a September 2013 al-Shabaab attack in Nairobi, the Kenyan government argued 
that Kenyatta needed to have the ability to address domestic terrorism, which they viewed the 
prosecution as hindering.317 Stability was only one concern related to the prosecution of 
Kenyatta, however, as the AU has also condemned Kenyatta’s prosecution as an 
infringement on African state sovereignty, much like they did with regards to Bashir’s 
indictment.318 Also similar to the Bashir case, Kenyan Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed has 
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pointed to head of state immunity as an international legal “principle that has existed for a 
long time.”319 
 In addition to this head of state concern, African leaders discussing the Kenyan 
referral have echoed Darfur referral criticisms regarding the Court’s selective bias. In 2011, 
Jean Ping, AU Commission Chief, accused the Court of “rendering justice with double 
standards.”320 Relatedly, Kenyatta at the 2013 AU Summit remarked,  
All the people indicted before that court, ever since its founding, have been 
Africans(…)We would love nothing more than to have an international forum 
for justice and accountability, but what choice do we have when we get only 
bias and race-hunting at the ICC?321 
 
The Big Critique: Neo-colonialism/Imperialistic Agenda 
 Since the beginning of the Court’s investigation into Kenya’s post-election violence, 
Kenyatta has deliberately framed its relations with the Court as a sovereignty issue.322 
Following the 2013 charges against Ruto and Sang, the Jubilee Alliance engendered “an anti-
imperialist sentiment among Kenyans” of which Kenyatta and Ugandan President Yoweri 
Museveni further fueled at Kenyatta’s presidential swearing-in ceremony.323 Museveni, in his 
address to the crowd, saluted Kenyan voters for their “rejection of the blackmail by the court 
and those who seek to abuse this institution for their own agenda.”324 At the AU Summit later 
in 2013, Kenyatta laid this sentiment out quite clearly, stating,  
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The ICC has been reduced to a painfully farcical pantomime, a travesty that 
adds insult to the injury of victims. It stopped being the home of justice the 
day it became the toy of declining imperial powers (…) It is the fact that this 
court performs on the cue of European and American governments against the 
sovereignty of African States and peoples that should outrage us (…) Africa is 
not a third-rate territory of second-class peoples. We are not a project, or 
experiment of outsiders.325  
 
In 2016, Kenyatta vowed to continue to defy the Court’s attempts to abuse their 
“sovereignty, security, and dignity as Africans” in his push for Africa to leave the ICC.326 He 
then capitalized on the dropped charges against Ruto and Sang, expressing vindication in 
May of 2016 when the supposedly politically-motivated indictments were vacated.327 He 
further claimed that the Court “was being manipulated by certain elements” in order “to 
influence Africans.”328 In this same interview, Kenyatta expressed powerful sentiments 
related to domestic ownership over the justice process, asserting,  
Our position has always been reform the ICC if you want our continued 
participation. We have put the same case before the Security Council – that 
this organization [sic] requires reform. And if we're not going to get the kind 
of reforms that we need, we are going to pull out. Let us form our own court 
that is going to actually handle these issues because it looks like those who 
pay the court are the ones who tell the court what to do. That wasn't the basis 
of setting up the court.329 
 
Kenyan Critiques: In a Nutshell 
 The Kenyan case, though similar to the Darfur case in terms of the head of state and 
selective bias criticisms, provides an intense focus on African perceptions of the Court’s 
apparent neo-colonial/imperialistic agenda. Unlike the Darfur referral, the Kenyan referral 
criticisms are directed solely at the Court and its supposed manipulation by outside, western 
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forces. Such vehement criticisms, which attack the core of the ICC’s legitimacy and mission, 
provide a stunning look into deep-seated African distrust of the Court and thus reveal a 
massive challenge for the Court in its continued operation.  
Case 3: Uganda 
The Conflict 
 Since the 1990s, the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel 
group with the aim of establishing a state centered around the Ten Commandments, have 
been embroiled in a civil war in which both sides have committed atrocities.330 LRA Leader 
Joseph Kony has been accused of abducting 30,000 Acholi children to serve as child soldiers 
or sex slaves in his army, which thus complicates the prosecution of LRA members who 
were initially victimized, abducted, and abused by LRA leadership.331 The LRA has been 
accused of murdering, kidnapping, sexually enslaving, and mutilating civilians, conscripting 
child soldiers, and destroying houses and camp settlements.332 The Ugandan government, for 
its part, has been accused of committing crimes during their counterinsurgency campaign and 
have allegedly aimed to quash the Acholi and civilian support for the rebels.333 Their alleged 
crimes include displacing people into “forced camps” without providing adequate amenities 
for them, arbitrarily arresting, treating, and torturing civilians, murder, assault, rape and 
defilement, and the use of child soldiers.334 Museveni has also been accused of corruption 
and the nefarious distribution of natural resources and has notably abolished his own 
presidential term limits.335 
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 Despite two years of negotiations between the Ugandan Government and the LRA in 
the Juba talks336 and some temporary stability in 2008, the LRA continues to perpetrate 
heinous crimes and has even spread to the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan.337 In December of 2008, Uganda, Sudan, and 
the DRC jointly attacked the LRA with U.S. backing, prompting the LRA to call for a 
ceasefire in early 2009.338 Yet, Kony refuses to agree to a peace deal so long as the ICC holds 
charges against him.339 As the conflict rages on, some 1.6 million people from Northern 
Uganda have been displaced, while over 100,000 have been killed, mutilated, or 
kidnapped.340 
ICC Intervention 
 Unlike the Darfur and Kenyan cases, the Ugandan situation was referred to the ICC 
by the Ugandan government itself.341 In January of 2004, the Ugandan government stated, 
Having exhausted every other means of bringing an end to this terrible 
suffering, the Republic of Uganda now turns to the newly established ICC and 
its promise of global justice. Uganda pledges its full cooperation to the 
Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of LRA crimes, achievement 
of which is vital not only for the future progress of the nation, but also for the 
suppression of the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole.342 
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Contained within this statement are the recognition that previous efforts at peace had failed, 
the hope that ICC prosecution would bring that much needed peace, and the key expectation 
that such prosecution would only focus on LRA crimes — something that harkens back to 
the ICTR’s experience with the Kagame government.  
 Indeed, though the ICC is investigating alleged war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed in the civil war between the Ugandan government and the LRA since 
July 1, 2002, the Court has only issued warrants for LRA perpetrators.343 The ICC has thus 
far issued warrants against LRA Leader Joseph Kony, LRA Vice-Chairmen and Second-in-
Command Vincent Otti, LRA Deputy Army Commander Okot Odhiambo, LRA Deputy 
Army Commander Raska Lukwiya, and LRA Brigade Commander Dominic Ongwen.344 
Arrest warrants for Kony, Otti, and Ongwen were issued on July 8, 2005,345 and though 
Kony and Otti remain at-large, Ongwen is currently in the midst of trial after having 
allegedly defected from the LRA in January of 2015 and turning himself into the Court.346 
All three leaders have been charged with numerous crimes against humanity, while Kony and 
Otti have also been charged with several war crimes, allegedly perpetrated in Northern 
Uganda after July 1, 2002.347 Lukwiya’s case was terminated after his death in July of 2007, 
while Odhiambo’s was terminated following his death in September of 2015.348  
Government Reaction 
 Since the Ugandan case was a self-referral, the Ugandan government was, at least 
initially, very supportive of the investigation and pledged full compliance. In turning 
jurisdiction over to the Court, the Ugandan government considered: (1) the scale and 
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seriousness of the alleged crimes; (2) the great benefit that the Court would provide to 
victims and toward fostering reconciliation and social healing; and (3) the Ugandan 
government’s inability to apprehend the suspected most-responsible perpetrators.349 Such 
notions of the Court’s ability to hold perpetrators accountable and do so in a way that would 
contribute to peace and reconciliation are striking to contrast with later conceptions of the 
Court by Museveni himself.  
Interestingly and despite his public statements suggesting otherwise, the 
understanding from Ugandan President Museveni’s end was that the Court would only be 
prosecuting LRA crimes.350 Museveni in early 2004, shortly after the referral stated, “I am 
ready to be investigated for war crimes…and if any of our people were involved in any 
crimes, we will give him up to be tried by the ICC (…) And in any case, if such cases are 
brought to our attention, we will try them ourselves.”351 Comments by government officials 
and analyses by international justice scholars, however, suggest otherwise.  
As Akhavan argues, Uganda referred its situation out of security concerns related to 
the LRA and the need to hold them accountable through apolitical trials.352 In a 2008 
interview with Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner, a Ugandan government minister stated 
that the goal of the referral was “to intimidate these thugs [the LRA], to show that they were 
sought by many more.”353 Additionally, in Ugandan Defence Minister Mbabazi’s statements 
to the Ugandan Parliament in late July of 2004, he framed the ICC’s investigation in terms of 
LRA crimes and assured Parliament that “the number of people to be handled by the ICC 
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does not exceed five,”354 again insinuating that the ICC would only be pursuing LRA 
atrocities. 
Unsurprisingly, given these comments, the Ugandan government has since made 
several threats against the Court in which they have said they would withdraw the referral if 
Ugandan and government officials who claim innocence were to be prosecuted.355 Museveni 
himself has turned against the Court since the referral, rebuking the Court in the context of 
both the Ugandan and Kenyan referrals by calling the Court “useless.”356 He has further 
accused the ICC of blackmail, incompetence, and self-interest.357 
Criticisms Embodied in the Ugandan Case 
 Criticisms in the Ugandan case focus both on the principle of complementarity and 
the prosecution’s perceived inhibition of peace processes. As a self-referral, criticisms of the 
ICC’s investigation into Uganda are fascinating, especially considering the Ugandan 
government’s prior statements regarding the Court’s ability to deliver global justice and 
contribute to peace, reconciliation, and healing within Uganda. Given the government’s 
initial receptiveness to the Court’s involvement, these critiques are particularly interesting to 
unwrap. This change of heart and the evidence from official comments suggest that Ugandan 
support for the Court extended only in-so-far as the government wouldn’t be held 
accountable by its justice. 
The Complementarity Critique 
 Complementarity was a principle of fundamental importance to many involved in the 
Rome negotiations. This idea that the Court would only prosecute when national courts were 
either unable or unwilling to try perpetrators, while central to the Court’s functioning, was 
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nonetheless problematic from the beginning, given that the Rome Statute provides no 
guidance for determining the competency of a national judiciary.358 Despite this lack of 
guidance, some scholars and legal professionals within the Ugandan judiciary have asserted 
that Uganda has capable judiciaries.359  
At the 2010 Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Justice Kiza, Head of the Special War Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda, 
asserted that the Ugandan courts were able and willing to prosecute those indicted by the 
Court. Kiza did, however, request assistance from the international community in building up 
the courts by training prosecutors.360 Thus, the question as to whether the ICC appropriately 
has jurisdiction to try the crimes committed during Uganda’s Civil War is one rife with 
contention, not only within Uganda, but among scholars and lawyers in the international 
legal community.  
The Big Critique: Peace v. Justice 
 The major critique embodied in the Ugandan case revolves not around its legal 
admissibility but rather around the classic “peace versus justice debate.” Scholars like Adam 
Branch have argued that there is no incentive for LRA commanders to negotiate a peace deal, 
given the threat of ICC prosecution. According to Branch, “nobody can convince the leaders 
of a rebel movement to come to the negotiating table and at the same time tell them that they 
will appear in courts to be prosecuted.”361 Prior to its referral, Uganda in 2000 signaled its 
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belief that amnesties, as opposed to prosecutions, might incentivize the LRA to participate in 
peace talks.362 After Acholi mobilized in an effort to foster peace, the Ugandan Parliament 
passed the Uganda Amnesty Act of 2000, which provided LRA leaders with amnesty.363 
Akhavan, however, notes that no LRA leader used the Act and thus concludes that the Act 
was a failure.364  
 The ICC’s arrest warrants effectively nullify the Amnesty Act,365 which thereby 
renders Uganda’s actual commitment to peace through amnesty dubious, at best, given that 
they themselves referred the situation to the Court. Museveni, upon referring the case to the 
Court, had expressed to then-Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo that he intended to modify 
the Amnesty Act in order to remove protections for the LRA leadership.366 Once again, the 
Ugandan government’s political motivations for the referral perhaps reveal its inconsistent 
commitment to legal accountability in the context of the conflict’s alleged crimes. Branch 
suggests that the warrants were part of Uganda’s military strategy, in that it legitimized the 
government’s cause and thus allowed it to enhance its militarism against the rebels.367 The 
ICC’s investigation into the LRA, in this view, would position the Ugandan government as 
the right side of the conflict and potentially empower the military to use greater force against 
their opponents. 
 Yet again, in another example of Uganda’s inconsistent dedication to legal 
accountability and in blatant disregard of the ICC’s arrest warrants, Uganda offered “total 
amnesty” to Kony in 2006 in an attempt to end the civil war.368 Criticizing the UN’s inability 
to arrest Kony, Museveni remarked that the UN had failed to fulfill its duty to arrest the most 
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responsible perpetrator.369 During this time, the Sudanese and Southern Sudanese 
governments were attempting negotiations with the LRA and, according to UN reporting, 
LRA violence substantially decreased during this period.370 LRA fighters had been living and 
fighting in Sudan and had previously been receiving munitions from the Sudanese 
government.371  
Riek Machar, Southern Sudan’s Vice President, supported the notion that peace had 
to happen before legal accountability could be pursued, remarking, “Our priority is ending 
the war, bringing a peaceful settlement and then, after that, any legal process can take 
place.”372 He further stated that arresting the suspected perpetrators “would be obstructing a 
major process,”373 meaning the ongoing peace processes. While Machar’s approach to the 
peace versus justice debate leaves room for justice to follow after peace, it nonetheless 
reveals concern among African leaders that ICC intervention may prolong turmoil and 
suffering within the very region its prosecutions are meant to serve. 
Ugandan Critiques: In a Nutshell 
Uganda’s initial support and cooperation with the ICC undoubtedly adds a twist to 
their later and present critiques of the Court’s intervention. Though upon referral Uganda 
lauded the ICC for its perceived ability to hold perpetrators accountable and contribute to 
peace in Uganda, such praise appeared to be contingent upon the Ugandan government’s 
ability to use the Court to its own advantage. Indeed, remarks made by officials during the 
referral period suggest that the Ugandan government aimed to use ICC intervention as a 
means of quashing the LRA.  
The dubious nature of this referral undoubtedly connects to criticisms that the Court’s 
investigation into the Ugandan crimes violates the Rome Statute’s principle of 
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complementarity, which thus calls into question the legitimacy of the Court’s proceedings in 
the case. Moreover, the Ugandan government’s inconsistent policy toward amnesty and legal 
accountability further complicates its criticism that the Court is inhibiting peace processes in 
Uganda by imposing the law. While scholars generally and in the context of the Ugandan 
case recognize the validity of peace concerns as related to legal accountability, the Ugandan 
government’s flip-flopping has made the task of determining where it stands on this issue 
murky, at best.  
The AU-ICC Relationship: A Tense Dynamic 
 Turning away from the individual case studies, an examination into collective African 
dynamics with the Court, embodied best in the actions of the African Union, is in order. 
Upon such an examination, it is clear that no love is lost in the relationship between the 
African Union and the ICC, as the AU continues to oppose the ICC and refuse to cooperate 
with it. According to Murithi, “the AU sees its relationship with the ICC as so damaged that 
it is actively exploring how to make the Court’s future presence in Africa irrelevant.”374 
Those are hardly the actions of an institution supportive of and optimistic about the Court’s 
work.  
 In July of 2009 and having unsuccessfully requested UNSC deferral of ICC 
proceedings against Bashir, the AU in its summit meeting passed a decision pledging non-
cooperation with the Court regarding the arrest of Bashir. The AU connected this refusal to 
comply with concerns about the viability of peace in Sudan, as well as the dignity and 
sovereignty of the African continent.375 Once again, the major critiques are connected to and 
mutually reinforce one another.  
On February 2, 2010, the AU sought an amendment to the Rome Statute to give the 
UN General Assembly deferral power for cases in situations where the UNSC had not made 
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a decision.376 African experts Akande, Du Plessis, and Jalloh argue that this amendment push 
reflects the severity of AU concerns regarding peace and justice, as well as concerns over the 
UNSC’s enhanced role, particularly in regards to the Sudanese case.377 They also point to 
potential legal problems associated with it, such as whether the UN Charter confers upon the 
General Assembly the authority to act in situations where the UNSC is actively involved.378 
They thus conclude that, legally, the General Assembly would be able to act only in so far as 
they acted with secondary responsibility, in situations where the UNSC was not presently 
deliberating the specific request for deferral.379 Despite this, the Rome Statute’s requirements 
for specific amendments make it is unlikely that such an amendment could get the required 
support of seven-eighths of the state parties that it needs to pass.380 
The AU, for its part, has not stopped trying to assert itself against the ICC. At their 
2013 meeting in Addis Ababa, the AU again staunchly opposed the prosecution of sitting 
heads of state and, in particular, the indictments against Kenyatta and Bashir. Just as they had 
done in their previous statements and decisions, the AU connected their concern with sitting 
head of state prosecutions to concerns with sovereignty and peace, while they also 
highlighted the Court’s “unfair treatment of Africa and Africans.”381  
One year later, the AU shifted its focus to African judiciaries and expanding their 
jurisdiction relative to the ICC. In 2014, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government met in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea to adopt the Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Under this 
protocol, the AU extended the future Court’s jurisdiction to the four classes of international 
crimes covered by the ICC (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of 
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aggression). The protocol further granted immunity to sitting heads of state or government, 
or other senior-level officials while in office.382 The AU’s specific legal action to grant 
immunity to sitting heads of state and other high-level officials illustrates AU force behind its 
criticisms and reveals their commitment to opposing the prosecutions of such individuals 
while they are in office. 
In addition to these AU measures, the AU has also increasingly pushed for a 
permanent African seat on the Security Council. With no African representation on the “P5” 
within the Council, African critics of the Council’s make-up have increasingly perceived the 
Council’s ability to refer cases to the ICC as perpetuating the dominance of the developed 
North over the developing South.383 Such concerns undoubtedly resonate with the neo-
colonial/imperialist agenda critique examined in the case studies and recent African 
withdrawals from the Court.  
At the UN General Assembly’s 68th session in 2013, African leaders advocated for a 
permanent seat. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, South African Minister of International 
Relations, asserted, “The 70% of the issues that go to the Security Council are about us, so it 
cannot continue to be without us.”384 In 2016 at its 26th Summit, the AU enhanced its 
demands and called for two permanent seats with the veto power and five non-permanent 
seats, which would expand the Council from 15 to 26 members.385 In light of the AU’s recent 
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agreement for a mass African withdrawal from the Court, the saga of the AU’s contentious 
relationship with the ICC and the UNSC continues.  
Connections to Historical Concerns 
 Looking back at the African backlash as exemplified by the recent withdrawals, the 
three case studies, and the AU-ICC relationship, a clear nexus exists between these criticisms 
and those evoked in Chapter 1’s analysis of historical international justice concerns. From 
concerns with selective justice and the perceived neo-colonial/imperialistic agenda, to the 
peace versus justice debate, to questions regarding head of state prosecutions, to the intense 
resistance from governments whose individuals are subjected to prosecution, clear parallels 
arise between historical and present critiques. An analysis into these parallels provides an 
interesting perspective on current concerns and their evidently enduring legacies.  
Selective Bias and Neo-colonial/Imperialistic Agenda Parallels  
 In the analyses of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the discussions and negotiations leading 
up to the Rome Statute, various actors expressed concerns with selective justice and a feared 
nefarious neo-colonial agenda in regards to international judicial institutions. In the case of 
the ICTY, locals, and Serbs in particular, viewed the Court as biased against Serbs and 
perhaps rightfully so, as during the first few years of its operation the ICTY only indicted and 
prosecuted Serbs. Additionally, one of the ICTY’s major challenges was its physical distance 
from those it was meant to serve and its failure to foster domestic ownership over the judicial 
process. Such challenges reflect both concerns with selective bias in prosecutions, as well as 
resistance to seemingly imposed forms of judicial accountability from the outside.  
 The ICTR, as well, struggled with the “victor’s justice” dilemma and the one-sided 
prosecutions of Hutus, again contributing to notions of selective bias. In another clear 
connection to present African concerns with the ICC, Kagame and the RPF continually 
framed the ICTR as a western imposition of justice, pointing to the Tribunal’s distanced 
location and external staffing. Like the ICTY, the ICTR also struggled with fostering 
domestic ownership of prosecutions, which again reflects current African concerns with neo-
colonial/imperialistic control of judicial processes that involve Africa. 
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 Throughout the ICC discussions and negotiations, as well, States and African leaders 
in particular called for impartiality, fairness and objectivity, thus signaling their concerns that 
bias could be an issue. Actors also raised concerns over domestic ownership of justice and 
the need to strengthen national judiciaries, which again ties to the neo-colonial thread. 
Moreover, numerous actors and Africans in particular raised alarms over the scope of the 
UNSC’s and major powers’ power over the Court, suggesting that political biases were 
clearly on African minds from the beginning. Debates over referral and initiation 
mechanisms, consent requirements, and jurisdiction further relate to questions regarding 
various actors’ relative roles in the judicial process. Such debates call attention to historical 
and present concerns regarding whose voices and agendas have power in the ICC’s judicial 
process, and whose do not.  
Peace versus Justice Parallels  
 The “peace versus justice debate,” as well, finds it roots back in the historical 
concerns outlined in the studies of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC negotiations. In the establishing 
documents for both the ICTY and ICTR, the expectation was that the two tribunals would 
foster peace and reconciliation in their respective regions of focus. As was discussed in 
Chapter 1, however, both tribunals have failed to do so. In the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY 
failed to contribute to peace and reconciliation and the region actually experienced 
radicalization since intervention. One of the most vicious events of the conflict, the 
Srebrenica massacre, occurred in the midst of indictments. In Rwanda, as well, the ICTR 
failed to foster reconciliation. Victims and locals discussed in the previous chapter expressed 
that, to the contrary, Rwanda experienced an entrenchment of hostilities after the 
prosecutions. 
 During the negotiations for the ICC, however, various actors pointed to the potential 
peaceful power of legal accountability. Recall that Mr. Omar, the South African delegate 
who represented the SADC, explicitly advocated for the Court’s role as a promoter of 
international peace. Ambassador Josiah Jele Khiphusizi, another South African 
representative speaking on the SADC’s behalf, had similarly promoted the ICC’s potential 
ability to deter crimes and thus contribute to peace. This past faith in the law’s ability to 
foster peace is not only intriguing in light of current African criticisms of the Court’s effect 
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on peace, but also encouraging in that it signals potential hope for the Court’s future if key 
reforms are made. 
Prosecuting Sitting Heads of State Parallels  
 The experiences of the ICTY and ICTR regarding the prosecution of sitting heads of 
state varied, while during the Rome negotiations the specific question of prosecuting such 
officials was not directly addressed and thus, not perceived as a key issue then. The ICTY set 
a precedent for the international prosecution of sitting heads of state by prosecuting 
Milosevic and Karadzic, while the ICTR failed to prosecute those suspected of crimes within 
the ruling RPF in Rwanda. As was discussed in Chapter 1, prosecutor Del Ponte’s attempts to 
investigate RPF crimes ran up against staunch resistance from the Rwandan government, 
who opposed any governmental accountability.  
While the question of sitting head of state prosecution was not explicitly addressed 
during negotiations for the ICC, members did consistently express their commitment to 
fighting impunity at the highest levels, suggesting that even prominent officials should not be 
above prosecution. Given the severe African backlash against head of state indictments, 
perhaps actors did not envision that the Court would actually pursue prosecutions of sitting 
heads of state. When this became a reality, African leaders fought back hard.  
Other Parallels: Government Resistance and Non-Cooperation  
 In addition to the parallels with the four main criticisms is the connection between 
historical and present governmental resistance to international prosecutions. In both the 
ICTY and ICTR experiences, governments actively resisted international judicial 
accountability as delivered by the tribunals. In the case of the ICTR, the Rwandan 
government rallied locals against the ICTR through an intense anti-tribunal slander 
campaign.  
In the case studies of Darfur, Kenya, and Uganda, governmental resistance to 
prosecutions is rather clear, though certainly complicated in the Ugandan case. The Ugandan 
government’s initial support of and then opposition to the ICC is reminiscent of the Rwandan 
government’s turn on the ICTR, which suggests that the possibility of governmental 
accountability for crimes fueled backlash against the courts in both instances. Such parallels 
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shed light on the challenges of garnering governmental support for international 
prosecutions, particularly when institutions like the ICC lack enforcement mechanisms386 to 
facilitate accountability. With the ICC largely at the whim of state members to aid in the 
arrest process, such resistance and non-cooperation trends are incredibly problematic for the 
Court’s long-term viability.  
Taking Stock of the Backlash 
 This chapter has endeavored to detail both the immediate and multi-faceted nature of 
the African backlash against the ICC. Africa’s transition in Chapter 1 from one of the Court’s 
most ardent advocates to its role in Chapter 2 as the Court’s most vehement critic is indeed a 
fascinating switch to study. The concerns raised by the recent withdrawal attempts of 
Burindi, South Africa, and The Gambia, as well as those drawn out through the case studies 
of Darfur, Kenya, and Uganda and the examination of the AU-ICC relationship, reveal the 
complex and serious nature of African critiques of the Court.  
These four main critiques (selective bias, neo-colonial/imperialistic agenda, inhibition 
of peace processes, and lack of respect for heads of state) work together in interesting ways 
to challenge both the integrity and credibility of the Court, as well as the Court’s ability to 
foster peace for the victims and communities it is meant to serve. Considering the historical 
connection that these concerns have to the critiques and challenges faced by the ICTY and 
the ICTR, as well as the concerns raised during the Rome negotiations, these criticisms are 
clearly deeply-rooted and enduring in the context of international legal accountability. Such 
connections between historical and present critiques allow one to understand the depth of the 
various issues and to seek ways to avoid making similar mistakes in the future.  
Learning from these common critiques is indeed crucial, given that such concerns 
have already begun to propel African nations to withdraw from the Court. With the AU’s 
recent plan to collectively withdraw from the Court in the not-so-distant future, the 
international community cannot afford to let these concerns go unaddressed. But first, a look 
                                                                        
386 Gwen P. Barnes, “The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms: The Indictment 
of President Omar Al Bashir,” Fordham International Law Journal 34, no. 6 (2011): 1587, 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2313&context=ilj. 
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at local African perceptions is in order, as, after all, who is the Court meant to serve if not the 
people living near and most-affected by the crimes?  
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Chapter 3: Victim/Local and Civil Society Voices 
 Having explored both the historical concerns raised in Chapter 1 and the current 
critiques of African leaders investigated in Chapter 2, we must now turn to the perspectives 
of those most affected by the crimes, as well as the insights of those who help advocate for 
them: the victims-locals and civil society actors. Examining the perceptions of African 
victims and locals is important in its own right, as understanding how the people most 
affected by the prosecuted crimes perceive the Court and its work is crucial for evaluating the 
Court’s efficacy. African victim and local perspectives are also important to consider in 
relation to the concerns raised by governments in the previous chapters, as their voices may 
provide an interesting contrast between elite and local actors’ perspectives.387  
One cannot conduct such an analysis, however, without also examining the reactions 
of broader African civil society. From their support for the Rome Statute to their continued 
advocacy for the Court and efforts at the local level, African civil society has played a key 
role in bridging the divide between the ICC and the people it serves. This essential function 
will prove vital when considering future policy recommendations for the Court in its effort to 
regain African support.  
Early Expectations and Current Pitfalls 
 From the beginning of the Rome Conference, the focus of the ICC’s justice was 
supposedly upon the victims of the perpetrators it would be prosecuting. To begin the 
Conference, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared that “the overriding interest 
must be that of the victims, and of the international community as a whole.”388 The ICC itself 
would reinforce this explicit focus on the victims eight years later, when the Pre-Trial 
Chamber described the Rome Statute as providing victims with “an independent voice and 
                                                                        
387 Due to source limitations, the victim and local voices and perspectives come from fragmented sources, such 
as news articles, national polls, fieldwork, and reports from various victims’ rights groups. These perspectives 
are thus not systematic and do not represent the voices of all African victims and locals in regards to the ICC. 
388 United Nations, “UN Secretary-General Declares Overriding Interest of International Criminal Court 
Conference Must Be that of Victims and World Community as a Whole” (UN Press Release, June 15, 1998), 
http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980615.sgsm6597.html. 
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role in proceedings before the Court.”389 Thus, both the Court and influential actors have 
championed the Court as an institution endeavoring to both serve and empower victims in the 
justice process. 
 Yet, has the Court really empowered and served victims in its pursuit of justice? 
Anecdotal evidence and analyses by scholars suggest that the answer is perhaps a 
disappointing, “No.” According to one victim, “The court hears the voices of the people who 
perpetrated this violence, not the victims.”390 Peter Kagwanja, CEO of the Africa Policy 
Institute, further challenges the notion that the ICC has prioritized victims in its pursuits and 
instead suggests a kind of justice from on high. Referring to Kenya, Kagwanja states,  
The kind of hang ’em [sic] high justice you see at the ICC has absolutely 
nothing to do with the victims. For the last five years IDPs have been in 
camps rain come, rain go. Children who were born when they were displaced 
are now five years [old]. What has the ICC done to ensure these kids go to 
school? What has [the] ICC done to ensure that these people are resettled as it 
pursues this other kind of justice?391 
 
Sara Kendall and Sarah Nouwen reinforce this notion that the Court, in practice, does little to 
serve the victims of the crimes it tackles. According to them, the Court in its victim-centered 
rhetoric and victim legal categorization has created “a deity-like and seemingly sovereign 
entity, ‘The Victim’, which transcends all actual victims and corresponds to no individual 
victims in their particularity.”392 The Court simply does not appear to back up its claim to 
                                                                        
389 International Criminal Court, “Decision on the Application for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1-
6” (Pre-Trial Chamber I, January 17, 2006). 
390 Mark Kersten, “The ICC, A Victims’ Court? It Could Happen,” Justice in Conflict, November 21, 2015, 
https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/11/21/the-icc-a-victims-court-it-could-happen/. 
391 Olive Burrows, “ICC Trials Have Done Little for Victims,” Capital News, September 12, 2013, 
https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/09/icc-trials-done-little-victims/. 
This quote reveals the disconnect between victims and the justice rendered by the ICC, as it highlights 
differences in victim priorities versus those pursued by the legal mechanisms of the ICC. The explicit mention 
of “this other kind of justice” also indicates a potential feeling among victims that the ICC is imposing an 
outside form of justice. While directly providing for these services may not rightfully be the ICC’s 
responsibility, it is nonetheless important to recognize and consider this clear and major issue of local 
disconnect when evaluating the Court’s present and future viability as a judicial institution. 
392 Sara Kendall and Sarah Nouwen, “Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: The Gap 
between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, New York: Social Science 
Research Network, August 12, 2013), 8, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2313094. 
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serving victims once one looks below the surface of its goals to see the practical impact of its 
work.   
Victim and Local Perspectives: A Mixed Bag of Perceptions 
 Investigating this impact, in fact, reveals interesting divisions among victims and 
locals regarding the work of the Court. Such mixed perceptions undoubtedly highlight the 
complexity of the Court’s victim and local relations and the need to parse out various strands 
of criticism, as well as the strands of hope that some of the perceptions leave room for. 
Divisions among victims and locals regarding the Court exist on several dimensions, 
including: (1) knowledge and interaction with the Court; (2) perceptions of their indicted 
leaders; (3) perceptions of the Court’s bias; (4) how to handle atrocities and priorities in 
relation to justice, including peace versus justice concerns; and (5) frustrations with the slow 
and limited justice process. It is to these dimensions that we now turn.  
Knowledge of and Interaction with the Court 
 One factor of division among many victims and locals is the relative knowledge that 
they have of the Court and how it works. According to a study of 622 victim participants393 
from Uganda, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, and the DRC, a majority of victim participants lacked 
adequate knowledge of the ICC.394 In the words of one DRC victim,  
As victims, we do not understand. We need more information so we 
understand our case. Intermediaries are struggling to inform us. They provide 
information when they have it, but the problem is to reach us. Their means are 
limited. There are not enough efforts to keep the victims informed.395 
                                                                        
393 Victim participants are victims of crimes under ICC investigation who participate in the ICC’s proceedings. 
See Stephen Smith Cody et al., “The Victims’ Court? A Study of 622 Victim Participants at the International 
Criminal Court” (Human Rights Center: UC Berkeley School of Law, 2015), 1, 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6v00x9jf.pdf. 
394 Ibid., 71. 
395 Ibid., 43. 
This foreshadows civil society arguments that NGOs need more funds and support from the Court in order to 
perform their intermediary function. 
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While the survey of Ugandan victims and locals potentially contradicts this by finding that 
60% of respondents had heard of the ICC,396 this does not mean that those respondents had 
an in-depth knowledge of the ICC and its work.  
A different study indeed suggests this lack of awareness about the intricacies of the 
Court’s processes, particularly in regards to victims’ rights in the Court. DRC community 
groups in South Kivu reported that “the population is not at all informed about its rights. This 
is the reason why most experience difficulties in seeking justice.”397 At the same time, some 
NGOs in Ituri Province in the DRC have asserted that the ICC’s involvement has enabled 
child soldiers to realize that they could make a claim at the Court as victims,398 thus 
suggesting evidence of positive knowledge among some victims. 
Those who had a firmer grasp on the Court and victim rights likely developed such a 
knowledge-base by virtue of their higher levels of interaction with the Court. Additionally, 
the victim participants study found that personal satisfaction with the ICC depended upon 
victim participants’ individual interactions with the ICC staff and their lawyers,399 again 
suggesting the variability in victim perceptions. Another study of victims found that, in the 
DRC, victims who directly participated in the Court proceedings were “to some extent 
satisfied by the procedures and the work undertaken by the ICC.”400 Thus, not only are 
victims and locals divided regarding their knowledge of the ICC, but this division also likely 
impacts their level of involvement with the Court and, connected to this, their level of 
satisfaction with its work.  
                                                                        
396 Phuong Pham et al., “When the War Ends: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, 
and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda” (Human Rights Center: UC Berkeley School of Law; Payson 
Center for International Development; International Center for Transitional Justice, 2007), 5, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1448368. 
397 Victims’ Rights Working Group, “The Impact of the Rome Statute System on Victims and Affected 
Communities,” April 2010, 18, 
http://www.vrwg.org/VRWG_DOC/2010_Apr_VRWG_Impact_of_ICC_on_victims.pdf. 
398 Ibid., 25. 
399 Cody et al., “The Victims’ Court?,” 72. 
400 Victims’ Rights Working Group, “The Impact of the Rome Statute System on Victims and Affected 
Communities,” 17. 
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Perceptions of their Leaders 
 One of the most glaring divisions among African victims and locals relates to the very 
leaders that criticized the Court so much in Chapter 2, as it involves varying victim and local 
perceptions of their individual African leaders. Such division implies that local perceptions 
of African leaders may impact local perceptions of courts that try to go after those leaders, 
thus further suggesting that African victims and locals are divided over their views of the 
ICC. In Chapter 1, we saw President Kagame’s masterful ability to demonize the ICTR and 
rally popular sentiment against it, manifesting itself in the fierce local protests against the 
Tribunal’s intervention. When it comes to the ICC’s victims, both Kenyatta and Bashir have 
also successfully fomented popular local resistance to the Court.  
 When Kenyatta was elected in 2013, some Kenyans deplored Kenyatta, while others 
celebrated his victory and joined his anti-ICC rhetoric. At a hair salon, while some non-
Kikuyus lamented the “impunity and negative ethnicity”401 symbolized by Kenyatta’s 
victory, several female Kikuyu staff members, from Kenyatta’s tribe, cheered “in glee as they 
watched their new leader hold his freshly inked oath up for the cameras like a child with a 
certificate at sports day.”402 One woman remarked, “If Kenyans had the confidence to vote 
for this guy, then he cannot have done anything bad.”403 In 2014, prior to Kenyatta’s 
appearance at The Hague, protestors gathered with a banner that said “hands off our prez, he 
is innocent.”404 Such evidence suggests that local views of their leaders and their perceptions 
of his guilt, which may in part be informed by ethnic politics, shape how they view the Court 
and its involvement in their country’s matters.  
                                                                        
401 Negative ethnicity is a term coined by Koigi wa Wamwere which refers to ethnic bias, hatred, and the feeling 
of superiority, and which accounts for the entrenched, pre-colonial and colonial roots of ethnic tensions in 
Africa. See Koigi wa Wamwere, Negative Ethnicity: From Bias to Genocide, An Open Media Book (New 
York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), 22. 
402 Hatcher, “Controversy as Kenya Salutes Uhuru Kenyatta as New Leader.” 
403 Ibid. 
404 Owen Bowcott, “Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta Becomes First Head of State to Appear before ICC,” The 
Guardian, October 8, 2014, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/08/kenya-uhuru-
kenyatta-head-of-state-icc-hague. 
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 President Bashir, despite facing popular resistance and protests in 2013 and brewing 
opposition in 2016,405 has also engendered vitriol for the Court among some Sudanese and 
other sympathetic nationals. On March 8, 2009, tens of thousands of protestors rallied in 
Darfur in support of Bashir and in opposition to the ICC.406 Two days later, Palestinians in 
Lebanese camps echoed the neo-colonial criticism and rallied in support of Bashir, holding a 
banner that read, “Palestinian people in Lebanon’s camps stand by Sudanese President and 
people against colonization.”407 Sudanese living in Syria then rallied in Damascus the 
following day, also in support of Bashir.408 One week later, protestors threw stones at the 
French embassy in Khartoum to protest Bashir’s indictments, while thousands of Arab 
Rizeigat tribesman rallied behind Bashir at a speech in Darfur and pledged their allegiance to 
the president.409 
 In light of these Kenyan and Sudanese examples, it is clear that stark divisions 
amongst local Africans exist regarding their perceptions of their leaders, and in part by virtue 
of this split, regarding their opinions of the Court. These anecdotes suggest the ability of 
leaders like Kenyatta and Bashir to use inflammatory rhetoric in order to incite hatred of and 
opposition to the ICC, as well as the absorption of both leaders’ neo-colonial critique of the 
Court among certain locals and sympathetic nationals living elsewhere. While significant 
numbers of locals and victims oppose such leaders and their hateful rhetoric, as will be 
exemplified in the analyses to come, it is nonetheless important to consider the clusters of 
local Africans that buy into their leaders’ anti-ICC messages.  
Perceptions of ICC Bias 
 Like the critics explored in chapters 1 and 2, some African victims and locals, and 
particularly Ugandans, for whom more evidence is available, perceive the Court as biased. 
From the beginning of the Court’s involvement in the Ugandan case, Museveni’s 
                                                                        
405 “Sudan’s Bashir Vows to Crush Opposition Protests,” The New Arab, December 12, 2016, 
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/12/12/sudans-bashir-vows-to-crush-opposition-protests. 
406 Azikiwe, “Africans Rally behind Sudan President.” 
407 Ibid. 
408 Ibid. 
409 Heavens, “Sudan’s Bashir Rallies Arab Tribesmen in Darfur.” 
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involvement in the referral doomed the Court’s ability to be seen as an objective and 
independent investigator.410 The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has done itself no favors in 
combatting this bias criticism, as they have failed to seek investigations into potential crimes 
committed by Ugandan government forces.411 Taking issue with this prosecutorial bias, 
victim communities in Uganda have remarked, “The ICC looks at only the LRA as the 
perpetrators of insecurity and yet forces like the UPDF did the same and the ICC has not 
handled them.”412 Among some Acholi victims, the perception brews that the Prosecutor 
does not consider UPDF crimes of forcibly displacing Acholi as grave enough to 
prosecute.413 
 Such victim frustrations with the Court’s prosecutorial discretion reveal both 
aggravation with the Court’s one-sided prosecution, as well as the potential lack of 
knowledge on the part of victims. Elizabeth Evenson in her Human Rights Watch report, for 
instance, points to the possibility that the OTP lacks the necessary evidence to prosecute the 
UPDF.414 Thus, part of the victims’ bias criticism may be due to a lack of awareness as to the 
Court’s legal limitations. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this bias criticism differs 
from the overarching selective bias criticism touted by African leaders. As Kenneth Roth 
asserts, African victims of atrocities largely do not support the African criticism of selective 
prosecution.415 Given the Ugandan evidence, it appears that victims are more critical of the 
selective prosecution of certain perpetrators within a conflict, rather than with the general 
targeting of certain conflicts. Such a difference is worth noting. 
 
                                                                        
410 Elizabeth Evenson, Unfinished Business: Closing Gaps in the Selection of ICC Cases (New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 2011), 25. 
411 Ibid., 27. 
412 Victims’ Rights Working Group, “The Impact of the Rome Statute System on Victims and Affected 
Communities,” 14. 
413 Marlies Glasius, “What Is Global Justice and Who Decides? Civil Society and Victim Responses to the 
International Criminal Court’s First Investigations,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 502. 
414 Evenson, Unfinished Business, 27. 
415 Roth, “Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court,” January 8, 2014. 
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Perceptions on Justice, Priorities, and Peace 
 Another key division among African victims and locals regards what type of 
resolution, or justice process they prefer, what their conflict and post-conflict priorities are, 
and how they believe peace and justice interact. In the study of victim participants from 
Uganda, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, and the DRC, researchers found that the majority of victim 
participants want to see convictions come to fruition.416 A 2009 poll of Kenyans backs this 
assertion up, as 55% favored trials for individuals responsible for the post-election violence, 
while 47% favored an amnesty solution.417  
 Yet, as the breakdown in this Kenyan poll suggests, locals are divided over what 
justice mechanisms they prefer. Ugandan victims are also highly divided over what types of 
justice they desire,418 which undoubtedly makes it incredibly difficult for the Court to deliver 
appropriate justice if there is no agreed upon standard of what that justice looks like. In 
another study of Ugandan victims and locals from the most heavily impacted areas of the 
Ugandan conflict, Ugandans were asked which mechanisms they believed were most 
appropriate for handling the UPDF or LRA crimes.419 In response, 29% said the ICC, 28% 
said the Ugandan national court system, and 20% said the Amnesty Commission; more than 
50% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that “it is important to have trials for the LRA 
leaders.”420 While these figures reveal that most favor trials and that nearly the same number 
of victims and locals support the ICC handling prosecutions as they do the Ugandan national 
courts, taken together, more victims and locals favor an alternative to the ICC’s involvement.  
                                                                        
416 Cody et al., “The Victims’ Court?,” 71. 
417 Thomas Darnstädt, Helene Zuber, and Jan Puhl, “‘A Dangerous Luxury’: The International Criminal Court’s 
Dream of Global Justice,” Spiegel Online, January 14, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-
dangerous-luxury-the-international-criminal-court-s-dream-of-global-justice-a-601258.html. 
418 Erica Hall, “What Sort of Justice Do Survivors of Sexual War Crimes Want?,” The Guardian, April 12, 
2016, sec. Global development, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/apr/12/justice-
survivors-sexual-war-crimes-violence-in-conflict. 
419 Pham et al., “When the War Ends,” 4. 
420 Ibid., 4–5. 
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 In fact, Ugandans’ “[o]verwhelming support” for the 2000 Uganda Amnesty Act, 
which provides all rebels who surrendered with immunity and is still in-force,421 suggests a 
disconnect between the ICC’s form of justice and the justice preferred by locals.  Though the 
amnesty law directly contradicts the ICC’s mission to hold perpetrators legally accountable 
for their actions, Ugandans don’t see their support for amnesty as running contrary to justice. 
According to one victim,  
Our people do not see our traditional system here as a form of impunity. In 
fact, I would say that if Joseph Kony were to be taken away to the Hague or 
elsewhere to be tried, the Acholi people would not be satisfied. They would 
not accept that matters would have been concluded. We believe that it is only 
when rituals of cleansing and reconciliation have been carried out that true 
justice would have been done.422 
 
Other victims have similarly exposed the rift between how local Ugandans may prefer 
to deliver justice and how the West, through the ICC, renders its own form of accountability. 
According to a Der Spiegel expose on another LRA victim, Calvin Ocora, “He doesn’t want 
Moreno-Ocampo and the West to come save the day, stating that, ‘Western criminal justice 
doesn’t bring us any closer to peace. We could have had peace a long time ago without The 
Hague.’”423 Reflecting the African leaders’ critique of neo-colonial imposition with these 
statements, others also accentuate the disconnect between the Court and the victim/local 
community by challenging the perceived luxurious treatment that perpetrators get at The 
Hague.424 Such criticisms echo those made by Rwandan victims and locals in regards to the 
ICTR. 
 Both Ugandan and Sudanese victims also grapple in differing ways with their 
priorities in relation to justice, as well as their perceptions that the ICC’s justice may be 
thwarting the attainment of much-needed peace in their regions. In the population study of 
                                                                        
421 Katherine Southwick, “Investigating War in Northern Uganda,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 1 
(2005): 109, http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/051110southwick.pdf; “The Amnesty Act,” 
Chap. No. 294 (2000), http://www.ulii.org/node/23788. 
422 Barney Afako, Seeking Alternatives in Justice: The Experience of Northern Uganda (London: African 
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affected Acholi and non-Acholi, researchers asked respondents whether they favored peace 
with amnesty or peace with trials; 80% said peace with amnesty, 54% expressed preferences 
for LRA leaders’ confessions and apologies or for subsequent reconciliation, reintegration, 
and forgiveness for them, while 41% desired trials and/or retributive punishment, such as 
incarceration. More than 81% believed that amnesty would contribute to peace and 86% 
remarked that if amnesty was the only way to attain peace, they would accept it.425 Such 
figures reveal that an overwhelming majority of affected Ugandans desire peace with 
amnesty, want truth and reintegration mechanisms, believe that amnesty will foster peace, 
and would accept amnesty without trials if it was the only path to peace. Trials were the least 
desirable option. 
 Further Ugandan anecdotes support this local perception that peace must be a priority 
and that the ICC’s justice process is likely derailing this goal. Pasca Lakob, a Ugandan 
victim whose family and friends had been murdered by the LRA, stated, “His atrocities are 
so evil, there’s no punishment that could fit the crime. They might as well pardon him,” 
while Northerners and main victims of the LRA have similarly risen against the ICC to 
advocate for amnesty in order to foster peace.426 Such anecdotes are supported by Ugandans’ 
vast support for the Uganda Amnesty Act, as noted earlier.  
 This striking support for amnesty connects to victim and local divisions over the 
effects of justice and the proper priorities in current conflict or post-conflict situations. 
According to the study of victim participants, researchers found that victim participants are 
afraid of retaliation for their participation.427 Nigerian lawyer, human rights activist, and 
former National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Chairman428 Chidi Odinkalu writes 
that Sudanese victims and locals fear that Darfur’s destabilization, a likely result of Bashir’s 
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arrest absent any transition plan, could wreak havoc on people across the region.429 Such 
concerns have propelled victims to call for reliable protection alongside the search for 
justice.430 In the words of Odinkalu,  
Victims now seem to be the people paying the highest cost for international 
justice. They suffer threats of death, exile, and other forms of persecution for 
their commitment to justice with little protection, assistance or 
acknowledgement from governments or international institutions.431 
 
Prosecutor Bensouda, in a December 2014 meeting with the Security Council, 
recognized the brutality and violence continually suffered by Darfur victims. Bensouda 
acknowledged the ongoing plight of rape victims victimized by perpetrators that were not 
being held accountable, criticized the Council’s dangerous investigative approach in what are 
sensitive victim-perpetrator circumstances in Darfur, and pointed to the inability of UNSC 
investigators to offer victim protection after conducting their investigations.432 The Chief 
Prosecutor’s recognition of Darfur’s tumultuous state of affairs only lends power to the peace 
concerns voiced in reference to the ICC’s involvement. 
In Uganda, victims and locals similarly focus on peace and basic necessities when 
discussing their dire conflict-ridden situations. For the hundreds of thousands of Ugandans in 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, access to basic health and educational amenities is 
severely limited.433 Many of these IDPs understandably prioritize the attainment of these 
essentials and peace over justice.434 In the study of the Acholi and non-Acholi most impacted 
by the Ugandan violence, only 3% of respondents named justice as a primary priority.435 
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In fact, many victims and locals held the perception that the ICC’s involvement was 
impeding peace processes, echoing the larger peace versus justice critique of African leaders 
in the previous chapter. According to Northern Ugandan victim communities,  
The ICC has promoted justice over peace [..] which has scared away the 
rebels [...] from coming out and facing the traditional justice system which is 
regarded [by their communities] as the best method of bringing total peace. 
The traditional justice system cannot bring total peace but can only appease.436 
 
Similarly, in 2006 the leader of a Ugandan IDP camp told UN under-secretary general for 
humanitarian affairs, Jan Egeland, “We don’t want the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
We want peace […] how will the trial of five people bring us those we have lost? Will the 
ICC really bring peace, or fuel war again?”437 This statement once again underscores peace 
versus justice concerns, as well as the prioritization of legal accountability and the 
questioning of the value such processes hold for victims. 
 Yet, just as scholars like Akhavan assert that the peace versus justice debate is not a 
clear dichotomy, so too do Ugandan victims and locals offer differing conceptions of the 
peace-justice relationship. While 90% of respondents in the Acholi and non-Acholi 
population survey believed that dialogue with the LRA could attain peace and 86% believed 
that pardoning the LRA could achieve peace, 70% also believed that holding perpetrators in 
Northern Uganda accountable was important. 50% believed in holding LRA leaders 
accountable, 48% believed in holding all members of the LRA accountable, and 55% 
believed that UPDF perpetrators should be tried.438 These numbers reveal a mixture of 
accountability with truth-seeking goals and amnesty, and thus also show that such goals may 
not be mutually exclusive.  
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In fact, some respondents from the same study seemed to suggest that justice could 
follow peace and that it was more of a timing issue. 64% of respondents who had heard of 
the ICC said they would suggest that the Court cease with its arrest warrants or wait to issue 
such warrants until after peace had been achieved, while 76% stated that the ICC’s trials at 
the moment could potentially threaten the then-current peace process in Juba, Sudan.439 
These sentiments reflect the previous victim assertions regarding their priorities in relation to 
justice and perhaps imply that victims would respond more favorably to ICC justice 
processes once peace, stability, and basic necessities are achieved.  
Some, however, believed that the ICC and its intervention in Uganda had had a 
beneficial impact on peace. In the same study of Ugandan victims and locals, 71% of 
respondents who had heard of the ICC believed that the ICC had helped decrease violence in 
the conflict and 64% believed that the ICC had contributed to incentivizing the LRA toward 
peace talks.440 Despite this recognition that the ICC could bring some peace benefits to the 
Ugandan conflict, others still recognized the double-edged sword of the ICC’s intervention. 
In the view of another Ugandan victim in a different victim-based study,  
As much as the indictment of top LRA commanders initiated and forced the 
LRA rebels to talk peace with the government [...] it also frustrated the peace 
talks as the rebels demanded the withdrawal of the indictment as a condition 
to continue with the peace [...]. This will in the long run impact negatively on 
the current peace realized by the people in the region.441 
 
 In light of victims’ and locals’ varying opinions regarding appropriate justice 
mechanisms, conflict and post-conflict priorities, and the relationship between peace and 
justice, victim and local perceptions on these issues are quite multi-faceted and complex. 
Their perspectives regarding these big questions go far beyond the simplistic peace versus 
justice dichotomy to encompass deeper considerations about the value of certain types of 
justice and the ways in which peace and justice may or may not work together in different 
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contexts or at different times. Thus, their voices serve to complicate and enrich the peace 
versus justice criticisms of actors in the previous two chapters and provide food for thought 
for the Court moving forward.  
Frustrations of the Optimists 
 As this discussion of varying African victim and local perspectives of the Court has 
shown, the people most directly impacted by the Court’s targeted crimes hold mixed and/or 
divergent beliefs, including negative and positive elements, regarding the Court and its work. 
The positive elements of their perspectives are particularly interesting, given the 
overwhelmingly negative rhetoric of certain African leaders from the previous chapter. Such 
positive strands give hope that African victims and locals do see some value in the ICC and 
what it does, though they also reveal points of intense frustration with the Court. This 
frustration, which revolves around the Court’s slow, cumbersome process442 and the inherent 
legal limitations of its work, stems in part from the knowledge-gap explored earlier.  
 As Odinkalu argues, victims and locals held the original hope that the ICC would stop 
impunity among powerful individuals in Africa and foster an African society where dignity, 
peace, and justice rule and where their government supports is people.443 Now, according to 
Odinkalu, Africans at the ground level doubt these initial expectations.444 The victim 
participants study supports Odinkalu’s characterization, as researchers found that victim 
participants became distrustful and disappointed with the long time-tables of the trials.445 The 
victims felt that the Court had driven up hopes of putting perpetrators away but have since 
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became disappointed in their inability to do so.446 Kenyan, Ugandan, and Sudanese anecdotes 
further reveal this transition from high hopes to intense disappointment.  
In Kenya, some held the hope that the ICC would deliver them justice but have since 
become frustrated and aggrieved by the perceived lack of justice and interethnic negativity. 
At the same hair salon in Kenya where some hairdressers had celebrated Kenyatta’s victory, 
other hairdressers were “bemoaning impunity and negative ethnicity” and saying that these 
things were “killing Kenya.”447 Connected to frustrations with the Court’s inability to hold 
Kenyatta and other high-level Kenyan perpetrators accountable, Kenyan victims also 
expressed frustration with the delayed trials of Kenyatta and Kenya’s attempts to stall 
Kenyatta’s appearance in court.448 Fergal Gaynor, a lawyer appointed by the ICC to represent 
20,000 ordinary Kenyans who lost homes, livelihoods, and loved-ones during hugely fatal, 
orchestrated ethnic clashes, put it simply: “The victims are angry.”449 Impunity and the slow 
justice process are turning victims and locals sour toward the Court and its promises.  
In Uganda, as well, victims were initially very hopeful about the Court’s intervention, 
though lost this faith in the Court’s ability to assist them as time went on.450 Writing in 2011, 
Evenson’s HRW report revealed that the Court’s inability to hold either side accountable for 
crimes had damaged its credibility in the eyes of Ugandan victims.451 Victims felt frustrated 
with the Court’s lack of resources and the continued declarations that there were ongoing 
investigations, without giving any specifics as to what was actually going on in the 
investigations.452 Some remarked that, “the ICC has failed to have the LRA leaders arrested 
and its prosecution process is very slow and has [thus] not met the expectations of the victims 
for justice,” while others “feel disappointed […] it seems like the ICC is stuck, [with] no 
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cooperation.”453 Alphonse Otto, an older man who was living in Pabbo refugee camp in 
2007, believes that perpetrators must be held responsible for their crimes but is irked by the 
Court’s failure to deliver this accountability. Otto remarked in reference to Kenyatta, “He has 
committed a crime and must face justice. Instead of talking, why doesn’t the ICC take 
action?”454  
Sudanese victims, as well have grown weary of the ICC’s process and have given up 
on its ability to deliver justice. Darfur victims, following Prosecutor Bensouda’s decision to 
halt the Court’s active investigation into Bashir, withdrew from participation in the Bashir 
case.455 The slow and seemingly hopeless process had deterred victims of some of the most 
gruesome crimes from lending their voice to the proceedings. Darfur victims are not alone in 
this discouragement, as researchers have found that the ICC’s slow and complex application 
process and case backlogs have prevented victim voice in key aspects of court 
proceedings.456  
While such anecdotes reveal victims’ and locals’ clear frustrations with the length of 
the justice process and the inability of justice to be delivered, their criticisms also likely 
connect to their lack of a comprehensive understanding of the legal process regarding its 
stages, duration, and limitations. Such knowledge-gap issues are even more clearly 
illuminated by Ugandan frustrations with the Court’s limited number of arrests, the nature of 
its arrests, and its limited temporal jurisdiction. According to a study of Ugandan victims, 
many regularly asked, “[W]hy is one war criminal indicted when many more remain free?”457 
Similarly, victims were frustrated that charges did not cover all of the victim communities 
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that had been affected by the atrocities, asking why “victims who suffered from the same 
atrocities, by the same groups, where [sic] not taken into account by investigators, [thus] 
creating frustrations.”458  
Though such critiques are certainly understandable given the dire situations these 
victims continue to face, the Court likely has good practical and legal reasoning for not 
pursuing the crimes pointed to by victims. Looking at the Court’s limited resources and the 
nature of prosecutorial discretion, it would be impossible for the OTP to indict and prosecute 
every perpetrator within a conflict, even if victims perceived certain perpetrators to be more 
directly responsible for their own harm. Nor was the Court ever intended to carry on 
prosecutions in this manner. Additionally, the OTP also has the onus of considering the 
nature and seriousness of crimes, as well as the available evidence, which further precludes 
them from indicting and prosecuting all whom the victims believe deserve to stand trial. 
Nonetheless, such criticisms, coming from the very people most harmed by these crimes, are 
real and powerful.  
Connected to frustrations with the Court’s limited scope of arrest warrants are 
Ugandan grievances with the Court’s limited temporal jurisdiction. For many of the Acholi, 
the conflict in Uganda goes back to 1986, when the Southern NRA succeeded Northern 
rulers and the government killed Acholi civilians and soldiers out of reprisal.459 Since 1996, 
the Ugandan government has been interning the Acholi in camps.460 Thus, Ugandan victims 
are frustrated with the Court’s inability to try crimes that date back to the 1986 
developments, as such a limitation leads to an incomplete picture of the conflict.461 It thus 
makes sense that many victims and locals, as revealed through earlier analyses, preferred 
accountability for UPDF crimes in addition to LRA crimes, and sometimes at even higher 
levels. Again, however, such concerns are likely tied to a misunderstanding about the Court’s 
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jurisdiction as established by the Rome Statute, which intentionally prevented the Court from 
examining any crimes committed prior to 2002.   
Some Positive ICC Contributions, for a Change 
 Despite the divisions among African victims and locals regarding their perceptions 
and expectations of the Court, the ICC has made some tangible, positive contributions to 
victims and peace. The Trust Fund for Victims, which was created under the Rome Statute to 
provide assistance to victims and families and to implement reparations,462 stands as an 
example of such contributions. Thus far, the Trust Fund has pursued projects in the DRC, 
CAR, and Uganda, earmarked €5.5 million for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Projects 
since 2008, and utilized thirty-four donor countries since 2004.463 Currently, it has €5 million 
earmarked for victim reparations, €12 million resources earmarked for program activities, 
and €625,000 in resources not yet earmarked for programs.464 Most recently, in 2016 the 
Trust Fund served 104,548 direct beneficiaries and 358,498 indirect beneficiaries from its 
Uganda and DRC projects.465 
According to one victim study, the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims has begun a project 
in Uganda that helps provide victims and victims’ families with rehabilitative resources.466 
The families and their communities targeted by the Trust Fund valued these efforts and have 
experienced “both psychosocial and physical healing,” familial reunion, and “hope and 
confidence.”467 The victim participants study further found that victims value the process of 
                                                                        
462 The Trust Fund for Victims, “Annual Report Summary 2016,” Programme Progress Report (The Hague, The 
Netherlands: The Trust Fund for Victims: International Criminal Court, 2016), 2, 
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/imce/summary_EN_ONLINE.pdf. 
463 Ibid., 3; The Trust Fund for Victims, “Assistance & Reparations: Achievements, Lessons Learned, and 
Transitioning,” Programme Progress Report (The Hague, The Netherlands: The Trust Fund for Victims: 
International Criminal Court, 2015), 2, 
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/media_library/documents/FinalTFVPPR2015.pdf. 
464 The Trust Fund for Victims, “Annual Report Summary 2016,” 3. 
465 Ibid. 
466 Victims’ Rights Working Group, “The Impact of the Rome Statute System on Victims and Affected 
Communities,” 19. 
467 Ibid. 
Victim/Local and Civil Society Voices    Marisa O’Toole 
102 
 
completing an individual application to the ICC, though most do not want to directly 
participate in trials.468 
Tracing back to the earlier peace versus justice concerns of victims and locals, some 
Ugandans have expressed a much more positive conception of the ICC’s effect on peace, 
believing that the Court has been instrumental in bringing peace to the region. In Uganda’s 
Amuru district, victims said that the Court “created fear on [sic] LRA which backed up the 
peace process hence reducing atrocities in Northern Uganda,” and that the LRA indictments 
“has [sic] led to the realisation [sic] of peace, as the rebels have withdrawn from the 
region.”469 Victims believed that such hopeful developments, in which victims were able to 
return to and rebuild their communities, “had not been realised [sic] before the arrest 
warrants against the LRA. Therefore the move undertaken by the ICC has contributed to 
this.”470 Indeed, some victims directly attributed the ICC’s involvement to the deterrence of 
crimes and the development of peace, believing that the ICC had deterred outside funders 
from continuing to support the LRA and therefore helped decrease inter-state conflict.471 
 Thus, while divisions certainly exist within the African victim and local community 
regarding the ICC’s effect on peace, some victims defy the peace versus justice dichotomy 
and believe that the Court’s work, particularly in Uganda, has contributed to peace processes. 
Such beliefs oppose the harsh peace versus justice criticisms of African leaders in the 
previous chapter, which serve as the crux of Uganda’s opposition to the Court’s intervention. 
The fact that some victims disagree with their leaders and approve of the Court’s effect on 
peace offers evidence that some support for the Court still lives.  
The Hope Grows: Africa’s Pro-ICC Civil Society 
 Though the story thus far has been one largely framed by intense strands of criticism 
and disappointment, both from leaders and locals, there remains one key set of actors that can 
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provide great hope in these seemingly dire circumstances: African civil society. From the 
beginning, African NGOs were very involved in the Rome negotiations and in a strong way, 
as they provided a key push for the Rome Statute and the creation of a permanent 
international court on both the domestic and international levels.472 These NGOs served as an 
influential part of the Coalition for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
working alongside Western NGOs to push states to ratify the Statute.473 According to John 
Washburn, this enormous coalition consisting of 800 organizations “profoundly influenced 
every aspect of the Conference and deserved much of the credit for its success.”474 Playing a 
key role within this coalition, African NGOs “mobilized shame to stir the conscience of their 
governments” in support for the Statute.475 
 Unlike African governments, African civil society on the continent remains steadfast 
in their commitment to the Court. In 2007, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR) implored Sudan to work with the ICC on surrendering individuals with 
warrants related to the Darfur situation.476 Following the AU’s July 3, 2009 decision to 
oppose Bashir’s ICC arrest warrant, over 160 groups from over 30 African countries signed a 
statement criticizing this move by the AU.477 The groups stated that the AU’s decision 
“threatens to block justice for victims,” contradicts the AU’s own statutorily enshrined 
commitment to reject impunity, and violates African governments’ commitment to the Rome 
Statute.478 The groups further called upon African parties to the Rome Statute to reassert their 
                                                                        
472 Jalloh, “Regionalizing International Criminal Law?,” 450. 
473 Roland J.V. Cole, “Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court: More Political Than Legal.” 
474 John Washburn, “The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and International 
Lawmaking in the 21st Century,” Pace International Law Review 11, no. 361 (1999): 367, 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1238&context=pilr. 
475 Jalloh, “Regionalizing International Criminal Law?,” 450. 
476 Hannah Foster, “NGO Statement at Official Opening of the 41st Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (Speech delivered at the 41st Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Accra, Ghana, May 16, 2007). 
477 Human Rights Watch, “African Civil Society Urges African States Parties to the Rome Statute to Reaffirm 
Their Commitment to the ICC” (Statements, July 30, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/30/african-
civil-society-urges-african-states-parties-rome-statute-reaffirm-their. 
478 Ibid. 
Victim/Local and Civil Society Voices    Marisa O’Toole 
104 
 
ICC support and cooperation and specifically cooperate in Bashir’s arrest and transfer.479 
They also argued that the AU should handle the UNSC’s non-deferral of Bashir’s case with 
the UNSC and not take it out on the Court.480 
 In September of 2009 and following the AU’s decision to not arrest Bashir, African 
civil society groups spanning across the DRC, Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Botswana, 
Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, along with various international organizations, again 
urged the AU states to support the ICC in its efforts to prosecute the most serious crimes. 
Aloysuis Toe from Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy in Liberia stated, 
“Governments that oppose the ICC can be expected to try to use the AU meeting to undercut 
the court’s ability to ensure justice for African and other victims.”481 Georges Kapiamba 
from the DRC’s Association Africaine de Defense des Droits de l’Homme also remarked, 
“The ICC is not without shortcomings, but the court remains one of the most important 
checks against unbridled impunity on the African continent.”482 Such civil society leaders 
both recognized the potential agendas behind African leaders’ critiques of the Court, as well 
as the need for the Court to stand as a force against impunity.  
 In 2010, 124 organizations representing over 25 African countries urged African 
governments to push for accountability in the ICC’s upcoming review conference, 
particularly in light of Bashir’s harsh anti-ICC rhetoric. Executive Director of Nigeria’s Civil 
Resource Development and Documentation Center, Oby Nwankwo, slammed the selective 
justice and neo-colonial criticisms and stated,  
The civil society declaration is a strong showing of support for positive 
African government action at the Kampala conference and for the ICC more 
generally […] While some leaders have tried to paint Africa as against the 
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ICC, our voices are a testament to the fallacy of such claims.483 
 
Echoing this call to action, Executive Director of Human Rights Network in Uganda, 
Mohammed Ndifuna, stated,  
The Kampala conference offers an exceptional occasion for African 
governments to help advance the global fights against impunity […] Our 
leaders should use the conference to restate their commitment to justice for 
victims and pledge to take steps to assist the ICC.484 
 
Once again, African civil society leaders asserted their dedication to the ICC and challenged 
African governments to commit alongside them.  
 On January 25, 2011, African civil society and international organizations maintained 
their pro-ICC advocacy and called upon the Kenyan government to commit to supporting the 
Court and halting its campaign against it.485 Following the AU’s efforts to undermine the 
Court through its non-cooperation with the Bashir warrants, 31 African civil society and 
international organizations submitted a letter in 2012 expressing concern with the AU’s 
actions and stated the need to act with caution when considering expansion of the jurisdiction 
of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.486 Then again in 2013, 130 African civil 
society and international organizations representing 34 countries wrote to the Foreign 
Ministers at the AU in support of the ICC and to call upon the governments to declare their 
support for the Court and the Rome Statute.487 The groups recognized that ICC withdrawal 
“would send the wrong signal about Africa’s commitment to protect and promote human 
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rights and reject impunity as reflected in article 4 of the AU’s Constitutive Act,” while it also 
would severely endanger African civilians.488 While the groups acknowledged the ICC’s 
uneven application of justice, they also asserted that “undercutting justice for crimes where it 
is possible because justice is not yet possible in all situations risks emboldening those who 
might commit grave crimes,” as well as stated that expanding membership, not decreasing it, 
will help spread accountability.489 The groups here objected to the use of the selective bias 
critique as a reason to not prosecute serious crimes, while they also recognized the need to 
hold a broader range of actors accountable. 
 In 2014, a group of civil society and international organizations maintained their push 
and urged the International Criminal Court’s Assembly of States Parties at the 13th Session to 
bolster, rather than subvert, the ICC.490 The group made several recommendations, including: 
(1) to elect judges to the Court who are the most highly qualified; (2) to safeguard the 
Court’s independence by preventing countries like Kenya from seeking to influence the 
judicial process; (3) to continue to support the Court as a last resort court and to extend 
justice to more victims; (4) to guarantee needed resources for the Court; (5) to encourage 
cooperation with the Court; (6) to oppose high-level impunity at the ICC; (7) to commit as 
state parties to enhancing their own judicial capacity to try the most serious crimes; and (8) to 
dedicate as state parties the inclusion of victims’ needs in the justice process.491 Similarly, in 
December of 2015, more than 30 African civil society groups and international organizations 
called upon African States Parties to affirm their cooperation with the Court at their general 
sessions of the Assembly of States Parties.492 In their call, the groups again urged African 
governments to commit to ensuring the ICC’s necessary operating resources, to bolster their 
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own judiciaries, and to protect the Court’s independence from South Africa’s and Kenya’s 
proposed amendments.493 Such suggestions focus on the ICC as part of the solution to justice, 
rather than as part of the problem, though with the recognition that improvements must be 
made for the ICC to better function.  
 As of 2016, activists throughout Africa, working with 21 African and international 
NGOs, urged African governments to support the Court and expressed their support for the 
Court and for holding leaders accountable.494 Ibrahim Tommy, from the Centre for 
Accountability and Rule of Law-Sierra Leone stated that, “The big clash [these days] is over 
African leaders, the powerful few, who really want impunity for themselves, versus the vast 
majority, in fact all of the victims of Africa’s continent, who want justice every day.”495 
Echoing the sentiment that African leaders are only looking out for their own best interests, 
Angela Mudukuti of the Southern Africa Litigation Centre remarked, “To say that the iCC 
[sic] is targeting Africa, I think, is a misrepresentation of the situation. It’s more Africans 
making use of the court they helped to create.”496 In order to serve the victims of atrocities, 
Chino Obiaqwu asserts that governments must support the Court.497 Since the AU’s 
consideration of a mass withdrawal from the Court, African civil society has continued to 
fight for the Court and has called upon the AU to “strengthen and support the ICC, not urge 
its members to quit the institution.”498 
Civil Society Outreach at the Local Level 
 Clearly staunchly opposed to African government and AU efforts to undermine and 
withdraw from the Court, numerous local and international NGOs, and especially faith-based 
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groups, have also committed to local outreach on behalf of the Court by informing locals 
about the ICC’s investigations and the ability to participate in them as victims.499 While 
initially Northern Ugandan civil society, such as tribal and religious leaders and international 
NGOs, “appeared to turn almost unanimously against the Court’s investigation” largely due 
to peace concerns,500 since then the picture has turned more favorably toward the ICC.501 In 
particular, former Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo invited tribal and religious leaders to 
the Court, listened to them, and committed investment to domestic outreach in Northern 
Uganda.502 With this shift in favorability toward the Court, local Ugandan activists have 
called upon the Court to do more, asking the ICC to provide victims and survivors with 
justice and to deter African leaders who would otherwise commit crimes, whom they fear 
benefit from impunity.503 
 Kenyan Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), as well, have worked to promote justice 
and accountability in Kenya in the face of a Kenyan government that has tried to quash them. 
CSOs in Kenya have attempted to push the government toward crucial judicial and police 
reforms, identified and in several circumstances protected ICC witnesses, and provided 
needed outreach to locals regarding the ICC. These groups have also been “critical 
watchdogs” of the Court by calling the ICC out for its lack of victim and witness protection, 
as well as for the prosecutor’s poor evidence-building in the Kenyan cases.504  
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However, such efforts to hold both the government and the ICC accountable for 
delivering justice have been met by massive resistance from the Kenyan government, which 
has sought to thwart Kenyan CSOs and NGOs. The government has repressed such groups in 
three critical ways: (1) utilizing the NGO Coordination Board, which registers and monitors 
Kenyan NGOs, to deregister or threaten the groups with deregistration; (2) sabotaging 
legislation that controls NGO operation and funding; and (3) mobilizing anti-NGO public 
opinion.505 Kenyan CSOs and NGOs, despite this governmental campaign against them, 
continue to fight for justice and accountability and refuse to be deterred. In the words of 
Peter Aling’o, senior researcher for the Institute for Security Studies in Nairobi, Kenya, 
The good thing about civil society in Kenya is that they are so resilient, so 
vibrant, and nothing can stop them. I don’t think that any attempt by President 
Kenyatta to close the civil society space will succeed.506 
 
African Civil Society’s Critiques of the Court 
 While undoubtedly far more supportive of the Court than the African leaders explored 
in Chapter 2 or the victim and local voices investigated earlier in this chapter, African civil 
society actors still criticize the Court in some key respects. For one, NGOs point to the ICC’s 
distance from the victim communities it serves and the effect that this has on its ability to 
serve victims. A Ugandan organization in Amuria District stated that, “the ICC had not been 
able to work properly because [it is] far away from the people, hence the ICC should 
decentralize their operations and services.”507 Such a criticism perhaps reflects African 
victim and local concerns with ICC justice that they perceive to be imposed upon them, 
without consideration for their own local contexts and preferences. This disconnect is 
amplified by NGO critiques of the Trust Fund allocations, of which NGOs and community 
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groups in the DRC believe are not enough and assert are going to unknown destinations so 
that “victims do not seem to benefit from them.”508 
 Additionally, NGOs have criticized the Court for its minimal support of the work that 
they, as intermediaries between the Court and the people, do. The Court has barely 
recognized the NGOs working to support and reach out to the victims involved with its 
proceedings, leading these groups to call upon the Court for enhanced training and protection 
for their work. Ugandan organizations specifically have urged the Court “to recognize the 
status and role of intermediaries including training, enumeration and protection,” while 
Eastern DRC NGOs have urged “for more respect” for their groups.509 Such criticisms 
highlight the self-perception among NGOs that they perform an important bridge function 
between the Court and local communities, as well as the acknowledgement that they are not 
being supported enough in this role.  
 Lastly, African NGOs also recognize the hypocrisy of certain major powers not 
facing accountability for their crimes510 and have urged the AU to discuss its concerns with 
the major powers’ apparent impunity at its UNSC meetings, recognizing the ability of the 
United States, China, and Russia to avoid ICC accountability.511 At the same time, these 
actors also acknowledge that, “At the end of the day, victims are victims, whether African or 
otherwise.”512 Thus, while they agree that the OTP in its selection of certain cases has not 
applied accountability in a particularly fair way across the world, they also hold that the 
selective bias argument cannot be used to abdicate responsibility for the vicious crimes 
committed in Africa.  
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Connecting Victim/Local Concerns and Civil Society Voice to Previous Concerns 
 Looking through the concerns emphasized both by African victims and locals and 
civil society actors, one can once again tie some common threads back to the concerns raised 
in the previous two chapters. One clear theme that connects victim and local sentiment is the 
phenomenon of leaders engendering popular opposition to the Court. Among pro-Kenyatta 
and pro-Bashir supporters, the respective leaders were able to incite intense opposition to the 
ICC, which clearly resembles Kagame’s fanning of anti-ICTR flames among his people.  
 Additionally, African victim and local perceptions underline concern with the 
disconnect between international adjudicative institutions and the local communities its 
prosecutions are targeting. Both general victim disconnect and specific anecdotes of 
distanced justice from Uganda connect to similar ICTY and ICTR concerns with the 
tribunals’ physical and metaphorical (in terms of the type of justice-rendered) distance from 
the communities. Moreover, the Ugandan victim/local perceptions of Court bias, as well as 
civil society’s criticism of the Court’s uneven prosecution, connect to earlier perceptions 
among Serbs and Rwandans that the respective tribunals were pursuing one-sided justice. 
Such criticism also connects to the popular resistance to Bashir and Kenyatta’s perceived 
“unfair” indictments. The lack of knowledge among African victims and locals regarding the 
ICC and its work, which resembles local Serbs’ lack of ICTY knowledge, further illuminates 
the Court’s disconnect from the local communities it is delivering supposed justice to.  
 Lastly, African victim and local perceptions, as well as the initial Ugandan NGO 
opposition to the Court’s intervention due to peace concerns, reveal the peace versus justice 
tensions previously explored in the context of the ICTY, ICTR, and African leaders’ 
critiques. Undoubtedly, victims and locals in particular and across Uganda, Kenya, and 
Darfur have expressed serious concerns as to the Court’s effect on peace processes in their 
regions, though these concerns do not present themselves in the same dichromatic form as 
the previous actors had framed them. Rather, African victims and locals vary in their 
opinions on the peace-justice relationship, with some outright opposing the Court’s justice as 
an instigator of violence, others preferring that justice follow peace, and still others viewing 
peace and justice as coinciding or even supporting one another. Thus, victim and local 
perceptions complicate the peace and justice debate explored earlier.  
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Parsing out Victim/Local Voice and Civil Society Calls 
 Given the important role of African NGOs as an intermediary between the ICC and 
the local communities impacted by the violence, the concerns raised by these groups must be 
given great weight. Clearly, the voices of African civil society are much more positive with 
regards to the Court than those of African leaders and many African victims and locals, 
whose lack of knowledge regarding the Court may play a significant role in many of their 
frustrations with the Court’s selection of perpetrators, its impact on peace processes and the 
type of justice preferred and/or prioritized, and its lengthy and limited legal processes. The 
role of NGOs as the intermediaries is thus a crucial one. They are the voice that has been 
missing from African leaders’ critiques, as both a strong voice for accountability, yet also a 
voice that recognizes the Court’s faults and the need to fix them, rather than undermine and 
turn away from the Court. Their constant commitment to the ICC and their recurrent urges to 
African governments to affirm their dedication to the Court offer hope for the ICC moving 
forward.  
Yet, these same civil society actors also recognize that certain obstacles hinder their 
ability to be better bridges, such as the Court’s distance from local communities, its minimal 
support for its work, and its regional prosecutorial selectivity. Thus, while the Court has 
allies in African civil society, it also must listen to those allies’ recommendations, as well as 
the critiques of African leaders, victims, and locals, and take them into account if it wants to 
remain viable. It is to these recommendations, as well as others, that I now turn to in the final 
chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Moving Forward 
 The ICC faces intense criticisms from African leaders, African victims and locals, 
and even African civil society actors. These criticisms, though current and in reference to the 
ICC specifically, run deep historically, as many key African critiques of the Court resemble 
similar challenges faced by the previous former Yugoslavian and Rwandan tribunals. 
Additionally, several red flags that were raised early on during the Rome negotiations, both 
by non-African and African state actors, elucidate the current African backlash that the Court 
faces.  
 Though these criticisms are not universal, as some African countries have maintained 
their support for the ICC, they are also not confined to the three countries studied here. The 
Court now faces opposition from the African Union and several African leaders — once 
some of its strongest supporters. Discovering the reasons behind this fascinating twist of 
events has been a central feature of this exploration.  
 The previous three chapters investigated several historical and contemporary 
criticisms with international justice as delivered by the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC. As the 
examination into the perceptions of African leaders, victims and locals, and civil society 
actors illuminates, the Court is up against sharp criticisms from a variety of actors. However, 
the analyses of certain victim, local, and civil society views toward the Court also bring hope 
that the Court’s life in Africa has not run its course quite yet. Building upon this hope will be 
the focus of this final section. 
Tying the Threads Together: Major Common African Critiques 
Following along this thread of optimism, there is room still for the Court to repair its 
relationship with Africa and avoid losing the support of its most important regional 
membership bloc. In order to do so, the Court must address the major common criticisms 
leveled by African leaders, African victims and locals, and African civil society actors. The 
first major criticism, selective justice, involves both favoring certain sides of a conflict and 
pursuing or not pursuing certain conflicts and connects to neocolonialism, complementarity, 
political, and head of state concerns. Judicial disconnect from local populations, the second 
major criticism, connects to issues of physical and metaphorical distance, in the sense that the 
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ICC’s justice is not informed by the local contexts of the situations it investigates. This 
criticism also connects to local knowledge gaps regarding the Court, domestic institution 
building concerns and complementarity, and the Court’s poor support of civil society actors. 
Lastly, the third major critique revolves around peace concerns connected to the ICC’s 
pursuit of legal accountability, which undoubtedly brings in issues of local context and 
victim consideration but also connects to sitting head of state issues.  
 Before turning to specific policy recommendations, however, one must first weigh 
these criticisms for what they are. The selective bias critique, considering the rhetoric of the 
African leaders making such a claim, appears at first glance to be self-serving. How can 
leaders, whose countries previously supported the establishment of the ICC in the name of 
fighting impunity, now criticize the Court for imposing accountability upon their own 
nationals? These actors’ commitment to human rights thus appears conditional upon whether 
they themselves are held accountable under the law. Such impunity and hypocrisy is 
undoubtedly unacceptable.  
 Yet, these leaders and critics also have a point. The numbers do not lie; if any region 
were targeted as much by the ICC’s investigations as the African continent has been, they too 
would be charging the Court with selection bias. And though such a criticism may be self-
interested and egregious crimes committed should not go unpunished, no matter who is 
committing them, this does not mean that such frustrations and outrage have no merit. The 
Court has been rightfully lambasted for disproportionately targeting the African continent in 
its investigative pursuits and Africa has every reason to react to this apparent prejudice. 
 The judicial disconnect criticism, unlike the previous criticism, focuses on the nexus 
between the ICC’s justice and the locals such justice is directed at. Though upholding the 
norms and values of rule of law and human rights is a worthy endeavor for its own sake, 
within the context of international justice, that justice has to apply to real people who’ve 
faced real harm. It is not enough for international law to deliver a model of justice deemed 
appropriate by the dominant actors within global society; rather, law and the justice it 
provides must be administered with a view to the people it serves. The importance of 
reaching out to victim and local communities, improving such actors’ knowledge, and 
considering local contexts and preferences cannot be overlooked. Nor can the Court overlook 
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the necessity of fostering justice close to home through supporting civil society and national 
judiciaries.  
Unfortunately, the ICC has simply not engaged with the local community enough to 
develop these crucial connections to justice. Too many local Africans lack basic knowledge 
of the Court’s procedures and limitations, while many explicitly express preferences for 
different forms of justice or strategies that are adapted to their conflict’s particular situation. 
Though local divisions over justice make it challenging for the ICC to determine precisely 
how to proceed, in pursuing its work the Court must nonetheless look into these divisions and 
viewpoints and partner with civil society actors who have deeper local knowledge and 
expertise on the ground.  
For justice to endure and enact positive change, it must be viewed as legitimate by the 
actors whom justice involves. Such legitimacy allows locals to not only support justice 
delivered by the ICC, but also that delivered by their own national courts in their pursuit of 
legal accountability. Thus, this criticism of the ICC-local disconnect is both valid and 
enormously consequential for the Court to address.  
The last major criticism revolves around peace concerns and is perhaps the most 
difficult to evaluate. Scholars, leaders, and locals themselves disagree over the specifics of 
the peace-justice relationship, making definitive assertions about the ICC’s effect on 
situational peace and stability impossible and unwise to make. Nevertheless, common sense 
does suggest that in certain circumstances where conflict is still raging, intergroup tensions 
abound, and/or politics within the country or countries in question are volatile, ICC 
involvement may inject further instability, or at least hamper peace prospects. Moreover, for 
those victims and locals who live in these conflict zones, survival and peace are 
understandably their main priorities. It is also quite logical for a person who has witnessed, 
been victimized, or otherwise been connected to a conflict to believe that ICC involvement in 
certain cases and at certain stages threatens stability and the chance for the situation’s 
peaceful resolution. Concerns over the destabilizing impact of sitting head of state 
prosecutions, while also logical, are more self-serving on the part of such leaders.  
Regardless of these leaders’ potentially selfish intensions and the unsettled natured of 
the peace versus justice debate, African criticisms of the Court’s effect on peace are 
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understandable in their origins, likely valid in certain circumstances, and incredibly 
important to consider. After all, international justice is counterproductive if its effect is to 
produce greater turmoil or to prevent the attainment of peace. For the sake of justice and the 
people suffering from horrific crimes, peace is a crucial factor that the Court must heavily 
weigh in its work.  
Addressing the Critiques 
With these three major concerns and their subdivisions in mind, several policy 
prescriptions for the ICC are now in order, so that it may address these critiques and find a 
way forward in Africa. In conceptualizing these main criticisms and their potential remedies, 
it helps to place them within the levels of analysis framework introduced at the beginning of 
this investigation. Examining the policy solutions in this manner reveals that state and 
individual level prescriptions are the most realistic and viable strategies for the Court moving 
forward, though there is also dim hope on the societal level.  
Societal Level Solutions: Starting at the Top 
Expanding the Scope of the ICC’s Investigations 
 One of the most glaring criticisms leveled against the Court has been the Court’s 
perceived selective bias in its prosecutions, leading African leaders and locals inspired by 
their rhetoric to level charges of neocolonialism against the Court and the major powers 
sitting on the Security Council. This criticism is undoubtedly bolstered by the Court’s track 
record regarding its investigations, in which nine out of ten of its ongoing situations involve 
African perpetrators allegedly committing crimes on African soil. These figures alone 
provide fuel for the Court’s most vehement African critics.  
 Combatting these numbers by expanding its investigations into other regions would 
go far in countering the selective bias and neocolonial criticisms of the Court among African 
leaders, locals, and civil society actors. Given that the news of the Court’s investigations are 
likely one of the more visible aspects of the ICC to the African public, the ICC’s expansion 
of investigations would take wind away from the sails of those charging the Court with 
selectively applying justice in a manner consistent with imperialistic agendas.  
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 Such an expansion, however, cannot only include investigations but must also involve 
prosecutions, so as to demonstrate the ICC’s commitment to objectively holding perpetrators 
accountable without regard to their ethnicity or race. This is undoubtedly tricky, as the 
decision to prosecute involves certain legal criteria that cannot and should not be 
circumvented in an effort to please critics of the Court’s apparent partiality. There will 
certainly be times when the Court cannot prosecute specific perpetrators due to constraints, 
such as lack of evidence or temporal limitations. Furthermore, even if the Court has a sound 
foundation for prosecuting suspected perpetrators, this does not guarantee that those 
individuals will be convicted. Thus, these legal realities allow for a certain degree of Court 
criticism to always exist, though the degree can be minimized by various other reforms that 
the Court can seek.  
 In fact, the Court has already begun preliminary investigations into Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Iraq, Palestine, Comoros, Cambodia, and Greece, and Ukraine. Such 
investigations would potentially implicate U.S., U.K., Israeli, and Russian actors in the 
alleged perpetration of international crimes.513 Thus, these investigations would incriminate 
individuals from several of the major powers that African critics of the Court have pointed to 
when charging the Court with politically-motivated investigations and imperialistic agendas. 
Investigating powers like the United States and Russia, neither of whom are state parties to 
the Court but both of whom are P5 members of the UNSC, would send a strong signal that 
the Court operates independently of the political powers of certain countries and separate 
from the UNSC in particular.  
 Such investigations nonetheless hold many challenges, especially given that the 
United States, Israel, and Russia are not members of the Rome Statute, that the United States 
and Russia hold permanent seats on the UNSC, and that the United States and Israel are 
allies. The Council, though potentially limited by the prospect of a veto, might try to use its 
power to defer an investigation into the major powers or their allies, should such 
investigations move beyond the preliminary stages. Going after the United Kingdom would 
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also risk alienating one of the Court’s largest funders,514 though by targeting such a large 
funder, the Court could combat the claim that its funders influence its actions. Additionally, 
the complementarity standards may prove to be a barrier for such investigations. While the 
United States has already argued that they have investigated war-time torture allegations 
against its soldiers, Bensouda has retorted that the court-martial system had not prosecuted 
any American soldier for the alleged crimes.515 The Justice Department, for its part, had 
opted to not prosecute any actor for the death of a prisoner in Afghanistan.516 Thus, questions 
remain as to the willingness of the United States to domestically hold potential perpetrators 
to account. 
 Despite these challenges, it is fair to say that the Court desperately needs to expand its 
geographical range of prosecutions. Going after the major powers, two of whom are not 
members to the Court yet possess prominent positions that have allowed them to hold other 
countries accountable to the Court, would be a strong way to combat the selective bias and 
neocolonial criticisms. Such expansion would strike a blow at the rhetoric of leaders who 
have criticized the Court for its selective and imperialistic agenda, thus potentially helping to 
combat the anti-ICC rhetoric espoused by leaders and adopted by victims. While the Court 
may still be unable to reach these people directly by making this change, it can further 
attempt to address their anti-ICC sentiments through other reforms aimed at locals, which 
will be discussed later.  
 The recognition that the Court needs to enlarge its geographical scope, however, also 
comes with the acknowledgement that such an expansion would be difficult to achieve in the 
near future. Though the initiation of preliminary investigations in the countries just discussed 
is encouraging, such investigations pose several political and legal hurdles for the Court. 
Moreover, even if the Court were to successfully open up investigations into these various 
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regions, the process would be just as slow, if not slower, as it has been in the cases it has 
already pursued and would thus not deliver short term results for those who seek major 
power accountability. Lastly, the Court’s expansion cannot erase the history of its past fifteen 
years; no matter which conflicts the Court targets in its future investigations, it will always 
have a history of nearly total African focus during its first decade and a half. Expanding the 
ICC’s scope of investigations is, therefore, a policy prescription with potential future, though 
little immediate, promise.  
UNSC Reforms? 
 Related to the issue of selectivity and power politics is the role of the Security 
Council in the referral of situations to the Court. Throughout the negotiations for the ICC, 
various non-African and African leaders expressed concern regarding the role that the UNSC 
would play in the ICC’s process and feared political manipulation by the institution. In 
current African leaders’ critiques of the Court, as well, the Council’s role in the Darfur 
referral has sparked indignation among leaders who view the involvement of major powers in 
the referral as fundamentally hypocritical and imperialistic.  
 Thus, while reforms to the Council cannot be achieved by the ICC itself, such 
developments would nonetheless help the Court combat some of the selectivity, neocolonial, 
and political criticisms leveled against it. Over the past year, nations without permanent 
representation on the Council have pushed for a Council expansion and have sought 
negotiations to that end. In February of 2017, African Ambassador Adikalie Foday Sumah 
reiterated Africa’s call for an enhanced role on the Council and asserted that reform was 
necessary, so as to address Africa’s massive under representation on the general council and 
its non-representation on the permanent council.517 Such an expansion would give Africa a 
stronger voice on the general council and a permanent voice within it, which would empower 
African leaders to play a role in the UNSC’s ICC relations and have power in the referral and 
deferral process. This inclusion would further cut away at the criticisms of the UNSC’s 
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political influence over the Court and the notion that the major powers dictate the Court’s 
investigations.  
While such an expansion would help the ICC indirectly combat some of the key 
legitimacy charges against it, the likelihood of Council expansion is dubious. Such an 
expansion would require agreement by the General Assembly, which has already failed to 
enact Council reform for the past two decades,518 while it would also require an amendment 
to the Charter, to which all current permanent members of the Council would have to 
agree.519 Once again, such a solution may be more realistic in the long-term, rather than in 
the short. Yet, even in the long-term such reforms have the potential to make the referral and 
deferral process messier and more complicated, given that more players and interests would 
be added to the mix of the decision-making body.  
Perhaps a more viable approach for the Council, then, would be to reorient itself as a 
more politically sensitive institution where it avoids involvement in and prevents continued 
investigation into politically volatile situations. In making this conscious shift, the Council 
should take a step back and consider not referring cases to the ICC. Given its intrinsically 
political nature, the Council might better serve itself and the Court by distancing itself from 
the referral process and thus allowing the Court to operate with perceived objectivity and 
independence. However, the Council would also do well to utilize its political sensitivities 
and defer cases where ICC investigation into the situation has been and will likely continue 
to be unsuccessful and even harmful. By not referring cases and being more willing to defer 
them, the Council will be simultaneously using its political knowledge to separate itself from 
the initiation of investigations and to halt the Court from further involvement in particularly 
tumultuous cases.   
 
                                                                        
518 “Updated Security Council Must Reflect Changing Global Reality, Member States Say, as General 
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Firmly Address the Head of State Immunities Question 
 The last societal-level suggestion for the Court is also the most viable of the solutions 
on this level and involves the Court’s need to publicly address the sitting head of state 
immunity question. Though partly connected to peace concerns surrounding the potential 
instability that may arise whilst a sitting leader is being prosecuted, this criticism involves 
more fundamentally legal questions in need of clarification. Ultimately, the OTP needs to 
assert in public statements its legal authority to prosecute sitting heads of state, which it can 
find in the precedents for such prosecutions in previous courts and in the specific ICTJ case 
discussed in Chapter 2, DRC v. Belgium. Though the Court must give due consideration to 
the stability and peace implications of prosecuting sitting heads of state, it cannot back down 
from the prosecution of such leaders simply due to their title.  
From the beginning of the Rome negotiations, Africans committed themselves to 
fighting impunity at the highest levels. This commitment included and still includes opposing 
the impunity of sitting heads of state, who seek to escape accountability using their immunity 
privileges. It is hypocritical to now turn against this mission and assert immunity from 
accountability simply because of the nature of the perpetrator’s position within society. 
The Court must refuse to accept this hypocrisy and continue to seek prosecutions 
against the world’s worst criminals, even if they are high-ranking government officials, if it 
wants to retain credibility as an institution that seeks to bring the biggest perpetrators to 
justice. Not prosecuting such high-level individuals, who are often some of the most 
egregious perpetrators, would go against its very mission to hold those “most responsible” 
accountable for their atrocities. Accountability for such actors is also important for victims to 
see that even the highest-level criminals, who are likely the most widely-visible perpetrators, 
cannot escape the law. Additionally, holding strong in the prosecution of all perpetrators, 
even sitting leaders, will be a more forceful deterrent to other leaders who might otherwise 
feel emboldened to commit terrible atrocities out of the supposition that they would not be 
held accountable for those atrocities, or at least not while they ruled.  
Thus, the ICC must remain steadfast in its pursuit of the highest-level criminals, even 
when those criminals happen to rule a country. Firmly asserting its legal authority to 
prosecute such prominent perpetrators is something the Court must do. However, it must also 
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be recognized that the Court, by refusing to capitulate to the head of state immunity concerns 
of leaders, will fail to respond to what has been a very serious area of African concern. 
Leaders will likely continue to rebuke the Court for its prosecution of sitting heads of state, 
even if the OTP publicly maintains its authority to do so. This criticism will presumably and 
unfortunately live on as a reality of international justice.  
State Level Solutions: Taking it to the State 
Commit to Complementarity  
 Yet another way that the Court could help itself against the criticisms of its supposed 
neocolonial agenda would be for the Court to commit to the principle of complementarity 
and lend support to national judiciaries so that they themselves can adjudicate cases. 
Members of the ICC recognize that their commitment to complementarity has been weak and 
explicitly acknowledged their failure to do so in their 2010 Review Conference in 
Kampala.520 As part of this recognition, members adopted a resolution to enhance national 
judiciaries and international support for domestic investigations and prosecutions of crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction.521 Though some countries like Kenya, Uganda, and South 
Africa have begun the process of domesticating the Rome Statute so as to enable national 
prosecutions of the crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction,522 this process has thus far been 
“slow and laborious.”523 The Court can do more.  
 According to Charles Jalloh, the Court must emphasize more strongly its prevention 
mandate and do so by enhancing its national capacity building programs to address impunity 
and to adhere to the complementarity principle. Such efforts will improve the Court’s image 
                                                                        
520 International Criminal Court, “Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Kampala, 31 May - 11 June 2010, Annex 99” (Official Records, The Hague, The Netherlands, June 31, 2010), 
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521 Ibid. 
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by engaging the community with its work and by better informing them of the process.524 
This effort will also help combat the neocolonial critique, as the ICC would be empowering 
national institutions to handle cases on their own. The Court must be careful with how they 
approach this strategy, however, so as to not conduct itself in such a way that the targeted 
countries perceive the Court to be acting like a colonial benefactor or western savior.525 In 
approaching engagement with national judiciaries and communities, the Court must work 
with the locals and consider local contexts, rather than attempt to impose a western model of 
justice, divorced from the people that justice concerns. 
 To more substantially commit to complementarity, the Court needs to be clearer 
about its guidelines for prosecution. Burke-White argues that while the ICC’s admissibility 
criteria help to create a benchmark that countries can use for reforming their judiciaries, these 
guidelines are very thin and provide a merely “skeletal framework for national 
judiciaries.”526 The Rome Statute provides scant direction other than that capable national 
courts are impartial, independent, and able to proceed with prosecutions.527 Thus, the Court 
should establish and publish clearer prosecutorial principles that will provide more concrete 
guidelines to countries in conducting their reforms and offer judges and jurists key guidance 
for evaluating the effectiveness of the judiciary.528 Such criteria, as Burke-White suggests, 
could include: how available experienced and impartial judicial personnel are, if there is 
viable legal infrastructure in place, if adequate functional law exists, and if law enforcement 
is capable of arresting individuals and conducting investigations.529 Making such guidelines 
available to national judiciaries would be a common-sense, easy reform that would have a 
far-ranging effect on the competency-building of national judiciaries seeking guidance.  
                                                                        
524 Jalloh, “Regionalizing International Criminal Law?,” 498–99. 
525 Civil society can play a crucial role in bridging the gap between the Court and African society and mitigating 
potential neocolonial sentiments in connection to complementarity efforts. 
526 William W. Burke-White, “Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a 
System of Multi-Level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Leiden Journal of 
International Law 18, no. 3 (November 2, 2005): 575, doi:10.1017/S0922156505002876. 
527  International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, sec. 2. 
528 Burke-White, “Complementarity in Practice,” 590; 576. 
529 Ibid., 576. 
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 The Court has already begun to see the need for its enhanced efforts in 
complementarity, suggesting that such reforms would not be out of the realm of possibility. 
In 2002, the OTP under Moreno-Ocampo shifted toward the idea of positive 
complementarity, in which the Court would play an active role in encouraging states to 
pursue domestic prosecutions, rather than simply serving as a safety last resort option for 
countries.530 Given the concerns raised by the selective justice and neocolonial/imperial 
critiques, encouraging domestic judiciaries to prosecute international crimes within their 
jurisdiction would keep prosecutions closer to the people most affected and give the country 
agency over its own prosecutions. This would in turn lessen the physical distance between 
where the justice is rendered and where the people affected by the justice live and thus 
combat the disconnect critique, as well.  
 Given that numerous actors have pointed to the need for enhanced resources for 
rendering justice, this renewed complementarity effort cannot go without resource assistance 
to national judiciaries. Mark Ellis suggests the creation of an International Technical 
Assistance Office which would be run by a non-governmental body like the International Bar 
Association (IBA) or the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) and which 
would offer objective and technical aid to national war crimes courts, including professional 
and legal expertise, trial observers, and legal education.531 This body could thus act as an arm 
for the ICC by performing crucial capacity building functions necessary for any real 
commitment to complementarity.  
Foster Domestic Capacity-Building 
 Hand-in-hand with this commitment to complementarity is the need for the Court to 
help foster domestic judicial capacity-building. International adjudicative institutions like the 
ICC cannot leave the locals out of the process, as forgetting the local populations creates 
detrimental distance between the people the courts are meant to serve. As Laura Dickinson 
                                                                        
530 Lionel Nichols, “The Strategy of Positive Complementarity,” in The International Criminal Court and the 
End of Impunity in Kenya, Springer Series in Transitional Justice (Springer International Publishing, 2015), 31–
32, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-10729-5_2. 
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notes, “a purely international process that largely bypasses the local population does little to 
help build local capacity,” since international actors fulfilling the role of justice deliverer fail 
to prepare and train locals to deliver justice within their own communities.532 The ICC is this 
international process which has delivered justice in a way that is detached from the local 
contexts it works within.  
 Rather than continuing to remain detached from the domestic legal realm, the Court 
can support domestic law enforcement like the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the 
Ad Hoc Court in East Timor, and even the ICTR have done. The SCSL, for its part, has 
worked with local police investigators to improve their witness protection and management 
skills. In East Timor, the Ad Hoc Court has helped prepare domestic prosecutors and judges 
who gained experience through their Court work and are now using their learned skills in 
their own domestic systems. The ICTR has even provided computers in Rwandan 
courthouses that citizens and domestic judges have been able to use for research.533 There is 
no reason that the ICC cannot engage in similar domestic capacity-building efforts.534  
By engaging in domestic-capacity building, the ICC can enhance international justice 
on a much more global scale and expand rule of law to more regions of the world. As 
Odinkalu asserts, there is no choice between the ICC and national or regional judicial 
solutions, as all of them exist as “part of a menu.”535 Thus, there must be a mind shift among 
those that assert that the ICC is the only way and those that assert that regional and national 
judicial mechanisms are the only solution. These various judicial mechanisms can and must 
co-exist, with domestic capacity-building efforts helping them work together more smoothly 
                                                                        
532 Laura A. Dickinson, “The Promise of Hybrid Courts,” The American Journal of International Law 97, no. 2 
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and effectively to create a more lawful and just global society. The Court and the OTP, 
having already recognized the value of positive complementarity and taken some strides to 
employ such a strategy, can and must continue this effort and enhance its support of national 
judiciaries.   
State/Individual Level Solutions: Somewhere in Between 
Utilize and Support African Civil Society as an Intermediary 
 Though the previous solutions discuss the Court’s engagement with the countries its 
investigations involve, such engagement requires knowledge regarding how to engage and an 
understanding of the contexts within which justice is being delivered. To foster such an 
understanding, the Court must utilize its most supportive and widespread ally: African civil 
society. Civil society in Africa performs a crucial bridging function between the ICC and the 
local African communities involved with its investigations. As Murithi argues and as the 
analysis of civil society in Chapter 3 highlighted, however, African civil society can also 
function as a bridge between the ICC and the AU by helping to foster better dialogue 
between the two bodies.536 Ardent advocates for the Court and for accountability on African 
soil, African civil society actors are important partners for the Court in promoting its work 
and reaching out to communities that need support and/or a better understanding of the 
Court’s abilities and limitations.  
 In Dominic Ongwen’s recent and ongoing trial, a historic 13,000 Ugandans watched 
from seven screening locations in Uganda, while a delegation of ten Ugandans watched in 
the courtroom itself. Maria Mabinty Kamara, who serves as the Court’s head of outreach for 
Kenya and Uganda, said that the screening centers’ proximity to locals “attracted huge 
numbers,”537 which again suggests the importance of physical closeness to local 
communities. The ICC field offices worked with various civil society groups to make the 
screenings possible and those CSOs also helped offer counsel for victims who needed 
support with what they were witnessing. One Lukodi community member remarked, “What I 
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am seeing today with Ongwen appearing before the court for trial has built trust in me that 
the justice talked about over many years ago is being delivered now to us…I am happy about 
what I saw.”538 This example of the Ugandan trial screenings exemplifies the ability of CSOs 
to be a crucial bridge in bringing locals into contact with the Court and in providing essential 
psychological support to victims. Moreover, it underscores the power of knowledge-
enhancement and interaction with the Court in regards to local perceptions of its work, which 
again was made possible through the work of the CSOs.  
 Yet CSOs and scholars have recognized the Court’s poor support for the work of 
African civil society in performing these crucial functions. Murithi argues that the ICC needs 
to improve its own outreach to civil society by meeting with them throughout Africa and 
working harder to accommodate their representatives at the Hague,539 while Jalloh similarly 
asserts that the Court must work more closely and directly with civil society in Africa “to 
build bridges with the local populations” and promote justice.540 Stromseth offers some 
recommendations for engaging with and strengthening African civil society in its justice 
pursuits, such as holding workshops and sharing knowledge about human rights issues and 
pathways to legal accountability.541  
In light of these criticisms of the Court’s support for African CSOs and the 
suggestions for improved engagement, the ICC would be keen to take these constructive 
prescriptions seriously and seek to foster closer ties with civil society. The Court must give 
African CSOs working to promote international justice the credit they deserve, offer them 
enhanced resources to perform their work, and provide them with increased access to the 
Court. By doing so, the Court can embolden itself and its strongest allies in their common 
goal of pursuing and achieving international justice and accountability.  
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Give Peace a Chance  
 Yet another policy prescription for the ICC requires the Court to consider the 
particular state and individual level circumstances of the conflict under investigation. As one 
of the central criticisms among both African leaders and African victims-locals, the issue 
surrounding the Court’s potential inhibition of peace processes is one that cannot go 
unaddressed. Though divisions exist within the scholarly community and among local 
Africans regarding the particulars of the peace-justice relationship, there is no doubt that in 
some circumstances, the pursuit of legal accountability can, at the very least, stall peace 
efforts and instill uncertainty among locals on the ground as to the fate of the conflict. The 
Court must thus take seriously both leaders’ and locals’ concerns in Africa regarding the 
thwarting of peace processes as a result of the ICC’s legal pursuits.  
 The Rome Statute’s Article 53(1) empowers the prosecutor to consider the effects that 
certain investigations would have on “the interests of justice” and to choose not to investigate 
such situations.542 These “interests of justice” could reasonably be construed to include the 
interests of peace and stability in the situation under potential investigation. Additionally, 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides the UNSC with the power to defer cases,543 while 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives the UNSC the power to “maintain or restore 
international peace and security” if it finds “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
or peace, or act of aggression.”544 Thus, both the OTP and the UNSC have the legal authority 
to consider peace when evaluating involvement in certain conflict situations.  
 In aiming to provide justice to victims through the law, the Court must inherently 
consider how its actions will impact victims and locals on the ground, as justice for justice’s 
sake would be useless if such “justice” threatened the safety and livelihoods of the people it 
purports to serve. According to Katherine Southwick, “in ongoing conflict the moral duty to 
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end atrocities necessitates a dispassionate, pragmatic analysis of cause and effect.”545 Within 
the context of Uganda, one must consider the nature of ongoing negotiations and how the 
Court’s involvement could logically hinder resolution of the conflict by agreement. One must 
also look to Ugandans’ overwhelming support of the Amnesty Act and the fact that the Act 
came about as the result of an Acholi campaign for peace. Though the Ugandan government 
itself referred the situation to the Court, is it worth pushing a certain conception of justice 
onto people who widely do not want that type of justice and are the very people to suffer 
from the crimes at hand? Should the Chief Prosecutor have considered the potential local 
perceptions of such a one-sided prosecution, as well as the investigation’s prospects for 
peace, in making his decision to pursue the case?  
 Such questions go to the issue of needing to better understand local contexts and the 
preferences of the victims themselves. As Southwick argues,  
Where victims oppose ICC involvement on grounds that it either threatens 
security or their collective efforts to apply their own judicial processes, 
including reconciliation and democratically enacted amnesty laws, then the 
court should seriously consider deferring investigation.546 
 
Similarly, Branch recognizes the need to involve victim preferences in the consideration of 
accountability pursuits. According to Branch,  
[W]hen international prosecution is not in solidarity with local demands, then 
the idea that any part of humanity is entitled to punish those guilty of “crimes 
against humanity” necessarily entails a rejection of others’ autonomy and self-
determination. The decision, on the one hand, to seek justice through 
punishment or, on the other, to forgo punishment in favor of justice through 
reconciliation, is a decision that must be made by the concrete community that 
is the victim of the crimes and that will have to live with the consequences of 
the decision....If [international law] is not [guided by those it is claiming to 
serve], the ICC will find its...legitimacy eviscerated.547  
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In continuing to deny victims the opportunity to express for themselves their own preferences 
in regards to the conflicts they themselves have suffered from, the Court only further fuels 
the perception of its neocolonial, western imposition upon the African continent.  
 Yet, it must be acknowledged that issues may arise if the Court were to go too far in 
adapting itself to victims’ preferences. As Chapter 3 revealed, victim and local perceptions 
regarding peace and justice, particularly among Ugandans, were quite divided. Some wanted 
justice from the ICC, some wanted their own national courts to handle prosecutions, and 
others wanted amnesty or a mixture of amnesty with accountability. Victims and locals also 
diverged regarding their views of how justice, the ICC, and peace interact. Thus, whose 
perceptions do you listen to if you are the ICC deciding which tact to take? Can you elevate 
the concerns of some victims-locals over others in strategizing justice in particular 
circumstances? Such issues again point to the key role that African civil society can play in 
clarifying for the Court, as best they can, what victims largely need and seek from the Court 
in its deliverance of justice.  
 Despite these valid concerns with adapting too much to local perceptions, the Court 
could do much better in considering the peace ramifications of its actions in certain 
situations. Branch asserts that the ICC shouldn’t intervene in ongoing situations but should 
rather wait until stability is reached,548 which suggests that the Prosecutor would be keen to 
use her Article 53(1) power to not investigate Uganda while the situation is ongoing and 
peace concerns remain high. It further hints that perhaps the UNSC should use its Article 16 
power to defer the Bashir case for similar peace concerns that have been heavily voiced by 
critics of the Court’s intervention in Darfur. Because a deferral requires a clear political 
consensus among Council members, however, this solution unfortunately relies upon 
members’ political will and ability to reach agreement.   
 Outside of these changes and the role of the UNSC, the Court could also publicize 
written materials that express its commitment to peace considerations. As Murithi notes, the 
OTP could produce policy papers which discuss a plan for ICC interventions to work in 
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tandem with peace processes and political reconciliation.549 Such an explicit ICC recognition 
of peace concerns and clear commitment to considering peace as part of its accountability 
strategy would signal to the international community and Africa at-large that the Court hears 
their concerns and is integrating those considerations into its plan of action.  
Individual Level Solutions: Taking it to the People 
Improve Victim Outreach 
 The previous solutions, as well as the criticisms voiced by victims and locals, make 
clear that the ICC must significantly enhance its efforts to engage with the people on the 
ground in and around these conflicts and pursue more substantial and significant victim 
outreach programs. Outreach programs enhance local knowledge of the Court’s process and 
legal limits, while they also expand victim and local access to the Court. Once again, 
members recognize that this is a problem, as they did in 2010 when they acknowledged the 
need to enhance local knowledge of and access to the justice process.550 As was detailed in 
Chapter 3, many Ugandans lack an understanding of the Court’s enforcement mechanisms or 
its ability to pause its proceedings.551 Thus, the Court must do a better job of spreading such 
information to local communities.  
 The Court also needs to improve its Trust Fund resources, as Human Rights Watch 
points out that the Fund is currently only active in two out of nine situations and that victims’ 
rights and involvement in the process has not been what it was envisioned to be.552 One of 
African civil society’s key recommendations was to dedicate as state parties the inclusion of 
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victims’ needs in the justice process.553 Putting more resources in the Trust Fund and toward 
this inclusion goal would enable the Court to better live up to its commitment to the victims.  
Moreover, enhanced outreach will help to minimize victim and local frustrations with 
the Court and particularly those that stem from misunderstandings about the Court’s abilities 
and procedures. Improved outreach will increase knowledge of the Court and the length of 
time that such legal processes can take, which will likely in turn minimize frustrations with 
the sluggishness of the legal system. It will also help the Court better understand the 
priorities of victims and perhaps adapt its strategy to better suit those needs, working 
alongside civil society groups to provide victims and locals with tangible benefits like 
reparations and social healing. This will serve to decrease the physical and metaphorical 
distance between the ICC and the local communities targeted by its justice.  
Chapter 3 pointed out the knowledge-gaps of Africans and the frequent lack of 
understanding of victims’ rights, which the ICC has done a poor job of prioritizing. 
Connected to this lack of knowledge was the suggestion that increased interaction with the 
ICC and its staff led to a better understanding of its work and often more favorable views of 
the Court. Thus, enhanced outreach will also foster better local knowledge of the Court, 
empower victims to pursue their legal rights, and likely create more positive perceptions of 
the Court among them. Though the Court cannot and should not become another 
development institution, it can and should expand access to its processes and utilize African 
civil society in an endeavor to engage with locals on the ground.  
Better Understand Local Contexts 
 Yet another place for improvement is one that has already been evoked in the 
previous reform discussions: the need for the Court to develop a deeper, more-grounded 
understanding of the local contexts of the situations it is investigating. As Jane Stromseth 
argues, “understanding the local terrain deeply and fully is crucial to any strategy for 
achieving justice on the ground.”554 Matthew Saul and James Sweeney similarly argue that 
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international law should be tailored to the particular local contexts presented by certain 
situations.555 Thus, the ICC, as the preeminent international adjudicative institution with the 
goal of providing justice for the gravest international crimes, must work to develop more 
comprehensive knowledge of the facts on the ground if it wants to fulfill its goal. 
 Developing such a deeper understanding requires resources to be put toward such 
aims. As Stromseth suggests, the Court should designate professional staff members to solely 
commit to understanding local concerns, expectations, and needs. Such a team would consist 
of legal and country experts and anthropologists who would work with civil society and local 
leaders in developing this better understanding. This team would focus upon the countries’ 
domestic judiciaries, its peoples’ opinions and expectations about justice in post-conflict 
situations, ethnic and other group dynamics, leaders’ attitudes toward accountability, and 
attitudes toward truth and reconciliation methods, memorials, and reparations.556 In doing so, 
the Court would take into account the work being done by other international institutions, as 
well as by NGOs and CSOs. By focusing on these contextual elements of particular 
situations, the Court through this team and partnership would develop a more substantive 
knowledge of the conflict itself and the dynamics that may unfold with the Court’s 
involvement. Logically, the Court should pursue such background research during the 
preliminary investigation stage, when the OTP is already gathering information about the 
conflict. 
 Dedicating efforts to developing a deeper understanding of the local situation, and 
particularly building knowledge regarding ethnic conflicts, historical perspectives, and 
justice preferences among the locals, will allow the Court to engage more substantially with 
the local community and thus further improve outreach. In addition, engaging seriously with 
the local contexts will open the Court’s eyes to local perceptions of conflicts and better 
position the Court to engage in more even-handed prosecutions than they might otherwise 
pursue, given a relative ignorance about the dynamics of certain conflicts. While the OTP’s 
ability to prosecute certain alleged perpetrators will again depend in part upon the Court’s 
temporal and evidentiary limitations, better understanding local perspectives on conflicts can, 
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at the very least, highlight for the Court areas of local concern and frustration that either it or 
civil society need to address and mitigate if it is going to get involved in the situation.  
 Even if in the end the Court fails to indict, prosecute, and charge the perpetrators that 
locals believe are most responsible, as the Court is unlikely and unexpected to be able to do, 
its efforts to build an in-depth understanding of the situation through its local interactions 
will help to decrease local sentiments of western indifference to and ignorance of their 
particular situations. Such an endeavor will also further the work of improving local 
knowledge of the Court’s abilities and constraints and, thus, help to lessen frustrations with 
and misconceptions of the Court. Though understanding local contexts will not solve 
everything, the Court should not and cannot continue to operate without the necessary input 
of the victims it is aiming to serve. Without understanding the particular political and social 
contexts that surround the situations it investigates, the Court’s accountability efforts will 
prove inevitably problematic, particularly from the standpoint of Africans on the ground. 
There is Hope Yet 
 Though these policy recommendations for the ICC will by no means solve all of its 
problems with Africa, they nonetheless are a solid foundation for the Court to begin 
rebuilding its relationship with the continent that so fervently supported it in the beginning. 
Admittedly, some recommendations are more viable in the short term, and even in the long 
term, than others. Societal level prescriptions, such as the proposal to expand the ICC’s 
geographical investigative scope and the proposal to expand UNSC membership, face serious 
political and procedural obstacles that make actual implementation unlikely in the near future 
and decision-making after implementation potentially cumbersome. Firmly asserting its 
authority to prosecute sitting head of states, however, is a societal level strategy that the ICC 
can and must pursue.  
Fortunately, the ICC has several state and individual level strategies that it can 
undertake in its effort to be a more effective institution. Committing to complementarity and 
fostering domestic capacity building are two state level pursuits that the Court can and 
already has begun to seek in an effort to strengthen rule of law domestically. Utilizing 
African civil society, giving more weight to peace considerations, and improving victim 
outreach and local understanding are related state and individual level solutions that offer the 
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Court a way forward in providing better justice for people on the ground. Thus, the Court 
should focus its efforts, at least in the present and near term, on these much more viable state 
and individual level prescriptions. 
Not only are these solutions more realistic in the short, and even long term, but they 
also aim more directly at the heart of the justice issue. International justice matters because 
real people are harmed by atrocities which seriously destabilize, and sometimes even take, 
their lives. Whether impacted directly as a victim or indirectly as a local within the context of 
a conflict, the people on the ground of these ICC investigations deserve justice that they feel 
is justice. Justice must thus be pursued with the victims and their needs as the priority in 
mind.  
To serve the victims and locals, the Court must take measures to ensure that the 
countries within which they live respect the rule of law and the principles enshrined within 
the Rome Statute. Thus, strategies to combat the criticisms of African leaders must be 
addressed, so as to regain and retain African state support for a Court that will ideally 
provide justice for its people. Getting the states on board, however, must go hand-in-hand 
with efforts to directly engage the victims and locals. In doing so, the Court will not only 
better understand the situations it goes into and offer more substantive justice to the people, 
but it will also enhance its own legitimacy in their eyes. Such legitimacy in the eyes of 
African people will go a long way in building support from the ground up for the Court’s 
work and will thus provide the Court with a solid foundation upon which to pursue justice. 
By focusing on the state and individual levels and addressing the three main criticisms of and 
subdivisions within selective justice, judicial disconnect from the local communities, and the 
Court’s effect on peace, these reforms push the Court along on its way to bringing Africa 
back into its fold. This endeavor is crucial, as the Court simply cannot afford to lose the 
support of a bloc that was so key to its successful establishment.  
Nor can the Court afford to let these major concerns go unaddressed, even if such 
concerns didn’t amount to the potential mass-withdrawal of an entire continent from ICC 
membership. As history and this analysis have shown, these concerns are deep, long-
standing, and not limited to Africa. Thus, pursuing such reforms now will not only help the 
ICC’s relationship with Africa, but it will also help the Court in the future as it pursues new 
investigations. The African backlash against the Court may be the springboard for these 
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reforms, but the ultimate effect could be an ICC that is more effective, credible, and viable in 
the long-run and on the global stage. Such an enterprise is well worth pursing for the sake of 
international justice and the people it serves. 
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